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Abstract
This dissertation examines the political, cultural, and economic history of the Chiapan
borderlands from its political incorporation into the post-independence Mexican state in 1821
until the arrival of Guatemalan refugees in the 1980’s. This history is explored through the
directives, interactions, and policies of officials from Mexico City as the borderlands drifted in
and out of the orbit of the priorities of the changing governments of independent Mexico.
A large part of the dissertation examines how the post-revolutionary Mexican state rediscovered and conceptualized the borderlands as a both a threat to national security and a
potential site of energy derived from its natural resources, especially the Usumacinta and
Grijalva rivers. Utilizing national archives the narrative traces how the growing federal
bureaucracy sought to control the borderlands through demographic commissions, increased
border patrols, and finally the many arms of national security apparatus. Meanwhile, Mexican
diplomats and engineers viewing the history of their interactions with the United States through
optimistic lenses, sought to engage their traditional rival of Guatemala in transboundary
cooperation. For decades Mexican officials presented plans for shared demarcation and
management of borderland rivers to their Guatemalan counterparts, a necessary step for Mexican
engineers to build planned massive hydroelectric dams on rivers that began south of the
boundary line. Finally, the dissertation examines the reaction by key departments of the
Mexican state, such as the military, to the arrival of thousands of Guatemalan refugees fleeing
the brutal counterinsurgeny of the 1980’s. As Mexican officials sought to close the border, the
influential Dioceses of San Cristobal de las Casas, led by Bishop Samuel Ruiznon-government
institutions in the absence of moral state power.
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Introduction:
Glimpses of the Chiapan Borderlands
Mexico’s southern border stretches for seven hundred miles from the Pacific Ocean to the
Atlantic; the Chiapan borderlands comprise four hundred of those miles. Most of the border, like
its northern counterpart, is defined by water. The Suchiate river plays the role of the Rio Grande,
the Usumacinta and Grijalva rivers those of the Colorado and Tijuana. Starting from the Pacific,
and going against the current, the Suchiate runs east past the Chiapan borderland’s most
populous region, Soconusco. It passes by refurbished German coffee plantations now part of
heritage tours and carries the brisk illegal exchange of people and goods back and forth between
Guatemala and Mexico on pieced-together homemade lanchas that threaten to disintegrate into
the water. The Suchiate then heads northeast, moving under recently completed bridges
connecting towns with dueling nationalistic names, such as Tecún Umán, Guatemala and Ciudad
Hidalgo, Mexico. The Suchiate then rises into the Sierra Madre of Chiapas. There the Tacaná
Volcano, the source of the Suchiate, marks the northern end of an active range of peaks
stretching south into Guatemala. As the border continues east, the high peaks of the Sierra
Madre descend into the cattle-grazing plains of the region known as La Mesilla; the markets of
the main urban center, the city of Comitán, attract Guatemalan and Mexican traders.1 The plains
stop at the Lacandon Jungle. For years the jungle remained a blank spot on the map, home to
countless plants and animals, Mayan temples, and the decayed remnants of the hastily built
structures of the nineteenth-century loggers and chicleros who braved its isolation in the pursuit
of riches.

1

In 1915 the city changed its name to Comitán de Domínguez to honor its native son, the revolutionary
martyr Belisario Domínguez. Elected to the Senate in 1912, his public speeches denouncing President Victoriano
Huerta caused his death at the hands of Huerta henchmen, on October 13, 1913. The text reflects the common usage
in the region and refers to the city simply as Comitán.

1

Figure 1“Mapas geográficos.” Gobierno del Estado de Chiapas, Accessed March 19, 2015
http://www.chiapas.gob.mx/mapas/#territoriales

These Chiapan borderlands are relatively new. Guatemala only officially conceded that
Chiapas was part of Mexico in 1882, and the outlines of the political boundary were only agreed
upon in 1895. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, in comparison to the rest of the
country, the Chiapan borderlands have remained sparsely populated. In 1910, on the eve of the
revolution, in a nation of around fifteen million, approximately 80,000 people called the
municipalities of the Chiapan borderlands home. The entire state of Chiapas could only claim

2

440,000.2 That pivotal event in Mexican history, the revolution, according to both academic and
popular thought, never arrived in Chiapas. Or at least, if it did arrive, according to this
viewpoint, then the counter-revolutionaries put it down.3
In 1948 the Pan-American Highway, which stretched across Mexico from the northern
border city of Ciudad Juárez to the southern town straddling the Guatemalan border, Ciudad
Cuauhtémoc, finally was completed. In the borderland city of Comitán, only a few dozen miles
from the end of the line, a dirt road was replaced with pavement, connecting it with the rest of
the country. An abundance of new cars, new fashions, and new people arrived. The men in town
multiplied, as salesmen and travelers from the north passed through looking for female
companionship, disrupting the traditional rituals of courtship. The 1950 Pan-American Race
brought the world to the city of Comitán, as racers from around the globe made their way to the
borderlands. Without electricity during the day, and therefore unable to know from the radio
who was winning, families from the borderland city camped out along the road all day, waiting
to catch a glimpse of the international group of drivers.4
Jorge Carrillo Olea, the longtime Mexican government insider, related an anecdote to me
regarding his brief stint in 1976 as the Undersecretary of the Treasury. New to the job, he
embarked on a tour to the north and the south to analyze the trading zones Mexico shared with
the U.S. and Guatemala. Upon reporting back to President Echeverría — with whom he shared a
close relationship — Carrillo told him, “You know we have two borders.”5 Along the U.S.-

Manuel Angel Castillo, Mónica Toussaint Ribot, and Mario Vázquez Olivera, Espacios diversos, historia
en común: México, Guatemala y Belice, la construcción de una frontera (México: Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores, 2006), 28-29.
3
Juan Pedro Viqueira, “Los Peligros del Chiapas Imaginario,” Letras Libres 1 (1999): 24.
4
Caroney de Zebadúda María Antonia, “Aquella carrera panamericana,” in Diez Ramas de un Árbol
(Comitán de Domínguez, Consejo Municipal de la Crónica, 2012), 129-134.
5
Jorge Carrillo Olea, interview with author October 2, 2012, Cuernavaca, México.
2
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Mexico border he surveyed the bustling trade of the burgeoning maquilas. In the zonas libres
connecting sister cities like Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso, he saw the constant
stream of trucks carrying goods back and forth. In the Chiapan borderlands he watched with the
border guards the home-made lanchas cross.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for many Mexicans in the center of the
country the Chiapan borderlands were at best a series of brief exotic vignettes, a region
disconnected from the national narrative and the imagined community of Hidalgo and Villa.6
The dense landscape and the indigenous people of the Lacandon Jungle anchored the romantic
and derogatory image of backwardness connected to a pre-Hispanic past. In the twentieth
century the region became an opportunity for intrepid adventurers to travel back in time by
interacting with the region’s indigenous people. For example, in 1961 the Sonoran journalist
Tito Gallegos S. traveled into the bush to meet with, “the chiefs of the jungle: the Lacandones,
direct descendants of the Mayas, a race that still enjoys universal acclaim for its knowledge and
its refined artistic spirit reached in its greatest epic.” Gallegos described their curious accents,
their short stature, and the jungle overgrowth that seemed limitless.7 In 1970, when Comitán
native Jose Gustavo Trujillo left to study architecture at the National Autonomous University of
Mexico, he remembers his chilango classmates asking him if he lived with monkeys back home.8
For many political observers and the average Mexican, the rise of the Zapatista Army of
National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberacióenousn Nacional) in 1994, brought Chiapas
out of its historic isolation, thrusting the state into the national and world spotlights. After the
revolt a cartoonist depicted President Carlos Salinas de Gortari exclaiming, “Damn! We forgot

For the concept of imagined communities, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
7
Tito Gallegos S., “En La Legendaria Selva Lacandon,” La Voz del Sureste, April 29, 1961.
8
Jose Gustavo Trujillo, interview with author December 5, 2012, Comitán de Domínguez, México.
6
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that Chiapas is also part of Mexico!”9 The communiques from Subcomandante Marcos in the
Lacandon Jungle seemed to reinforce this narrative as he highlighted the immense poverty in the
state:

Education? The worst in the country. At the elementary school level, 72 out of every 100 children
don't finish the first grade. More than half of the schools only offer up to a third-grade education
and half of the schools only have one teacher for all the courses offered….Industry? Look, 40%
of Chiapas's "industry" consists of Nixtamal mills, tortillas, and wood furniture mills…..Fiftyfour percent of the population of Chiapas suffer from malnutrition, and in the highlands and forest
this percentage increases to 80 percent. A campesino's average diet consists of coffee, corn,
tortillas, and beans.”10

It is impossible to talk about the Chiapan borderlands without mentioning its role in the
world’s first major post-Cold War political revolt. However, this dissertation is not interested in
connecting the history of Chiapas to what academics, and sympathizers, tend to depict as an
inevitable reaction by the region’s indigenous people to the new world economic and political
order symbolized by the North American Free Trade Agreement.11 Instead, one of the questions
guiding this dissertation, not often asked by historians of the region, is whether Mexico really
did forget about the borderlands (and if so, why). This dissertation complicates the question and
the answer by exploring the interactions between the borderlands and the central Mexican

Jorge Volpi Escalante, La guerra y las palabras: una historia intelectual de 1994 (México: Ediciones Era,
2004), 21-22.
10
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, Zapatistas!: Documents of the New Mexican Revolution:
December 31, 1993-June 12, 1994 (New York: Autonomedia, 1994), 23.
11
See for example Tom Hayden, The Zapatista Reader (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books,
2002). With contributions by such luminaries as Gabriel García Márquez, José Saramago, Homero Aridjis, and
Elena Poniatowska, the Zapatista Rebellion gave a post-Cold War Left a new cause, globalization, to rally against,
and a new hero, Marcos, to replace Che Guevara and Fidel Castro.
9
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government. The policies enacted by the state neither entirely ignored nor abandoned the
borderlands, but rather reflected an understanding of the borderlands as foreign, a door to Central
American political disorder and, finally, a source of great natural resources for the Mexican
nation.
This dissertation takes a broad view of the history of the borderlands beginning in 1821
with Mexican independence and the decades-long struggle to incorporate Chiapas into the new
state and continuing through the Guatemalan Refugee Crisis of the 1980’s. By spanning nearly
two centuries, it can better examine issues such as historical memory as well as the changes in
the region during the whole of the 20th century with the introduction of the modern Mexican
state. This breadth also allows me to contextualize the state of Chiapas in its entirety as a
borderlands region: for much of the nineteenth century the defining political, cultural, and
economic aspect of the region was its contested border with Guatemala. This perception, I
argue, defined Chiapas as a borderlands state well into the twentieth century, with meaningful
implications for the region. Although much of the dissertation focuses on areas close to the
political border, the state as was often understood in popular thought as a region more
Guatemalan than Mexican. Much as the historiography of the U.S.-Mexico border has expanded
the conceptualization of borderlands past the narrow region that straddles the political boundaries
of neighboring nations, I will examine the greater borderlands area of Chiapas.
The viewpoint of this dissertation is from the center. In large part this reflects the
archival material consulted in Mexico City. From the Archivo General de la Nación I utilize the
memos, regional evaluations, and the reports of agents and soldiers in the field from the
Secretariat of Defense, the Federal Security Directorate and the General Directorate of Political
and Social Investigation to study the concerns of the officials of the Mexican national security

6

apparatus. The Presidential Archives located at the AGN, ranging from that of Lázaro Cárdenas
(1934-1940) to that of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), provide a key insight into the initiatives
and viewpoints emanating from Los Pinos, while the dialogue between federal and state officials
at the border and in Mexico City reveals the development of policy and the impressions of the
border of those close to power. Finally, at the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, the archives of
the International Boundary and Water Commission between Mexico and Guatemala are valuable
in documenting the work of the engineers, surveyors, and bureaucratic officials working on the
border itself.
Considering the region’s history from the center allows me to explore issues not
previously studied, such as national security and infrastructure development. Historians of
Mexico have cautioned us to avoid the reification of the Mexican state, noting that “the state is
not a thing.”12 The increasing presence of the state, however, and especially of powerful
bureaus such as the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources, was critical in the Chiapan borderlands.
State actions seemed even more powerful in the post-revolutionary years because for a large part
of its history, from 1821 to the end of the nineteenth century, the Mexican state was largely
absent from the borderlands, as its sovereignty was contested by Guatemalans that cited
historical, colonial claims. Thus, an important and understudied aspect of the history of the
borderlands is the introduction of the policies and representatives of the state and their
interactions with the region. But it is true that the state was not a monolith. Rather, it was
composed of officials, soldiers, and national security agents sent to enact policy, create
commissions, and guard against foreign — that is, Guatemalan — incursions. This dissertation
examines the impact of the state though the actions of such figures. Using censuses,

Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugents, eds. Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the
Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).
12
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demarcations, border-patrol checkpoints, and hydrometric surveys, they sought to control,
exploit, and incorporate the borderlands into Mexico.
A large part of the history of this incorporation is how Mexican officials came to
understand the southern border and their relationship with Guatemala through the lens of their
experiences on the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexican diplomats chose to interpret and promote their
interactions with the United States as positive, especially regarding transnational management of
the border. They ignored clear examples of the United States rejecting cooperation, such as U.S.
refusal to abide by a 1911 international arbiter’s decision to return the bulk of the Chamizal to
Mexico. In that instance, a Canadian mediator decided against the United States’ argument that
the shifting of the Rio Grande also moved the political border, and in the case of the Chamizal,
legally added land to the United States.13 Mexican diplomats ignored this instance of bullying by
their northern neighbor and instead emphasized agreements leading to joint energy and irrigation
projects. The 1944 Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande, in particular, became key to this interpretation, its impact measured in the
building of bi-national dams and the watering of millions of acres of desert. With examples of
cooperation like this fresh in mind, Mexico often sought to emulate the bi-national framework of
the northern border, a situation with which their Guatemalan counterparts had no experience, in
the Chiapan borderlands.
Finally, a key, and often overlooked, element of the Mexican state’s policies towards the
borderlands was the control and monitoring of the transnational movement of Guatemalans by
the modern Mexican security apparatus. Guatemalan laborers, exiles, and those borderlanders
who routinely lived and worked on both sides of the political boundary worried Mexico City

13

Jeffrey M. Schulze, "The Chamizal Blues: El Paso, the Wayward River, and the Peoples in Between,”
Western Historical Quarterly 3 (2012): 301-324.
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officials and politicians. They feared that exiles could promote political discontent in Mexico
and erode already tense relations with Guatemala by utilizing the borderlands as a staging ground
for revolution.
This dissertation examines these multifaceted interactions by conceptualizing the
Chiapan borderlands as a fugitive landscape. I borrow the concept from historians Raymond B.
Craib and Samuel Truett. Truett utilizes the concept of “fugitive landscape” to describe a mostly
“wild frontier” in the borderlands of Arizona and Sonora, rich with copper and other economic
promise. He focuses on how the capitalist dreams of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
U.S. entrepreneurs met loud and costly deaths from labor revolts, a formidable geography of
mountains and desert and, finally, political strife.14 Craib focuses on the nation-building
significance of the work of surveyors deployed by the nineteenth-century federal Mexican
government. Much like Matthew Edney’s work on colonial India, Craib examines the close
relationship between cartography, spatial knowledge, and state power.15 Unlike those of Truett,
Craib’s fugitive landscapes were not borderlands, but the increasingly intersecting communities
of Veracruz. He explores how bureaucrats who were employed in surveying had to satisfy
conflicting claims by communities disputing scarce land and other resources. The territory and
people in Craib’s study lay outside the state’s ability to codify and control -- especially in terms
of the government maps that, symbolically and practically, signified the political and economic
integration of the region into the Mexican state.16

Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New
Haven: Yale University Press: 2006).
15
Matthew H Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Edney borrows Michel Foucault’s interpretation of the panopticon to
describe the spatial power of state mapping.
16
Raymond B. Craib, Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).
14
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Truett and Craib’s fugitive landscapes are important as conceptual paradigms in
approaching the Chiapan borderlands. A helpful theoretical context for how Mexico City sees
such borderlands is James Scott’s Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed. Although Scott’s explorations of the societal and political
conditions motivating such state-sponsored disasters as China’s Great Leap Forward do not fit
exactly with the events covered in this dissertation, his points are highly relevant regarding the
state’s desire and willingness to control landscapes and communities. The Mexican
government’s plans for the borderlands invoked larger national goals that, to borrow from Scott,
only a state could see, such as national security, energy development, and sovereignty, all of
which would demand a degree of control of a fugitive landscape.17
But while a landscape might seem fugitive from the perspective of state security officials,
or even surveyors, it is important to note that for many borderlanders there was nothing
particularly fugitive about their home. This proved true especially for those borderlanders who
simply gave little thought to Mexico’s federal government or a political boundary never
recognized on the ground. Those that avoided the encroaching presence of the state, such as
smugglers, were simply continuing a practice that existed long before the arrival of the newly
established border patrol in the 1920’s. However, just as often as borderlanders deliberately or
inadvertently ignored the state, the dialogue between the Chiapan borderlands and the center
exposed an anxiousness for the state’s attention in the form of funding for infrastructure and
communication with the interior of Mexico. Throughout much of the period examined in this
dissertation, many Chiapanecos lamented the state of the borderlands, which often seemed more
forgotten than fugitive.

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
17
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Historiography

Until very recently the same, slightly paraphrased, question posed by Carrillo to President
Echeverría could have been posed to U.S. and Mexican historians of the Chiapan borderlands:
“you know, Mexico has two borders.”
The works of Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo and Catherine Nolan-Ferrell are among
the few to focus on and adopt a borderlands approach to the Chiapan borderlands. Both
historians examine migrating indigenous Guatemalan workers attracted to Chiapas, and in
particular the region of Soconusco, by employment opportunities in its booming coffee fields.
Nolan-Ferrell analyzes late nineteenth and early twentieth century Soconusco, populated by a
transient workforce and racist, mostly German, planters who promoted a eugenics infused notion
of progress. Nolan-Ferrell argues that Soconusco failed to form a Mexican national identity,
remaining a coffee island on the edge of the country. Hernández Castillo analyzes the Mayan
Mam who first came to Chiapas from Guatemala during the early part of the twentieth century.
She analyzes government efforts, underlined by an indigenista ideology, during the postrevolutionary period, to suppress Mam cultural practices identified as foreign, while also tying
Mam communities to the state through the National Indigenist Institute.18
There is a greater number of works focusing on the political and economic formation of
Chiapas from the sixteenth century Spanish entrada to the early twentieth century. As in the
works of the noted historian of Chiapas, Jan de Vos, they incorporate the frontier as a gateway,
noting the cultural and economic influences and similarities shared by both Guatemalan and

Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo, Histories and Stories from Chiapas: Border Identities in Southern
Mexico, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001); Catherine Nolan-Ferrell, Constructing Citizenship:
Transnational Workers and Revolution on the Mexico-Guatemala Border, 1880-1950 (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 2012).
18
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Mexican indigenous groups, though avoiding extensive discussion of the interaction of Mexicans
with the historical actors beyond the political boundary, which is a key component of
borderlands scholarship.19 Two comprehensive edited volumes, the first in 1985 and the second
in 2006, seek to fill in the gaps in Mexican historiography, highlighting Mexican aggression
during post-Independence territorial squabbles with Central America, and the powerful role of
transnational corporations in shaping political boundaries.20 Monographs by Jennifer P.
Mathews and Gillian P. Schultz, and Mario Eduardo Valdez Gordillo, along with a few articles,
have concentrated on the process and role of chicle extraction in the jungles of the southern
border in attracting investment, workers from across Mexico and Central America, and political
pressure from North American corporations.21
Especially helpful have been those works that examine the history of twentieth century
politics in Chiapas by studying the often byzantine and violent histories of politicians, finqueros,
labor organizers, and revolutionaries. Thomas Benjamin’s detailed examination of the political
and economic machinations of Chiapan elites during the twentieth century reveals the cauldron
of social unrest and economic inequality that simmered beneath the surface. Benjamin’s work
has become a touchstone in the historiography by describing how local forces, often in league

For representative example of his work see Jan de Vos, Oro verde: la conquista de la Selva Lacandoña
por los madereros tabasqueños; 1822 – 1949 (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988); Jan de Vos, Vivir en
frontera: la experiencia de los indios de Chiapas (Tlalpan: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en
Antropología Social, 1997).
20
Mariano Baez et al., La formacion historica de la frontera sur (México: Centro de Investigaciones y
Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1985); Manuel Angel Castillo, Mónica Toussaint Ribot, and Mario
Vázquez Olivera, Espacios diversos, historia en común: México, Guatemala y Belice: la construcción de una
frontera (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2006).
21
Jennifer P Mathews and Gillian P. Schultz, Chicle: the Chewing Gum of the Americas, from the Ancient
Maya to William Wrigley (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009); Mario Eduardo Valdez Gordillo,
Desencuentro y encuentro de fronteras: El Petén guatemalteco y el sureste mexicano, 1895-1949 (Tuxtla Gutiérrez:
Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas, 2006); Oscar A. Forero and Michael Redclift, "The Role of the
Mexican State in the Development of Chicle Extraction in Yucatán, and the Continuing Importance of Coyotaje,"
Journal of Latin American Studies 38 (2006), 65-93.
19
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with national allies, violently resisted any efforts by Chiapanecos to claim the revolution’s
promise of agricultural, labor, and political reform. The state’s resources, the rich land with its
cattle and coffee, became closed off to those not connected to the levers of power.22 Stephen E.
Lewis’s examination of the impact of Cárdenas-era education policy has been especially helpful
in revealing the difficulties the state experienced in implementing its policy initiatives in
Chiapas. The Cárdenas regime became the first post-revolutionary government intent on
extending its reach into the borderlands. The local elite’s resistance to the socialist federal
schools revealed the difficulties the federal government had in promoting its cultural,
educational, and economic programs in the distant state.23
Andrés Aubry’s study Chiapas a contrapelo: Una agenda de trabajo para su historia en
perspectiva sistémica (2005), has helped me conceptualize the periodization of Chiapan history
and the region’s situation in world, national, and regional history. Aubry characterizes the latter
half of the twentieth century as “la política del crímen,” when the Mexican state violently
repressed resistance to the post-revolutionary order, and “la mutación de Chiapas,” when the
exploitation of the valuable natural resources of the region caused further political, economic,
and ecological misery.24
Especially illuminating in helping me think about issues of resistance have been those
works examining the burgeoning social movements, starting in the 1970’s, among the indigenous
communities. In particular Neil Harvey’s The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and
Democracy (1998) has served as great resource in charting the development and struggles of the

Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, a Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas (Albuquerque:
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number of local and statewide organizations that advocated for political and economic rights.25
Related works examining the political and social impact of the Diocese of San Cristóbal led by
Bishop Samuel Ruiz García have helped me in understanding the practical and theological
evolution of the church. Considering the important role the church played upon arrival of
thousands of Guatemalan refugees, Jean Meyer’s, Samuel Ruiz en San Cristóbal 1960 - 2000
(2000) has been invaluable in explaining intellectual influences and on the ground pastoral
experiences that shaped the church’s eventual approach to the refugees.26
After the flood of refugees into Chiapas in the early 1980s, social scientists conducting
fieldwork and working with NGOs such as Americas Watch have focused on the impact and
treatment of the Guatemalan refugees by national and local Mexican governments.27 A few of
the key works include Beatriz Manz’s Refugees of a Hidden War: The Aftermath of
Counterinsurgency in Guatemala (1988), the edited volume, La experiencia de refugio en
Chiapas: nuevas relaciones en la frontera sur mexicana (1993), and the recent collection, Flujos
migratorios en la frontera Guatemala-México (2009). Guadalupe Rodríguez de Ita’s book La
política mexicana de asilo diplomático a la luz del caso Guatemalteco, 1944-1954 (2003),
explores older policies toward exiles: the Mexican government’s policy towards Guatemalan
politicians, labor leaders, and others connected to the October Revolutionary government who
were forced to flee Guatemala after the military coup of 1954.28
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The historiography of refugees and exile is often connected to national security issues,
but very few historians have focused on the development and workings of the modern Mexican
security state. A notable exception is historian Sergio Aguayo. His many works on the people
and policies motivating powerful government bureaucracies such as the Federal Security
Directorate have brought the study of national security out of the realm of journalistic exposes
and into academic discourse. Though much of the history of institutions such as the DFS is filled
with examples of corruption and human rights abuses, Aguayo aptly argues for the need of
historians to examine the logic, fears, and paranoia that guided the national security apparatus of
twentieth century Mexico.29
Many national security concerns were prompted by the political upheaval of Guatemala
during the twentieth century. Studies by both Jim Handy and Piero Gleijeses focusing on the
tumultuous decade of 1944-1954 place that country’s social, political, and economic history in
an international context. Appearing in their works are the political exiles who, depending on
what side they found themselves on, called Mexico home briefly or for the rest of their lives.
Understanding their role during the October Revolution has helped me contextualize Mexico’s
national security apparatus’s response to those seeking safety in the borderlands and Mexico
City.30 Nick Cullather’s Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in
Guatemala, 1952-1954 (2006) also features many of the Guatemalan exiles who fled to Mexico.
Cullather’s detailed examination of the United States role in the 1954 coup informs the cautious
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approach Mexico took on the diplomatic stage in publicly supporting the Árbenz Regime as it
unsuccessfully sought allies in its final moments.31 Finally, Susanne Jonas’s The Battle for
Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power (1991) examines the economic, political, and
social history following the 1954 coup. She describes the complex history of military controlled
governments connected to large landowning elites violently suppressing efforts at reform, and
later revolution, by the largely indigenous population. Jonas’s work explains not only the
history behind the violent counterinsurgency of the late 1970’s early 1980’s, but also motives for
Mexican elites to worry over the similarities between the conditions of social unrest in
Guatemala and the Chiapan borderlands. 32
Finally, the dissertation owes an intellectual debt to the expansive historiography on the
U.S.-Mexico Border. Foundational studies such as David Weber’s, The Mexican Frontier, 18211846: The American Southwest Under Mexico (1982) and Foreigners in their Native Land:
Historical Roots of the Mexican-Americans (1972), have provided a conceptual model and
reminder to situate the Chiapan borderlands both in and outside of the narrative of the nation
state.33 Kelly Lytle-Hernandez’s study of the United States border patrol serves as an instructive
model in describing national and local efforts to harden a border. Her detailed examination of
policy and those called to enforce the policy have been helpful in understanding the development
of efforts at border enforcement in the Chiapan borderlands.34 Finally, though not a borderlands
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work, Fredrich Katz’s Secret War in Mexico, which conceptualizes of the closing of Mexico’s
northern frontier during the Porfiriato through the introduction of large scale capital and
development of infrastructure, prompted a similar question regarding if, and when, the Chiapan
borderlands lost its porous nature.35
This dissertation adds to this diverse historiography through its exploration of the
relationship between the center and the borderlands through its examination of previously
unstudied federal bureaus such as the International Boundary and Water Commission between
Guatemala and Mexico and the Demographic Commission of 1935. Through the study of the
motivations of the politicians who formed and directed these fragments of the state, as well as
the officials who carried out their mandates, this dissertation studies the effort by the center to
integrate the Chiapan borderlands into the nation through control of the movement of people
across the border and exploitation of the region’s resources.
This dissertation brings both Katz’s and Truett’s conceptualizations of the borderlands
south. Drawing on Katz, I ask if the introduction of capital and efforts by the center at political
integration truly hardened the southern frontier into a border, bringing the region under the
control of the center. For Truett, capital alone could not control a fugitive landscape. His
borderlands were outside of the gaze of national history, its people beyond state control, its
political boundaries ignored or willfully avoided. I answer that the Chiapan borderlands retained
aspects of a fugitive landscape much as Truett described well into the twentieth century as the
arrival of the Guatemalan revolutionaries and refugees demonstrated that despite the large-scale
infrastructure projects of the sixties and seventies, and the increasing presence of national
security officials, control of the region was at times illusory. Precise survey maps and mega-
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dams managed by the engineers of newly created government bureaus did not mean a
government presence in areas like the Lacandon. Finally, the proximity of a genocidal civil war
in Guatemala meant any hardening of the border, giving the line on the map real significance on
the ground, only made it more attractive for Guatemalans seeking safety by crossing it, bringing
with them a conflict the Mexican government wanted no part of, but ultimately could not avoid.

Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter one, “A Stateless Land: 1821-1882,” places the Chiapan borderlands within the
larger history of nineteenth century Latin American boundary disputes. Following
independence, Guatemala and Mexico, like many newly formed states in the region, struggled to
manage the transition from preexisting colonial jurisdictions to modern political boundaries.
This chapter examines the diplomatic and often violent struggle over Chiapas between state and
non-state actors representing Mexico and Guatemala, and the impact of press accounts
reinforcing among the larger Mexican public the image of a lawless borderlands. The latter half
of the chapter highlights the history of Matias Romero’s struggles in the borderlands. In the
1870’s the former ambassador to the United States attempted to become a Soconuscan coffee
farmer, buying land he believed pertained to Mexico due to the suggestion of Guatemalan
strongman and fellow finquero Justo Rufino Barrios. Upon a disagreement with him -- Barrios
later claimed Romero took Guatemalan land -- the former diplomat fled the borderlands in fear
of his life, his failure a potent symbol of the stateless nature of the borderlands. Romero’s
subsequent determination to forge a boundary treaty and his boosterism of the borderlands were
the start of a century long effort by the Mexican state to promote the natural resources of the
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region. Finally, his history promoting Chiapas’s integration as a state into Mexico represents the
foundation of the historical narrative of Chiapanecos choosing to be part of the Mexican state.
Chapter two,”The State Approaches: Logging, Revolution, and the Demographic
Commission: 1882-1956” picks up from the signing of the 1882 Treaty of Limits. This chapter
examines the contentious binational demarcation of the border, the sale of large tracts of the
Lacandon to foreign logging companies during the Porfiriato, the muted impact of the revolution
in Chiapas, and the establishment of the 1935 Demographic Commission. The chapter’s
examination of these pivotal events in the borderlands reflects the history and nature of the
changing federal government. From the laissez-faire auction of natural resources during the
Porfiriato to the xenophobic policies of the post-revolutionary government, the political priorities
of the federal government found their extreme expression in the borderlands. The Demographic
Commission is a crucial part of this chapter. Its composition represented part of the Cárdenas
regime’s attempt to establish a federal government presence in the region. Plagued by
corruption, discontent of federal officials assigned to what was considered a hardship post, and
the porous nature of the border, its ultimate failure symbolized the difficulties encountered by the
state in its efforts to harden the political boundary.
Chapter three, “Engineers Come to Chiapas,” pivots on post-revolutionary Mexico’s
diplomatic approach to Guatemala, as concerns the shared management of resources in the
borderlands through replication of the International Boundary and Water Commission between
Mexico and the United States. For decades, until finally securing the establishment of the
Mexican-Guatemalan Commission in 1961, Mexican diplomats stubbornly attempted to
convince their longtime rivals of the value of cooperation, especially as concerned the region’s
rivers. A shifting Suchiate potentially meant a change in the border and even a loss of land,
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similar to what occurred with the Chamizal along the Rio Grande. In addition, the sources of the
powerful Usumacinta and Grijalva rivers were located in Guatemala, and any interference
upriver would disrupt Mexico’s planned mega-hydroelectric projects of the 1960’s and 1970’s.
Securing cooperation became a key part of Mexico’s efforts to harness the resources of the
borderlands to provide power for the growing economy of the nation.
Chapter four, “Exiles in the Borderlands: Generals, Intellectuals, and the October
Revolution: 1944-1954,” situates the history of exile in the borderlands within the larger history
of exile in Latin America, exploring the region as a particular site of exile for Guatemalans since
independence. Guatemalan adventurers, politicians, and would-be national leaders, such as
Barrios, had retreated to the borderlands to escape persecution, gather resources, and plan
triumphant returns. This chapter focuses in particular on the impact, reaction, and policies of the
Mexican government towards Guatemalans in exile from the 1944 October Revolution until the
dissolution of the October Revolutionary government in 1954. For first time in borderlands
history, a burgeoning Mexican security apparatus attempted to control the activities of
Guatemalan exiles, and in the case of many high profile right wing generals and politicians in
1945, ensure their distance from the border to protect the revolutionary Guatemalan government.
This chapter examines the intersection of Mexican national security concerns in the borderlands
with foreign policy, Cold War politics, and internal political rivalries.
Chapter five, “Students, Guerrillas, and the First Wave of Revolution: 1960-1972,”
continues the examination of the borderlands as a site of exile, focusing on the initial wave of
Guatemalan guerrilla groups, their utilization of the borderlands as a site of operation, and how
during the height of Mexico’s Dirty War (Late 1960’s-1970’s) the borderlands became an
entrance point of insurgency in the national security calculations of the Federal Security
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Directorate and the Mexican military. Mexican national security concerns shifted from how
Guatemalan exiles could affect the politics of their southern neighbor to how they could
contribute to the growing left-wing opposition inside of Mexico.
Chapter six, “Guerrillas, Refugees, and the Church,” examines the borderlands during the
height of the Guatemalan Civil War (Late 1970’s -1980’s) when the larger second wave of the
Guatemalan guerrilla movement, like the insurgent movement of previous years, utilized the
borderlands to escape Guatemalan counter insurgency efforts. It also examines how the Mexican
national security apparatus assessed this development in the context of the growing activism in
the borderlands inspired in part by the Diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas. For that reason the
federal government interpreted the arrival of thousands of refugees -- a different form of exile,
these were people who were forced to participate in the political violence of the time -- as a
threat to political stability. This assessment led to their forced removal from the borderlands, a
violent reaction stemming from security rather humanitarian concerns.
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22

Chapter One: A Stateless Land: 1821-1882

On February 6, 1930, Joaquín Cruz, a Guatemalan Forest Inspector assigned to the
northern Petén to stop the lucrative contraband trade in the region, crossed into Mexican territory
to attack the chicle camp of La Fama with a group of men from the Forest Police and the
Guatemalan Army under his command.36 After destroying the camp--wrecking furniture,
cutting ropes, and overturning supplies of water crucial for the chicleros camping in the middle
of the jungle--the rampaging Guatemalans turned south, leading seventeen captive employees of
La Fama and eighteen mules, while leaving in their wake hundreds of pounds of chicle strewn on
the forest floor. Crossing back into Guatemala, Cruz and his men then assaulted the other nearby
camps, Las Ruinas and Las Fuentes, of Mexican chicle entrepreneur Francisco Buenfil. Finally,
the group of prisoners and their Guatemalan escort arrived at the small town of Ciudad Flores,
Petén, where Cruz locked the hapless employees of La Fama in jail, seemingly unaware he had
just sparked an international dispute between Guatemala and Mexico.37
Though the Guatemalan Forest Inspector eventually released the jailed employees, his
“invasion” of Mexico prompted years of diplomatic arguments between the two neighboring
countries as to what exactly happened and who was at fault: did Cruz defend Guatemala, invade
a sovereign Mexico, or act as some type of border bandit? 38 These questions were ultimately
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not answered, nor was the fundamental one: just where the border between the two “sister
republics” actually lay. It is helpful to examine the La Fama incident of the 1930’s in brief detail
to illustrate how the conflictive political, economic, and cultural integration of the Chiapan
borderlands into the Mexican nation during the 19th century shaped the reality and image of the
border during the twentieth.
Joaquín Cruz’s intrusion had immediate precedents. Just a year before, in May 1929, the
Mexican chiclero Jose Maria Barragán complained to the Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture and
Development--after being rebuffed earlier in the year by a local Guatemalan official--that in
January of that year, upon his absence from his camp of San Pedro, over four hundred kilos of
chicle and some mules were stolen by Guatemalan officials from Ciudad Flores. Arriving at the
camp right after the theft, Barragán rushed across the border to Ciudad Flores only to have to pay
two hundred dollars to the local officials to recover his mules.39 Accepting the loss of chicle
and money, Barragán instead complained that, “the border between our republic and the
neighbor’s has been lost.” He not only sought protection from the Mexican government for
himself and the other chicleros from frequent Guatemalan incursions but demanded something
more profound: that the border drawn on maps become something real on the ground, that it
become significant to both Mexican and Guatemalan borderlanders.40
Barragán’s story lacked the dramatic details of La Fama. In addition, the Mexican
ambassador to Guatemala at the time, Eduardo Hay, explained that the matter could be
dismissed, as he had been informed that arrangements had been made to satisfy Barragán. Hay,
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however, could not escape the border incident of La Fama, nor dismiss it as easily. Making
front-page news as far away as San Francisco and eventually ending up in the 1930 Presidential
Address of Pascual Ortiz Rubio, Cruz’s actions had repercussions far beyond the jungle-covered
border.41
As Hay would soon find during his own investigation, the assault on La Fama
encapsulated the confusion surrounding the stateless Mexican-Guatemalan border that would
persist into the late twentieth century. The La Fama incident had many contributing factors: the
actions of the Mexican chicleros that prompted it, the sudden violence of state actors, and the
general lack of awareness, or at least respect, by both Mexican and Guatemalan borderlanders, of
the border and its concomitant rights for resource extraction. In the constant private
correspondence Hay sent updating the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations on his research
into the events leading to La Fama, he admitted that the 1919 concession to collect chicle granted
to Buenfil by the Mexican Secretary of Agriculture and Development was at least partly to blame
for his incursion into Guatemalan territory. Hay privately acknowledged that the contract
described the camps Las Ruinas and Las Fuentes as if they were in Mexican territory, when, in
fact, Guatemalan Oficials had known for years that the two camps were in Guatemalan territory.
However, as Hay discovered, Buenfil was not some particularly brazen entrepreneur within the
borderland environment. Indeed, in the chicle extraction business, and among those who worked
and lived on the southern border in general, there was little respect for international boundaries,
especially considering the lack of border fencing and the fact that border monuments, where they
existed, were often deeply covered in vegetation. Hay found this out for himself after he hired
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an engineer and local guides to take him to the ruined chicle camps, acknowledging that only
those well versed in the region would have any vague idea where the international border might
be.42
In 1931, the arrival of the antagonistic Jorge Ubico to power in Guatemala put a halt to the
negotiations over Guatemalan payments to Buenfil for the damages to the camp and to the Mexican
chicleros for their imprisonment. Until his ouster in 1944, Ubico remained a predictable adversary
of Mexico. Like many of his compatriots, he resented the unequal balance of power that existed
between the two countries and viewed the Mexican Revolution as a Communist victory and thus
a threat to Guatemala.43 Due to his intransigence, the detailed parsing of lost revenue and the
claims of lost wages by the captured chicleros were lost in the final lump sum payment of $10,000
dollars to the Mexican government in 1934. By then the man who had sparked the incident, Cruz,
had fled to Honduras to escape prosecution.44 Hay’s proposal to have Guatemala send detectives
to return him to justice was ignored, and the assault on La Fama became just another incident,
another “invasion” of Mexico.45
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Post-Independence Borders and the Struggle for Chiapas

Older Mexicans following the drama of La Fama would have felt a sense of déjà vu as
they read the alarmed reactions by Mexican officials towards an incursion by Guatemalans in
distant, but still Mexican, Chiapas. From independence in 1821, until the Treaty of Limits of
1882, when Guatemala formally renounced its claims to Chiapas, Mexico’s southern borderlands
remained in contention at local and international levels. During that period, the national press
frequently reported on the chaotic on the ground violence similar to that experienced by the
hapless chicleros of La Fama. Frequent uncontested incursions by Guatemalan nationals across
a stateless border gave the impression of a region lost to the rest of the nation.
In addition, this period defined the intellectual and popular struggle to identify Chiapas as
part of the Mexican story. The Chiapan borderlands had no natural historical adhesion to the
Mexican state that emerged in 1821. For all of its history organized as a formal colonial
administrative unit, nearly three hundred years stretching from 1528 to independence in 1821,
the province of Chiapas had pertained to the Captaincy General of Guatemala.46 The political,
economic, and cultural implications of this bureaucratic arrangement meant that during the
colonial era Chiapanecos often looked south, to Guatemala City. The province remained largely
isolated, in part due to the imposing geography of the Sierra Madres, the only well maintained
road being the Camino Real along the Pacific Coast, maintained in parts by villages, on which
depended the commercial traffic that wound south from Chiapas into Central America.47
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Guatemalan Officials were responsible for tribute collection from the large indigenous
population, official inspections of the province, as well as the religious administration of the
dioceses.48 Even today, a visitor can see in the architecture of colonial era churches and homes
the cultural affinity of the two regions.49 Though Chiapanecos certainly made connection with
the cities of New Spain, for example in trade with Tabasco, the colonial connections formed
between Chiapas and Guatemala were powerful economic, cultural, and political attachments.
Due to this history connecting Chiapas to its southern neighbors in the colonial era, it had
to be argued into the Mexican nation after independence from Spain. During the 19th century
Mexican writers, especially the politician Matías Romero, shaped the narrative of how exactly
Chiapas belonged into the Mexican nation. His writings were part of a transnational dialogue
with Guatemalan writers, each side arguing for the historical precedents that argued for inclusion
of the region in their respective post-independence nations. The narrative constructed by
Mexican intellectuals focused on two themes and eras: pre-colonial and colonial, and the postindependence era. These writers argued that during the pre-colonial and colonial era, Chiapas
formed a powerful cultural, economic, and political connection to central Mexico. Secondly,
they focused on Chiapas’s 1824 statewide plebiscite, in which it voted to join Mexico. This
event became an accomplishment of popular sovereignty and a celebration of Mexicanness
during an era when the political state of Mexico seemed to be disintegrating both from the inside,
through political turmoil, and from the outside through foreign invasion. This narrative,
combined with the potential riches of areas such as Soconusco, culminated in the Treaty of 1882,
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when the political space of Chiapas became without a doubt Mexican. However, the success of
the historical narrative on the ground remained in doubt well into the twentieth century, as seen
in incidents like La Fama.
In nearly all of Latin America, independence from the Spanish Empire meant a
diplomatic and, at times, military fight over the demarcation of the region’s new borders. Mexico
and Guatemala were no different. Any regional unity that existed in the fight against Spain
proved to be easily torn apart in the territorial confusion following independence, due to the
fractious ambitions of the new independence era. The Mexico and Guatemala border dispute
places the region within this wider history of conflictive Latin American boundaries, some of
which have continued to produce inter-state conflict until the present day.50

.

As the last diplomatic and military victories across the Americas finally dissolved the
centuries long imperial administration of Madrid, regional gatherings, such as the Bolivarian
inspired Congress of Panama of 1826, sought a unified “Hispano America.” 51 However, the
optimism fueling large national projects like Gran Colombia was quickly discouraged as political
rivalries and claims over natural resources sparked regional conflict. Emerging political leaders
rallied followers around new national identities based on the boundaries of former colonial
administrations such as Venezuela or Guatemala.52 By 1848, the idea of a Bolívar-inspired unity
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in Latin America proved unattainable. In consequence, the Lima Conference of that year
coalesced regional consensus behind the legal formulation of uti possidetis to determine
boundary disputes.53
Uti possidetis dated back to Roman legal theory; the concept emerged as method to settle
property disputes. In the case of conflict, usually over land, the property holder retained
possession of the property in question while the legal system determined the legality of each
party’s claim. Possession trumped other considerations, as burden of proof rested on the
accuser.54 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the concept expanded to wartime
conquests. For example, the prominent international legal theorist Hugo Grotius defended the
right of booty taken by ships of the Dutch East India Company. In the midst of an era of
frequent conflict, an increasing number of legal theorists joined Grotius, and in time so did
warring nations, in applying uti possidetis to negotiated peace treaties. Frequently this meant
aggressor nations retained possession of lands and objects gained during an ex-post facto agreed
time of conflict. For example, the 1667 Treaty of Breda between France, England, and the Dutch
allowed the continued possession of land and vessels taken before May 20, but not after. This
concept also served as a useful legal foundation from which to mediate clashes over exploration
and mineral rights. For the emerging states of newly independent Latin America seeking a legal
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framework to fix boundaries, uti possidetis, and through it the inheritance of colonial borders,
seemed to be a solution to halt conflicts over boundaries.55
However, the rhetoric of inheritance of borders espoused by new national leaders ran into
various on the ground challenges, many of which were present in the Chiapan borderlands. The
colonial legacy left uncertain delimitations of national political boundaries as various religious
and secular offices, as well as the reach and subsequent duties owed to such institutions,
produced a confusing landscape of twisting and overlapping boundaries.56 In addition, the
natural boundaries cited in official colonial documents and maps, such as rivers, mountains, and
hills, were often mislabeled or impossible to verify.57 Finally, regional ambition frequently
trumped cooperation as throughout the two continents new nations fought and schemed to shape
advantageous political boundaries.
The imperial dreams of Augustin de Iturbide and the Plan de Iguala were clear examples
of this ambition. Though short-lived, Iturbide’s territorial designs irrevocably shaped the future
claims of Guatemala and Mexico regarding Chiapas. The grandiose plan, which called for a
Mexican Empire stretching from California to the Isthmus of Panama, ignored the preexisting
border between the previous Captaincy General of Guatemala and the Viceroyalty of New Spain.
Though the empire endured no more than a couple of years, it established a lasting foundation
for a tense relationship between militarily dominant Mexico and the weaker Guatemala, akin to
that which developed between the United States and Mexico.
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The Plan de Iguala undermined the script of regional elites forming nations around
former colonial borders. In Chiapas, Iturbide’s ambition presented an opportunity to the elites of
Ciudad Real (present-day San Cristóbal de las Casas) to break away from the dominance of
Guatemala City. They rallied support and attached the region to imperial Mexico for a variety
of reasons: a lingering resentment of the power exercised by Guatemala City officials during the
colonial era; the perception that Mexico represented a much wealthier alternative; and the mutual
appreciation Chiapan elites shared with those of Mexico City of the strategic position of Chiapas.
Both viewed the region as essential to secure in case of foreign invasion, and above all, as a site
for a future transatlantic canal. In addition, Mexico City told coletos (residents of Ciudad Real)
that they would invest Ciudad Real with greater regional power.58 Imperial officials planned to
redraw the administrative provinces of the region. They sought to make Ciudad Real the titular
capital of a new southwestern unit consisting of Tabasco and parts of Guatemala, a plan that
coincided with a similar plan hatched by elite coletos, which they had proposed and had rejected
years before by colonial Spanish authorities. In sum, independence allowed local elites the
ability to negotiate the future political and economic allegiances of the borderlands. In 1822,
Iturbide announced that Chiapas was incorporated forever into the Mexican Empire; soon after
this ambitious pronouncement, however, in 1823, Iturbide and the nascent Mexican Empire
collapsed.59
The disintegration of the empire presented the opportunity for the formation of the United
Provinces of Central America by Central American political elites, who officially adopted the
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colonial boundaries of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, including Chiapas. Composed of
Guatemala, San Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras y Nicaragua, the United Provinces challenged
the political affiliation of Chiapas to the Mexican state. In the meantime, Chiapaneco elites
resisted entreaties from Mexico and the United Provinces — each too weak militarily to simply
possess the region by force at the time — to incorporate the region into their respective nations.
In July 1823 representatives from major Chiapan cities met in Ciudad Real to discuss the issue of
the region’s sovereignty. They produced the Decreto de Bases. It was a declaration of possible
territorial actions revealing the political and economic calculations of Chiapaneco elites and the
weakness of both Mexico and the United Provinces. The Decreto laid out the territorial options
under consideration: union with Mexico, the United Provinces, or a possible new nation
composed of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Yucatán.60 Chiapan elites had decided to weigh
which option best suited them.
In Mexico City, Secretary of Foreign Relations Lucas Alamán directed a campaign to
influence the Chiapanecos to join Mexico. He utilized the country’s nascent legislative body and
national press to both pressure and persuade them that union with Mexico would further their
political and economic interests. In addition, Alamán worked with pro-Mexicanist coletos to
place allies in key municipal bodies wavering between incorporation with Mexico or the United
Provinces, such as in the southeastern border city of Comitán. Alamán’s efforts went relatively
unopposed by the United Provinces due to fighting between rival Liberals and Conservatives for
political power, which sapped their resources and above all, distracted their attention.61
In May of 1824, Alamán and the Mexican Congress increased the pressure on
Chiapanecos by threatening military action: Chiapas had three months to decide regarding their
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incorporation to Mexico, or else a military expedition would settle the issue. Taking advantage
of this bluff, pro-Mexican elites organized a municipal plebiscite regarding territorial integration
into Mexico, each vote weighed according to the population of each city. The structure of the
vote gave the advantage to pro-Mexican bastions such as Ciudad Real and Comitán, assuring the
result of the historic plebiscite before it took place: Chiapas became part of Mexico.62
The United Provinces reacted to Mexico’s addition of Chiapas by announcing the
unilateral incorporation of the state’s coastal region, Soconusco. A narrow strip of land
adjoining Guatemala and sandwiched between the Pacific Coast and the Chiapan highlands,
Soconusco and its principal city, Tapachula, maintained close economic and political relations
with northern Guatemala and the city of Quetzaltenango throughout the precolonial and colonial
eras. As a result, throughout the debate, the intrigue, and finally the plebiscite regarding
incorporation into Mexico, Soconuscans favored adhesion to the United Provinces. They feared
that policies from a distant Mexico City would harm their economic and political interests.
Consequently, when the regional Chiapan government reacted to the United Provinces’
declaration by reaffirming Soconusco as part of Chiapas -- and therefore, Mexico – Officials in
Tapachula responded by declaring their union with the United Provinces. Soon after, a small
contingent of troops from Guatemala arrived to reinforce the break-a-way Soconusco, while
Mexico announced its own military expedition. Much as was occurring in the newly
independent South American states, it seemed regional conflict would erupt in the Chiapan
borderlands over the composition of post-independence borders. However, as Mexican troops
began to arrive in Soconusco, intimidated Guatemalan troops retreated and open conflict was
avoided. As both countries could ill afford a costly conflict, an unlikely truce developed
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between Mexico and the United Provinces. Both renounced the use of force to decide the fate of
Soconusco, though significantly neither renounced its claim of sovereignty over the strip of land
by the Pacific.
The truce did not diminish violence, as non-state actors continued to battle for political
influence in Soconusco. Rival factions of local Mexicanists and Central Americanists battled in
the streets and the countryside for control of key local government seats. Occasionally irregular
bands of Guatemalan troops assisted in these local conflicts, but any similar Mexican forces were
too distant to help. Mexico City residents could read about this violence in newspapers like La
Lima de Vulcan which published a front page article on February 10, 1838, detailing the
“invasion of troops led by the agitator D. José Miguel Gutiérrez,” from Central America, who
caused the “the ruin of Chiapaneco families.”63 Soconusco became a violent, state less region
pulled between Mexico and the United Provinces.64
In Mexico City, diplomats of the frequently rotating governments occasionally sparred
with their counterparts of the United Provinces over Soconusco, though for much of this time
Chiapas remained isolated, cut off from the economic and political currents affecting the rest of
Mexico. The few and difficult roads that existed between Chiapas and the rest of the Mexican
nation only connected major urban areas such as Tuxtla and Ciudad Real located in the center
and northern half of the state. The southern region close to Guatemala had little contact at all
with central Mexico, or even eastern neighbors such as Tabasco, the Lacandon Forest proving to
be a formidable barrier. In addition, due to tensions surrounding the territorial demarcation, the
official trade that had existed with Guatemala dried up as Soconusco and its port city of
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Tapachula remained effectively closed towards Guatemalan merchants. Meanwhile, trade
through the state’s other major border city, Comitán, consisted of mostly contraband aguardiente.
An example of region’s isolation was seen in 1834 when a cholera outbreak in central Chiapas
stayed in the highlands.65
In addition to the state’s isolation, the state and federal governments in Ciudad Real and
Mexico City remained in ignorance as to the extent of the territory and borders claimed by
Chiapas, especially as concerned the vast Lacandon Jungle. The humid, tropical forest covers
over two thousand square miles, broken by mountain peaks rising as high as 4,000 feet and
traversed by the Usumacinta, Perlas, and Lacantún Rivers along with their countless tributaries.66
During the colonial era, in urban mestizo centers such as Ciudad Real and Comitán, the area and
the indigenous people that lived within it obtained an almost mystically fearsome reputation
resulting in scant exploration and the corresponding blank sections of maps: the vast forested
area gained the ominous moniker of Desert. In 1826, the federal Mexican government sponsored
an expedition to fill in the blankness of the map. The small party that headed out from Comitán
hoped to document navigable rivers that could be used to traverse the Lacandon, and establish a
foothold in the jungle for subsequent logging expeditions. The failure of the trip, and the hasty
conclusion drawn from the experience, that the Lacandon remained impenetrable, discouraged
future surveying trips from the government; the region acquired the reputation as a distant, exotic
wilderness.67
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In August 1842, Mexico City dramatically broke the region’s isolation as Antonio López
de Santa Anna marched troops into Soconusco. Santa Anna’s bold move came in reaction to
international and national political dynamics. First, the United Provinces had collapsed in 1839,
dragged down by the constant fighting between Liberals and Conservatives and fierce regional
rivalries. Though during its existence it never proved to be a regional power, it remained a
formidable obstacle to Mexican territorial ambitions. Second, upon his seizure of power Santa
Anna found a fracturing Mexico as regions spun away from the center. In the north, an
independent Texas seemed certain to provoke a war with the United States, while a successful
secessionist movement in the Yucatán only needed enough votes in Washington D.C. to become
a new U.S. state. In the southern borderlands, a relatively weak Guatemala claimed Chiapas,
while one of its key regions remained for all purposes cut off from Mexico.68 In a reaction to
this international image of weakness, and in part to send a message to the United States, Santa
Anna ordered a small contingent of Mexican troops to occupy Soconusco. He effectively ended
any notion of the region’s neutrality, annulling Guatemala’s claims with bayonets.69
Though Santa Anna’s actions might have officially ended Soconusco’s status as a neutral
sliver of land wedged between the competing powers, it did not settle Mexico and Guatemala’s
competing claims on Chiapas. That fundamental disagreement was not resolved until four
decades later. In the meantime, elites from both nations remained occupied with national and
international challenges. For Mexico, these included a crippling debt owed to European powers;
internal political strife causing a rotating cast of presidents; a devastating war with the United
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States; and, finally, a civil war followed by an occupation by a foreign power. In Rafael Carrera
dominated Guatemala, the nation often found itself in conflict with its Central American
neighbors. The Conservative Carrera fought to forge regional unity under his rule, utilizing
Guatemalan arms and men to ensure that pliant allies maintained themselves in power. For both
countries, especially Mexico, the Chiapan-Guatemalan border dispute seemed to pale in
significance to the never-ending battle for political stability and territorial integrity.
In addition, a diplomatic solution remained difficult due to the importance Chiapas
played in the domestic cultural and political landscape of Guatemala. Carrera, like future
Guatemalan leaders, utilized the country’s colonial claim on Chiapas to rally domestic support
for his regime, making it politically difficult to negotiate with Mexico. For example, in reaction
to Santa Anna’s march into Soconusco, Carrera published a broadside directed to the
Guatemalan public reiterating the country’s claim on Chiapas. It read, “they [Chipanecos]
appealed daily to the government of Central America and General Carrera, lamenting bitterly the
slavery to which those defenseless peoples have been subjected by Mexican Forces.” Labeling
himself the “The Faithful Observer of the Rights of the People That Compose Central America,”
Carrera noted that his government would not use force to press its historic claims; instead they
hoped to find a peaceful solution with its “sister republic.” 70 Throughout this period an
underlying sense of loss, and the hope for possible recuperation of Chiapas, propelled
Guatemalan sentiment. For example, upon Santa Anna’a return to power in 1853, an article in
the official Gaceta de Guatemala speculated about whether Guatemalans might take advantage
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of Mexico’s precarious situation — tense negotiations with the United States and another
possible war — and reclaim Soconusco, “to undo what happened in 1842.”71
Carrera went even further than rhetoric to undermine Mexican political stability. For
example, during the War of Reform he assisted the cause of Mexican Conservatives through the
transfer of arms, money, and, above all, by providing a safe refuge in the northern Guatemalan
borderlands. As the long war turned in the Liberal camp’s favor, fleeing Conservatives found
safe exile in Guatemala, and a platform from which to harass and threaten nearby Mexico.
Upon Carrera’s death in 1865 and the assumption of power by the Liberal regime of Barrios in
1871, a key roadblock to a potential compromise disappeared. Though sensitive to Guatemala’s
historical claims, Barrios shared a similar political and economic ideological outlook with the
Mexican regime.72

Coffee and Matías Romero

Further impetus to find a diplomatic solution to Chiapan sovereignty came from the
economic potential of coffee, which had already demonstrated its value, as well as the ability to
attract sought after European immigrants, in Central America. Beginning in the 1820’s German,
Spanish, and Guatemalan entrepreneurs had begun to establish coffee plantations and export
houses in Costa Rica for European and domestic consumption in Central America. In the
intervening decades, the technology of shipping improved and steam-powered boats allowed
traders to go against the strong seasonal Caribbean winds, making export to foreign markets a
viable and profitable enterprise. By the 1860’s a full-fledged coffee boom began to ripple

71
72

La Gaceta de Guatemala, May 20, 1853.
Buchenau, In the Shadow of the Giant, 16-21.

39

through Central America, and especially Guatemala, which had previously relied on cochineal
and cotton exports as its main source of revenue. In 1871, the Liberals gained power while
coffee also attained its ascendency, outpacing cochineal for the first time as the country’s
number one export.73
This coffee boom had the potential to travel north into Chiapas and, in particular,
Soconusco, where the soil and climate were particularly well situated for the crop. One of the
earliest and the most high-profile supporters of coffee’s potential in the borderlands was Matías
Romero, the former Secretary of Treasury under Benito Juárez. The Oaxacan Liberal’s difficult
experience in cultivating coffee in Chiapas reflected the frustration felt by the Mexican
government; it could not guarantee to potential European investors the security of planting in a
Chiapan borderlands not fully integrated into the nation. Romero’s experience demonstrated
that custom and the threat of violence held sway in the region, making it difficult to establish a
capital fueled enterprise, such as a coffee farm, that demanded as a prerequisite clearly
demarcated land. Romero’s personal experience proved to be a cautionary tale of optimistic
intentions waylaid by fugitive borderlands.
Born in 1837 in Oaxaca, at an early age Romero gained increasingly important
government positions after the assumption of power by the Liberal regime of 1857. That year,
he joined his mentor, and fellow Oaxacan, Benito Juárez’s government as member of the
department of Foreign Affairs. During the War of Reform as well as the French Intervention,
Romero played a key role in lobbying the United States government, gaining cautious support,
both material and political, for the Liberal cause, as well as restructuring Mexican debt
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agreements with the United States.74 Upon returning to Mexico City, Romero joined the
triumphant Liberal government as Secretary of Treasury, advising Juárez in his bold decision to
suspend Mexico’s debt payments. During the same period, he compiled the exhaustive Memoria
de Hacienda 1870, detailing the Mexican national economic situation. This reflected his
propensity for research and writing on large national questions.75 In 1872, disagreeing with his
erstwhile ally regarding his reelection, Romero quit the Juárez government and retired to
Chiapas, where he hoped to prosper as a coffee farmer “in the fertile regions of Soconusco, of
whose natural advantages I have the most esteemed idea.” He began the venture despite
Soconusco’s “abandonment by the central government,” and “the lack of the demarcation of
limits with Guatemala.”76
The ex-government minister turned coffee farmer did not intend to retire to a life of
leisure in the borderlands. Coffee, for Liberal elites like Romero, represented another one of
Mexico’s natural resources to exploit and sell to foreign markets, principally the United States,
and Romero envisioned Mexico surpassing Brazil as the world’s number one producer. He
praised coffee’s potential, claiming it might become one of the country’s “most lucrative
industries.” Combining the personal and the political, the former diplomat to the United States
enlisted the American officials and businessmen with whom he had developed relationships
while representing Juárez in the 1860’s to promote Mexican coffee. Romero had little personal
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success in farming coffee, but his boosterism for the crop proved to be a factor in increasing
exportation to the United States toward the end of the nineteenth century.77
Romero documented his experience in coffee cultivation in Chiapas, providing a
revealing snapshot of the political, economic, and social state of the borderlands before the
border treaty of 1882. Romero wrote two disparate works, the guardedly optimistic, Cultivo del
café en la costa meridional de Chiapas originally published in the Mexico City magazine, El
Porvenir, in 1874, and the 1876 work, Refutación de las inculpaciones hechas al c. Matías
Romero por el gobierno de Guatemala, written after his Chiapan venture had definitely failed.78
The two works are capped by Romero’s historical analysis and documentary collection, Bosquejo

histórico de la agregación a México de Chiapas y Soconusco y de las negociaciones sobre
límites entabladas por México con Centroamérica y Guatemala, published in 1877, which is
discussed below.79
At the time he published his 1874 work, Romero still possessed some of the optimism
in the region’s potential that had initially lured him to Chiapas in late 1872. Most of the 160
page Cultivo de Café has the ring of the boosterism of Mexico and its natural resources that
would define his stint as minister plenipotentiary to the United States from 1882 to 1898. It is
also an example of a detailed elite effort to describe and make plain the exotic through the
language of science, in this case, Romero’s advice on coffee cultivation. The bulk of Cultivo de
Café serves as a primer for the large-scale farmer Romero envisioned as developing the Chiapan
coffee-frontier. According to Romero, successful planting in the verdant borderlands required a
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little effort, the specialty knowledge he supplied, and capital. Though Romero takes care to
point out that the capital outlay was not extensive, his vision did not include the small-scale
peasant farmer that constituted the early stages of coffee frontiers in places such as in Costa
Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela.80
Romero put up his own capital in early 1874 when he purchased Cafetal Juárez on the
Petacalapa River. The process of by which he chose the property illustrates the confusion on the
ground regarding the political boundaries of Mexico and Guatemala. Upon arriving, he
surveyed the area on horseback with Barrios, the owner of the nearby finca of Malacate. Upon
arriving at the site of the future Cafetal Juárez, Romero noted that, “he [Barrios], the one and
only owner of Malacate,” assured him that though some considered it part of Guatemala, the land
belonged to Mexico, a startling admission from a Guatemalan politician. When Romero further
balked at purchasing the land by pointing out the presence of the surrounding indigenous villages
of Tajumulco and Sibinal whose inhabitants often planted nearby, Barrios assured him that he
would take care of them. He told Romero "it suits us that they stay on the land and that way
there are laborers: either way, I will make sure they don’t harm the finca.” Besides, Barrios
assured his Mexican friend, he had instructed the authorities of the nearby department of San
Marcos to make known to the surrounding indigenous villages of Sibinal and Tajumulco to
respect his property.81
Romero’s purchase of the land at the suggestion and assurance of Barrios reflected the
former finance minister’s attitude during his stay in the borderlands: a reliance on his friendship
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with the Guatemalan, viewing him as a totem for his success and failings in the region. Upon
first meeting Barrios at his finca Malacate, he was impressed. The energetic Guatemalan
caudillo widely praised the Juárez government’s reforms — policies that Romero no doubt
played a large part in implementing — and expressed the desire to enact similar transformations
in Guatemala. Romero was so impressed with Barrios that he recommended him to the President
of Mexico as an ally of the country and a future leader of Central America. He later admitted
that this burgeoning friendship with the Guatemalan politician finally sealed any doubts he might
have had about settling in the borderlands.82
According to the new finquero Soconusco presented few challenges in building a coffee
empire. For example, Romero claimed that unlike other coffee-growing regions of Mexico, such
as Colima and Córdoba, the borderlands needed no extensive irrigation, as the rains lasted six
months and the nearby ocean kept the air advantageously humid yearlong. The region
seemingly offered every advantage: cheap land, low cost of labor — which came from
Guatemala — and the ability to supplement income by the cultivation of sugar for the production
of aguardiente for the neighboring indigenous communities.83
He quickly learned the practices of coffee growing which he laid out in Cultivo del Café.
In it, he cited specific agricultural techniques, the majority from the writings of Ceylon coffee
farmer, William Sabonadière. The Mexican coffee promoter detailed the practice and use of
shading, the correct transport of seeds, the cleaning process, and the correct way to prune the
coffee plant.84 Romero even listed the calculated four-year expenses of cultivating two
caballerias of land in Soconusco (about 70 acres) compared to the distant Ceylon, coming to the
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forgone conclusion that the potential coffee entrepreneur’s capital would go much farther in the
Chiapan borderlands.85
Though Cultivo del Café reflected his initial optimism, his brief review of the challenges
of coffee cultivation in borderlands reveals the land tenure challenges prevalent in the contested
region and, in particular, the practice of indigenous Guatemalan communities of cultivating crops
far into Soconusco. Romero warned that the Mexican state offered no recourse to a potential
coffee farmer who attempted to expel the Guatemalans who planted in lands they claimed to be
Guatemalan, and were backed by the nearby Guatemalan authorities of the more populous
Guatemalan borderland towns like San Marcos. He warned:

If you try to force them [Guatemalans] from the terrain they have invaded, all the
advantages are for the Indians. Besides being very numerous and united to defend what
they consider their lands, they have the decisive support of the Guatemalan authorities,
they consider any armed force to protect Mexican land as an aggression against
Guatemalan territory, which they always repel….86

Romero proved to be prescient regarding the potential for conflict with indigenous
Guatemalans. Only a year after publishing his mostly laudatory estimation of the prospect of
coffee production in Chiapas, Romero fled the region in fear of his life. Already while writing
the 1874 publication, Romero watched with worry as indigenous Guatemalans, as they had done
for years, planted corn on the property that the former Secretary of Treasury claimed to belong to
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him and Mexico. The inevitable confrontation occurred: in 1875 a large group of Guatemalans
invaded Romero’s Cafetal Juárez. They destroyed equipment, dwellings, and killed some of the
workers. The incident forced Romero to flee Soconusco as well as lose his property. After he
fled, fellow finquero Barrios accused Romero of bringing the two countries to the brink of war.87
In the 1876 Refutación, Romero detailed his version of the circumstances leading to the
attack on Cafetal Juárez. Supported by hundreds of pages of letters, Mexican government
documents, and judicial testimony, Romero blamed Barrios for his misfortune. Soon after his
purchase of Cafetal Juárez the friendship between the two soured. In late 1873, Barrios blamed
Romero for encouraging an inept military revolt launched by a handful of Guatemalans from
Tapachula. In response, Romero claimed that Barrios encouraged and allowed the nearby
indigenous communities of Sibinal and Tajumulco to attack his property.88
While Romero’s belief that such an attack needed Barrios’s permission makes sense
considering the sway of the Guatemalan caudillo’s political power at the time, it is also evident
from a detailed reading of Romero’s recollections that borderland Guatemalans clearly contested
his claim to the land. To them, Cafetal Juárez surely represented an episode in the new
Guatemalan Liberal regime’s attack on communal property. Indigenous communities around the
country were well aware of elite efforts to convert such property to large-scale private estates,
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and they worked to secure long-held productive land before private interests could claim it.89 It
is likely that the indigenous communities that attacked Cafetal Juárez did not need too much
encouragement from Barrios to secure land they often used to supplement their annual crops. A
much more likely assessment is that Barrios simply decided to allow the indigenous
borderlanders to do what they intended from the beginning, kick Romero off property they
considered their own, and Guatemalan.
From Romero’s first efforts to map his property and thus to claim a piece of the
borderlands, he provoked a strong response from the Guatemalan borderlanders that he observed
in his initial survey of the land with Barrios. In the days following the purchase of Cafetal
Juárez, the nearby village of Sibinal sent Romero a note asking his intentions, warning that
“there would be fatal consequences” for taking land belonging to Guatemala and used by the
people of the region.90 After receiving the threatening note Romero, the former diplomat, visited
with some of the indigenous families on the land he had just bought, hoping to broker peace.
Romero gave a speech to the crowd that assembled upon his arrival. He informed them that
they had been living in Mexico, and he was going to buy the land. He told them, however, not to
worry: they had the opportunity to continue farming their plots in exchange for their labor on the
coffee farm he had planned to erect. With that Romero left, convinced that he had won them
over. He noted that nobody protested when, in the presence of the indigenous families, he and
his team of laborers and surveyors began setting up boundary markers to demarcate Cafetal
Juárez.91
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The indigenous borderlanders Romero was convinced he had converted into future
laborers had many opportunities to observe the establishment of Cafetal Juárez by following the
actions of the surveyor, Jose Encarnación Ibarra. As Encarnación later recounted, many
indigenous families from Tajumuclo, Tacana, and Sibinal came to observe the work of he and his
team, though as they did during Romero’s visit, they did not protest or attempt to stop him.
Despite the absence of a border treaty, the surveyor claimed he demarcated the finca, “without
introducing a single hand into the neighboring Republic.” Instead of state-produced maps,
Encarnación based his calculations of the property’s limits on surrounding property and staying
to the west of the Suchiate and Candelaria rivers, the customary local boundaries separating
Guatemala and Mexico. Encarnación describes the scientific limits of his mapping, for example,
by describing a large pile of cocoa branches used to mark the western limit of Romero’s land,
and a pile of fig tree branches in the shape of a cross that was laid at the edge of an indigenous
household. In very practical terms the limits of Romero’s property, and hence Mexico’s border,
were temporary, and in violation of the boundaries established by local tradition and
knowledge.92
A commission formed after the destruction of Cafetal Juárez by the municipal authorities
of Tapachula at the request of the Mexican president collected testimony regarding the
circumstances leading to the attack. The commissioners interviewed local officials, landowners,
Romero — safe in Mexico City — as well as some of the indigenous members of the raiding
villages. Although in Refutación Romero cast blame on Barrios and the Guatemalans to whom
he so graciously offered employment, the information collected by the commission reveals a
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borderlands landscape in which there was widespread disagreement over the location of national
boundaries.
The commissioners called residents from the village of Tuxtla Chico -- far enough north
of the natural boundary of the borderland rivers to be safely considered Mexican -- as expert
witnesses on the location of the traditional border. They testified that everyone knew that the
division of the two neighboring countries was the mouth of the Petacalapa River. They were
quick to add, however, that indigenous Guatemalans had been farming in an area considered
Mexican for generations due to the acquiescence of the authorities based in populous San
Marcos, a few miles south in what was clearly Guatemala. In the commission’s interview with a
pair of indigenous raiders, they blamed the municipal leaders of San Marcos for the destruction
of Romero’s farm. They claimed officials there ordered the “invasion” of Mexico after receiving
the complaints of the surrounding villages regarding the establishment of Cafetal Juárez. Further
testimony by residents of nearby Union Juárez, further north in Soconusco, claimed Guatemalans
frequently “committed abuses” in Mexico. These borderlanders, though, were not clear if the
attack on Romero’s property constituted another instance of such abuses. Tiburcio Escobar of
Union Juárez admitted to having doubts as to who owned the land upon which Cafetal Juárez
lay, but he reasoned that since Mexican authorities were there investigating what happened, the
land must belong to Mexico.93
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Figure 2 “Carta Postal de la República Mexicana. Estados de Tabasco, Campeche, y Chiapas.” 1905. David Rumsey Historical
Map Collection, Accessed May March 21, 2015,
http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~265311~5525284:Carta-Postal-de-la-Republ

Newspapers and Chiapan History

In distant Mexico City, readers followed Romero’s tribulations in newspaper articles. In
official and non-official periodicals such as the Revista Universal and the Diario Oficial, writers
50

decried the lack of a government presence in the region, Guatemalan designs on Chiapas, and
violent territorial incursions by both state and non-state actors.94 These articles were the latest
in what were years of accounts depicting a violent borderlands, its people at the mercy of
Guatemalan raiders eager to recover the region.
An illuminating example of this type of stories occurred in late 1852 and early 1853, as
the local Mexican militia faced a group of armed Guatemalans led by a Mexican filibuster,
ousted Comitecan caudillo, Ponciano Solórzano. After a failed attempt to overthrow state
authorities in 1849, Solórzan took refuge in Guatemala with the blessing of Rafael Carrera. He
returned a few years later, leading a force of Guatemalan irregulars in a raid on Tapachula intent
on seizing the territory for Guatemala. In February 24, 1853, the Mexico City periodical El Siglo
Diez y Nueve published a series of dramatic letters from the municipal authorities of Tapachula
to the governor of Chiapas, Fernando Nicolás Maldonado. The emotions of the capital’s readers
must have ranged from impassioned to disheartened upon reading the letters of the besieged and
outmanned Chiapanecos. Surrounded by more than two hundred Guatemalans and their artillery,
in the words of the Tapachula municipal president, the Mexican defenders were “sustaining the
national government” with the “the patriotism that burns in the hearts of all Soconuscans,”
although the central government had been deaf to their lamentations. Eventually, both the
Mexican and Guatemalan governments mobilized small contingents of armed forces to the
region, though they avoided engaging in a larger conflict at the last minute both nations found a
convenient scapegoat in Solórzano.95
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A reader of El Siglo Diez y Nueve could expect more than just accounts of Guatemalan
invasions, but also histories of Chiapas explaining, in part, why he or she should care about this
distant part of Mexico. Often, these histories were written in context of or in reaction to specific
events in the borderlands. Just as frequently, they served as counter-arguments, nationalist
histories refuting those of Guatemalan writers who portrayed Mexico’s policy towards Chiapas
as criminal: a land-hungry bully that stole land from Guatemala. Beginning to appear in the
middle of the nineteenth century, these transnational debates in the popular press would crop up
periodically throughout the twentieth century.
In general, the Mexican histories followed consistent themes. They argued that since the
pre-Hispanic era the borderlands and the region of central Mexico had forged enduring
economic, political, and cultural ties. Most important for these writers was the crucial plebiscite
of 1824. In these nationalist histories, this act of free expression forever cemented Chiapas to the
Mexican nation: Chiapanecos chose to become part of Mexico. The vote became an enduring
element of the character of Chiapas that endures to this day through government-sponsored
celebrations of the anniversary of the state’s integration into Mexico.96
By briefly exploring these Mexican texts we can see how they formed a part of elite
efforts to craft a national history in the latter half of the 19th century, a practice that would
culminate in the publication of the monumental México, a través de los siglos in 1889. In the
aftermath of the defeat by the United States, the War of Reform, and the French Intervention,
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Mexican intellectuals constructed a patriotically fulfilling and progressive history from the
nation’s pre-Hispanic roots to the present day of a nation united spatially and politically.97
The Chiapaneco lawyer, politician, and historian Manuel Larráinzar became the first to
publish a historical defense of the inclusion of Chiapas and Soconusco. Born in 1809 in Ciudad
Real to one of the principal families of the region, Larráinzar left home to receive a law degree in
Mexico City. Upon returning to Chiapas the conservative coleto quickly embarked on a political
career occupying a variety of prominent local positions, such as a judgeship, and later national
positions, representing Chiapas, for example, in the Mexican Congress. In 1865, after receiving
an invitation to join the short-lived imperial project of the Literary, Artistic, and Scientific
Commission of Mexico, Larráinzar conceived of a book project he called “Unas ideas sobre la
historia y la manera de escribir la de México, especialmente la contemporánea, desde la
Independencia hasta nuestros días.” Later, in a more formal proposal to the Mexican Society for
Geography and Statistics his ambitious project came into focus as he outlined the general
chronological parameters of the country’s history from the Pre-Colombian and Colonial periods,
to the first decades after Independence. For Larráinzar a general history of Mexico constituted
an essential foundation, a substratum of knowledge necessary for the country’s political and
economic progress. Upon the defeat of the Conservatives in 1867, Larráinzar found himself in
the court of the Russian tsar, an ambassador without a government, and forced to wander in
exile. Though his earlier ideas of a general history of Mexico served as outline, he did not
receive an invitation to contribute to México a través de los siglos, 98
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In 1843, a year after Santa Anna forcefully incorporated Soconusco, Larráinzar wrote
Noticia Histórica de Soconusco, y su incorporación a la República Mexicana. The Mexico City
newspapers, El Siglo Diez y Nueve and El Mosquito Mexicano serializad the polemical history.
Larráinzar became inspired to pick up his pen in order to counter the various Central American
writers that attacked the Mexican government’s obligation “conservation of the territory of the
Republic” and the protection of “little known Chiapas.”99 The three works referenced by
Larráinzar as his inspiration, which bore titles such as Soconusco, territorio de Central América,
ocupado militarmente por el órden de gobierno mexicano, painted a history of an expansionist
Mexico manipulating and coercing the Chiapanecos into integration.100
Throughout the nearly two-hundred-page folio, Larráinzar exhaustively refutes
Guatemalan claims of fraud while concentrating on the historic September 1824 vote. The
coleto paints a patriotic narrative of Chiapanecos freely choosing their adhesion to the Mexican
nation. Larráinzar, a member of the same Chiapan elite that manipulated the historic plebiscite,
praised the patriotism of the leading Chiapanecos, promoting the mestizo landowners as Mexican
founding fathers. In Larráinzar’s telling, they ignored the Machiavellian whispers of the United
Provinces and brought the rich paradise of Chiapas into the Mexican bosom.101
Larráinzar also connected the struggle over Chiapas to what at the time seemed the
disintegration of Mexico’s peripheral states. Only a few years after Santa Anna’s defeat at the
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Battle of San Jacinto in 1836, and in the climate of an expansionist and hostile United States, the
Mexican historian reflected on the errant territories of Texas and the Yucatan stating that;

…not in Chiapas, nor in Texas, nor in the Yucatan, nor in any part, should the rights of the Nation
be in doubt or uncertain, or abandoned, and its dignity be cast away and humiliated; it [the
Nation] should be respected and assured in the center as in the periphery.102

Back from exile in 1875, Larráinzar published Chiapas and Soconusco con motivo de la
cuestión de límites entre México y Guatemala, in reaction to Andrés Dardón’s, La cuestión de
límites entre México y Guatemala, por un centroamericano.103 At the time of Larráinzar’s
publication, Dardon’s work had circulated widely around elite circles in Mexico City, its
abundance of government documents giving weight to the claim that the author served as an
unofficial spokesperson for the Guatemalan government. In the context of Romero’s
misfortunes and increased diplomatic grumbling in the press as Guatemalan and Mexican
officials each blamed the other for the inability to secure a broader border deal, the nationalist
intensity surrounding the polemics was heightened. This tension no doubt played into the
Liberal government’s decision to publish parts of Larráinzar’s latest history in the Diario
Oficial.104 Despite nearly thirty years separating this 1875 history and Larráinzar’s first defense
of Chiapas’s integration, Chiapas and Soconusco con motivo de la cuestión de límites generally
followed the same argument as his 1843 work, at times even copying large parts of that earlier
history. One notable difference, perhaps reflecting his attempt to ingratiate himself with the new
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Liberal government, was Larráinzar’s interpretation of the 1824 vote in a federalist
framework.105
The latter part of the 1875 polemic disengaged from the refutation of Guatemalan
arguments and instead focused on the lack of spatial knowledge of the borderlands. Larráinzar
complained about the minimal representation of Chiapas in Antonio García Cubas’s grand
project, the 1857 Atlas geográfico, histórico, y estadístico de la República Mexicana. García
Cubas’s compilation of local maps served a score of purposes: the demarcation of land for the
Liberal project of colonization, disentailment of church property, and the removal of indigenous
people from land deemed productive for the newly envisioned export economy. It also marked a
parallel effort to that made by those historians busy creating a national identity, by assembling a
visual Mexico to accompany the idea of a united Mexico that had emerged out of the furious
violence of the first decades of independence.106 But for the Chiapan historian the project
remained incomplete. He notes, for example, that Garcia Cubas listed only one recent map of
Chiapas and that made by the “simple surveyor” Secundio Orantes, whose 1856 map provided
different figures of longitude and latitude for Chiapas than did the larger map of Mexico in the
Atlas. To the further consternation of Larráinzar, Garcia Cubas relied upon a late colonial survey
of the border between Mexico and Central America, which ceded a substantial amount of land to
Guatemala. In other words, the Chiapan borderlands were literally not on the map that the
intellectual elites in central Mexico began to form of the nation in the crucial years of national
identity formation in the latter half of the nineteenth century.107
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Larráinzar’s own suggestions about how to demarcate the border reflected the general
lack of cartographic knowledge that he himself criticized. His exacting proposals were based
mostly on local knowledge, echoing Romero’s surveyor in their reliance on landmarks.
Larráinzar suggests that surveyors start on the beach in Soconusco and make their way to the
ranch known as La Encantada. From there the historian leads the reader east, suggesting
tributaries of the Suchiate River as markers, such as the mouth of the Petacalapa River, where
Matías Romero built Cafetal Juárez. Going all the way to the Lacandon Forest, Larráinzar notes
that its limits as well as those of the regions of Tabasco, Campeche, and the Yucatan remained
unexplored and not part of the discussion, requiring the work of a binational team of surveyors
and engineers from Mexico and Guatemala. 108
At the time of Larráinzar’s publication Romero had already returned to Mexico City,
where he joined the new Díaz government as Secretary of Treasury in 1877. In the meantime, he
did not forget about Chiapas. Throughout 1876, in the Diario Oficial, he published parts of
what would become an extensive historical account of Chiapas’s incorporation into Mexico,
Bosquejo histórico de la agregacion á México de Chiapas y Soconusco y de las negociaciones
sobre límites entabladas por México con Centro-América y Guatemala. Colección de
documentos oficiales que sirve de respuesta al opúsculo de d. Andres Dardon, intitulado "La
cuestión de límites entre México y Guatemala. Tomo I. 1821-1831.
Unlike Refutación, this massive undertaking of a little over 800 pages did not detail the
personal experiences of Romero. Rather, like Larráinzar, Romero took Dardon’s work as an
opportunity to argue for the irreversible legal, cultural, and economic union of Chiapas and
Mexico. Taking advantage of his position within the government and his access to historical
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documents, Romero and an assistant compiled scores of archival materials regarding the crucial
decade of 1821-1831. The breadth of the research established Bosquejo as a valuable resource in
the historiography of post-independence Mexico, becoming a touchstone for future Mexican
historians and popular writers examining the Chiapan borderlands.109
Due to Romero’s influence in the central government, his eventual appointment as
special representative to the United States in 1882, and his role in the final border negotiations
with Guatemala, the main arguments in Bosquejo served as a foundation for Mexico’s Oficial
position vis-à-vis Chiapas.110 Much like Larráinzar, Romero focuses on the theme that the
people of the southern borderlands chose to be part of Mexico in 1821, and crucially in
September of 1824.111 The plebiscite of that year confirmed for Romero that in Chiapas, “the
opinion for Mexico was so generalized and decided that at last, it [the vote] prevailed, despite all
the difficulties that it had to fight to succeed.” It also made future Guatemalan incursions that
much more criminal as they sought to undermine the will of the Mexican people.112
Though he mentions his own experience with Cafetal Juárez only once, Romero
documents Guatemalan influence in the borderlands as violent.113 For example, he examines the
obligation of priests to swear an oath of allegiance to the Mexican government after the 1824
plebiscite. Romero documents how the jefe político of Soconusco, Manuel Escobar — who
voted yes on integration into Mexico but in the nebulous neutrality that prevailed after 1824
shifted his loyalties — prevented priests who had sworn the oath to enter Soconusco. In the
various letters, reproduced by Romero, between the Chiapan governor, the exiled priests, and
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Escobar himself — who, safely ensconced in distant Tapachula, denied involvement — it
became clear that the priests could only return if they pledged allegiance to the United Provinces.
Ultimately, it is unclear what happened to the priests, though a letter by one indicated he would
attempt to go back to his abandoned flock. For Romero, the incident highlights two themes of
relations on the ground in the borderlands: nefarious Guatemalan meddling and Mexican
restraint. Romero praises Mexico’s choice of issuing a diplomatic complaint rather than
responding with violence to Guatemalan provocations.114 Romero fails to note, however, that the
incident in question occurred only because of the clear absence of the Mexican state: a note of
protest remained the only option available to Ciudad Real and Mexico City.
Though Romero intended to continue his detailed documentation of the challenges of
Chiapas’s political incorporation into Mexico, his personal and professional ambitions drew him
away from the exhausting work of compilation and writing. Entrusting the remaining work to an
editor of the Diario Oficial, Romero began his new position as Secretary of Treasury in 1877.115
Once again he combined the personal and professional, embarking on a series of partnerships
with American political luminaries, contacts he had made as Juárez’s representative in the United
States in the 1860’s. For example, he began a failed venture with Ulysses S. Grant to build a
railroad through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. In the United States, Romero became a key agent
for the Porfirian plans for Mexican national development, selling the natural resources of the
nation to the American market.116 And, as minister plenipotentiary to the United States in 1882,
he became a key figure in the territorial negotiations between Mexico and Guatemala. This gave
Romero the opportunity to construct an economic opportunity for himself and the country in the
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borderlands: the consolidation of a burgeoning coffee frontier in Soconusco that he had sought
for so long.
Though Romero and other Mexican officials might have been skeptical, by 1882 Barrios
was ready to settle the boundary dispute with Mexico. He desperately wanted to dispense with
what had become more than a major annoyance to his efforts of forging a Guatemalan led
Central American union.117 Romero’s exit from the region did nothing to diminish the often
violent encounters between Guatemalans and Mexicans in the Soconusco region, events dutifully
reported in the Mexican press. For example, in late 1879, and throughout 1880, a handful of
Guatemalans — the few caught claimed to have been sent by Barrios, who denied responsibility
— sacked Tuxtla Chico, whose residents had earlier testified in the Cafetal Juárez commission.
As would be the case throughout the twentieth century, the Mexican press wrote sensational
accounts of the incident, reporting that a filibustering gang of Guatemalans, Central Americans,
and even some Mexicans looted and terrorized the population.118 In October of 1881, Mexican
President Manuel González sent close to five thousand troops to the borderlands with an
accompanying message to the Congress on the need to defend territorial integrity. Conflict
between the two neighbors seemed to be imminent.119
In June 1881, Barrios asked the U.S. administration of James Garfield to arbitrate the
limits of Mexico’s southern border, including deciding the question of Chiapas and Soconusco.
This invoked a fury of Mexican nationalism as it linked the present debate surrounding the
Chiapan borderlands to the still painful loss of Mexico’s northern territory four decades earlier.
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Barrios felt confident in allowing the United States to decide such vital questions as he enjoyed
the support of the political and business elite of New York and Washington D.C. These Manifest
Destiny schemers calculated that a Barrios led Central American political confederation could
produce a Nicaraguan government amiable enough to allow an inter-oceanic canal through its
territory. The Mexican press expressed the expected outrage at the idea of letting the United
States decide any question involving Mexican territorial integrity. For example, a front-page
editorial in the March 2, 1882 edition of El Siglo Diez y Nueve mockingly asked how the
neighbor to the north would feel about a friendly nation deciding if Texas belonged to them or
Mexico.120 The press also added its nationalist rancor against Guatemalan diplomats stationed
in the United States, accusing them of bribing politicians and planting the idea in Washington
political circles that Mexico planned an invasion of Central America. These accusations of
influence peddling were not so farfetched, as Barrios demonstrated a willingness to go to great
lengths to secure support. At one point, he suggested to American diplomats that the United
States should occupy Soconusco, an idea quickly rejected and not mentioned again.121
Against this backdrop, tense negotiations began in Washington D.C. in 1882 between
Romero and his Guatemalan counterpart Lorenzo Montúfar. Montúfar’s political background
suggested difficulties. As the former Guatemalan Minister of Education, he encouraged the
production of historical works emphasizing the legacy of the colonial Kingdom of Guatemala,
which included Chiapas. Like many Guatemalan elites, Montúfar looked on the colonial past as
a territorial roadmap for a future Central American union that could treat equally with the United
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States.122 Talks between Romero and Montúfar rapidly stalled. At one point, Romero seemingly
gave the impression of agreeing to submit to United States arbitration the legality of the adhesion
of Chiapas to Mexico, a claim Romero dismissed as a conjecture based on private conversations
with his Guatemalan counterpart. In the meantime, parallel negotiations began in Mexico City
between the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations and the Guatemalan ambassador. These
talks, following the advice of Barrios, focused on the placement of the border with the
assumption that Guatemala agreed to renounce its claims on Chiapas. When that news reached
the patriotic Montúfar, he quit in protest.123
The Mexican press kept the public abreast of the proceedings as, as had Alamán nearly
six decades earlier, the federal government worked hand-in-hand with the print media to drum up
patriotic support for the distant region. For example, Secretary of Foreign Relations Ignacio
Mariscal arranged for La Voz de México journalist Miguel Martínez to compile his coverage of
the negotiations into a single book, Cuestión entre México y Guatemala: Colección de artículos
publicados en La Voz de México. Amply supplied with Mexican, Guatemalan, and American
diplomatic letters by Mariscal’s Secretariat of Foreign Relations, Martínez framed the boundary
debate around the issue of patriotism. Even if a Mexico City reader could not locate Ciudad Real
on a map, he or she understood the nationalist pain of Mexico losing territory. The loss of the
northern borderlands decades earlier underlined and added a tenacity to the negotiation.
Martínez put the potential loss of Chiapas in historical context:
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The Mexican nation has not ceased to exist since those days [1821]. Much has been its
vicissitudes and its disgraces from then until today; but it has not lost its autonomy. The territory
has had great losses, tightening its confines; but that has not happened in the seas that limit it in
the west and the east. Neither has it been diminished in the south. 124

Barrio’s impatient desire to secure support for his Central American union plan finally
brought the negotiations to a close. In late April of 1882, he wrote to a rubber-stamp
Guatemalan Congress asking for powers to negotiate personally, “I ask the National Congress if
it esteems it opportune to concede [to me] special and ample authorization conferred in a Decree,
to put an end to [the negotiations] in the way that I judge to be the best path, which coincides
with the true interests of the Republic.”125 Barrios continued to insist on the intervention of the
United States, a non-starter for Mexico and rejected by the new administration of President
Chester Arthur without the approval of both parties. As Barrios eyed an upcoming European trip
to secure political and economic support for unification efforts, he wanted to leave the
borderlands problem behind him by securing a treaty with Mexico. Therefore, the owner of
Malacate sat down with his former friend Romero to hammer out a deal. The final agreement,
though it left in place the possibility of future United States arbitration over the exact placement
of the boundary, obtained Guatemala’s official renunciation of Chiapas and Soconusco.126
The agreement vaguely outlined the border. Based on faulty maps and the local
knowledge displayed by Chiapanecos like Larráinzar, the treaty described the demarcation route
of a seven hundred mile border in a few sentences: it essentially started at the Pacific Ocean,
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followed the Suchiate River east, and disappeared into the unknown Lacandon.127 Crucially,
Article Four of the treaty created a binational boundary commission to demarcate its placement.
As we will explore in the next chapter, and as revealed in the attack on La Fama, the demarcation
and knowledge on the ground of the political boundary would be an ongoing, incomplete
process, finished on maps in 1895, but remaining a source of tension between the two neighbors
well into the twentieth century.
After the signing of the four-page treaty in Mexico City in September of 1882, Barrios
turned his attention back to the ambitious dream of reuniting Central America under his
leadership. In February of 1885, the Guatemalan Congress declared him president of the newly
declared Central American Union. The new chief executive quickly set out to back up his title
by force against the resistance of isthmian states that balked at submitting to Guatemalan
leadership. Mexico’s reaction to Barrios’s political ambition proved that the diplomatic
agreement of 1882 did little to curb the potential for violence in the borderlands or fear of
Guatemalan intrusion. Porfirio Díaz, fearful that a revitalized Barrios might attempt to invade
Chiapas, sent a small force military force to the region, diverting a large number of Guatemalan
troops while also sending a clear signal of Mexico’s displeasure with the Guatemalan dictator’s
ambitions. In the United States, Romero worked his American counterparts, assuring them,
despite Barrios’s accusations of meddling, that Mexican troop movements were defensive in
nature and did not indicate a future military incursion into Central America. Romero’s lobbying
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and the United States’ wariness of unrest in the region eventually led to a denunciation in the
Senate of the establishment by force of a united isthmus, a startling rebuke to Barrios who
enjoyed widespread support a few years earlier. All the diplomatic and military posturing
quickly came to close in April 1885, when Barrios fell dead in battle against Salvadoran forces.
His death and the ineffectual efforts of his successors to continue his expansionist policies put an
end to the period in which Guatemala might have launched an effort to occupy the Chiapan
borderland force.128
In the meantime, with a treaty that offered greater guarantees to investors, Matías
Romero continued his boosterism of Mexico and the borderlands among the financial and
political elite of the United States. In private meetings, in the press, and in public Romero
stressed the potential returns on investment in Mexico’s natural resources offered to foreign
capital.129 Romero found willing audiences. For example, in 1891 the Democratic Club of New
York hosted a “Mexican Night,” inviting Romero as the guest of honor. In his introduction the
prominent lawyer Walter S. Logan, extolled Romero and the government of Díaz, “the deliverer
of Mexico,” as having “started the ball of education and civilization in Mexico.” That
civilization, Logan stressed, had all the hallmarks appealing to those interested in investing in a
politically secure country: a functional tax system, a budget surplus, and peace. In Mexico,
explained Logan, “not a battle has been fought….save for a few skirmishes with Apache and
Yaqui Indians.” 130
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Romero’s speech reflected his earlier works and efforts at promotion of capital
development in the borderlands. He described Mexico’s natural resources much as he once
wrote about the borderlands, a cornucopia waiting to be tapped and brought to market:

“You all know, gentlemen, that the wealth of Mexico is really astonishing….she alone can
provide all the coffee, sugar, vanilla, and india rubber and other tropical products needed to
provide the large market of the United States…. It will be an act of foresight to enter at once in
the large and rich field offered by Mexico, at the very doors of the United States.131

Romero’s pitch and the allure of profits to be made in Mexico appealed to at least one
investor in the room, William E. Dodge Jr., who dreamed of extending his copper empire into
Mexico’s northern borderlands.132 Due in part to Romero’s efforts the Chiapan borderlands were
open to investment to dreamers like Dodge, uniting both edges of Mexico in the common
Porfirian experience of frenzied foreign capital speculation.

.

After the signing of the 1882 Boundary Treaty, both the private and public sectors of
Mexico promoted investment in the Chiapan borderlands to foreign investors, especially in
coffee. The 1889 Universal Exposition in Paris displayed, at the behest of the governor of
Chiapas, Manuel Carrascosa, samples of amber, textiles, and coffee, demonstrating to potential
investors the riches of the region. In the accompanying literature, the governor emphasized the
availability of a pliant indigenous workforce ready to be employed as cheap labor.133 By the

131
Ibid., 16-17, 20. A few years later, in 1901, the prolific Romero wrote Coffee and India-rubber Culture
in Mexico. In the introduction, he glosses over the circumstances concerning his “sudden departure” from
Soconusco, noting instead that the coffee trees he planted bore fruit, eventually helping a relative make a large
fortune. Matías Romero, Coffee and India-Rubber Culture in Mexico (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1901), 1.
132
Truett, Fugitive Landscapes, 55-56.
133
Aaron Bobrow-Strain, Intimate Enemies: Landowners, Power, and Violence in Chiapas (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2007), 54-55.

66

1901 Pan American Exposition in Buffalo, the Mexican government noted that coffee had
become, “one of the most important articles of export.”134 Catherine Nolan-Ferrell examines
how in this period of the late nineteenth century private/public partnerships, such as the Mexican
Land and Colonization Company, sold to American and European investors the idea of a verdant
Chiapas. The discourse they utilized in their advertisement often depended on the same
optimistic language as Romero had used in describing an empty region: it was a “vacant” coffee
frontier, simply waiting for an intrepid investor to plant seeds.135
The confidence given by the 1882 treaty, efforts by individuals like Romero, and foreign
investment brought a coffee boom to the borderlands: by 1895 the region counted approximately
one million planted coffee trees.136 By 1911, the majority German coffee farmers had invested
nearly 4,500,000 pesos in rural Soconusco land purchases. The massive and rapid expansion
caused inflation in land prices from 60 centavos a hectare in 1880, to approximately 300 pesos
by 1910.137

Conclusion

The 1882 Boundary Treaty marked a diplomatic triumph for a nineteenth century
Mexico that had witnessed the loss (or threat of loss) of much of its territory since 1821. Against
the backdrop of Mexico’s experience in the northern borderlands, the Chiapan borderlands took
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on an added importance. The 1824 plebiscite became a triumph, an example of the free popular
expression of a region choosing Mexico — notably unlike Texas, for example. Though a
Chiapaneco like Larráinzar acknowledged that for most of Mexico, “the little known Chiapas”
did not figure in the national spatial imagination, in times of potential conflict such as 1842 and
1882, the national press picked up and repeated this attractive patriotic narrative of Mexicans
choosing to be Mexicans.
The narrative also presented and laid a foundation of difficulties, which impeded the
center, Mexico City, from truly integrating the borderlands. Works and experiences such as
Romero’s, coupled with frequent newspaper accounts of violent incidents, associated the
borderlands with the narrative of invasion in the minds of many Mexicans. Though the 1882
Boundary Treaty gave confidence to investors to purchase land, the Mexican government did
nothing to harden the border. On the ground, as seen in the La Fama incident nearly forty years
after the border treaty, this narrative of territorial violation continued to exist.
Yet, at the least, the Chiapan borderlands became part of the Mexican story, albeit in a
reduced role. For example, the epic 1889 México a través de los siglos only mentioned Chiapas
briefly, in the section regarding independence. Acknowledging its previous adhesion to the
Captaincy General of Guatemala, the work notes that at the time of the pronouncement of
Independence in 1821, “The people of Chiapas pronounced spontaneously, on their own, their
incorporation into the Mexican Empire.”138 Through the coverage was brief, Larráinzar and
Romero would have approved the sentiment.
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Chapter Two:
The State Approaches: Logging, Revolution, and the Demographic Commission:
1882-1956
During the first few months of 1956, Engineer Armando Trueba Quevedo of the Mexican
Boundary Commission with Guatemala led a small team of surveyors and support staff on a
demarcation expedition in the eastern region of Chiapas’s border with Guatemala. To fulfill
their assignment the group traveled through the municipalities of borderland towns such Las
Margaritas, Ocosingo, and Comitán. Along the way they experienced a land and climate
different from the humid coastal plains of the more populous western Chiapan borderlands of
Soconusco. Trueba and his group tracked over cool highlands and dropped into stretches of
almost impassible jungle, but overall the engineer noted that the region offered the ideal climate
and soil for the cultivation of corn, coffee, and cattle. 139
For Trueba the most notable observation was the visible brecha or break in the border
coming south from Guatemala. He looked out over a vast expanse of isolated borderlands
without any infrastructure or connection to the interior of Chiapas – except for a clearing of
crops. This intrusion, the large thumbprint of foreign cultivation, stood in contrast with the
seclusion of these Mexican borderlands from the remainder of Mexico.140 In the face of this
boundary violation, the engineer’s role changed. No longer was he simply delineating the
border; he now considered himself a political, demographic, and economic official of the federal
Mexican government, intent on investigating the extent of the Guatemalan intrusion. Trueba
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traveled up and down this eastern stretch of the borderlands, interrogating the scattered local
Chiapan officials and residents about Guatemalan cultivation and inhabitation.
Trueba’s findings and actions during his 1956 journey are a revealing introduction to the
historical context that led to the increasing efforts by the Mexican national government after
1882 to establish a state presence in the Chiapan borderlands. Under the terms of the 1882
Treaty of Limits, Guatemalan officials renounced their claims to the region, but those claims did
not immediately disappear. Rather, they continued to appear in strident nationalist tracts and
domestic posturing throughout the twentieth century. The continuing resentment of Guatemalans
towards the 1882 Treaty, as well as the value politicians found in occasionally lambasting
Mexico, helps explain why the fundamental promises of that treaty -- binational cooperation, and
a greater Mexican state presence in the borderlands -- only became a reality in 1961 with the
establishment of the International Boundary and Water Commission between Mexico and
Guatemala (Comisión de Límites de México con Guatemala, CILA).141
During the period between the signing of the Treaty of Limits to the establishment of the
CILA in 1961, Mexican government officials from the president to key officials such as the
Secretaries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, gradually became both more intrigued by the
region’s possibilities and increasingly alarmed by a series of discoveries concerning the Chiapan
borderlands: poorly demarcated boundaries, rivers that eroded away Mexican territory, a region
populated by culturally and politically foreign Guatemalans, frequent “invasions” by
Guatemalans, and finally, the lack of diplomatic mechanisms to solve transnational issues. The
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Chiapan borderlands, parts of which in 1882 were literally blank on the official maps of the
Mexican nation, persisted in being a fugitive landscape in a number of ways. 142
Trueba must have felt that his trip demonstrated that the borderlands were a mixture of
both forgotten and fugitive. As the engineer continued his tour of the border, he found an
abundance of corn and coffee, as well as various vegetables destined for the feeding of pigs and
other animals. Based on the growth of the trees, the Mexican engineer calculated that some of
the clearings had been there for at least ten to fifteen years. Small, temporary homes lay
scattered among the fields, destined for the workers from Guatemala who occasionally came to
check on the crops and beat back the ever-encroaching jungle. The cultivation efforts were
extensive: in some places, the crops extended as far as six kilometers into Mexican territory.
Trueba noted that the food, all destined for Guatemalan villages, constituted contraband: it
passed over an international border without the knowledge of the Mexican state.143
Trueba also detailed another invasion. This much more “serious” intrusion into Mexican
territory involved families of Guatemalans that had established permanent ranches along the
border in Mexican territory, some as far as twenty kilometers from the border. Trueba focused
on two particular Guatemalans, the Mauricio brothers, whose path toward the Chiapan
borderlands demonstrated the ease with which people and goods could cross over the poorly
defined border during this period. 144
Around the age of eleven or twelve, the brothers left their town in the Guatemalan
department of Huehuetenango to join their father in Zapaluta, Chiapas.145 A few years after
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emigrating, the brothers began to clear jungle growth and cultivate large tracts of coffee and corn
on land near the border, which in Trueba’s word, because of its “legendary unhealthiness,”
Mexican farmers had not dared to enter, the area becoming “more myth than reality.” Despite
Trueba’s fantastical language, common in official Mexican description of the borderlands, scores
of Guatemalans did find their way to the property to work--or even, as Trueba suggested, to
escape debt or a labor contract across the border, a common practice dating back decades.146 So
settled were the brothers that Trueba noted that Guatemalan campesinos paid the brothers for the
right to clear and cultivate on the Mexican side of the border. In addition, the Mexican engineer
was convinced that the ranch had become a way station for contraband such as alcohol and
cattle.
Mariano Montes, another Guatemalan landlord in the region, stayed for most of the year
at his home in San Mateo Ixtatán, Guatemala, about forty miles from the border. Despite his
time away, Trueba calculated that Montes had developed nearly 2,500 acres of land wedged
between the Patara, Hormiguero, and Pohom Rivers. Like his earlier assessment of the
Mauricio’s brothers’ land, Trueba describes an exotic entrance to Montes’s ranch; he cut his way
through deep jungle to emerge into a large area where coffee, corn and bananas were cultivated
by indigenous Guatemalans. Though nearly inaccessible from the Mexican side, a clear-cut path
south demonstrated that the cultivation was destined for the Guatemalan market, a clear case of
contraband from Trueba’s point of view.
Trueba sent indigenous laborers from Montes’s ranch to fetch their employer; upon
questioning, Trueba learned that Montes had inherited the title to the land from his father-in-law,
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Eusebio González Díaz. González applied for ownership through the post-revolutionary August
2, 1923 Decree, popularly known as the Law of Free Lands. Issued by President Álvaro
Obregón, the law allowed any Mexican over the age of eighteen to acquire undeveloped public
land through the simple act of occupation and improvement, followed by notification to the
Secretariat of Agriculture and Development. Within two short years, the popular law
encouraged approximately 16,000 petitions for lands equaling over seven million acres. By
1926, the post-revolutionary regime replaced the Law of Free Lands because its vague nature
caused conflict on the ground.147 In Chiapas, however, the Law of Free Lands became useful to
those hired to begin the construction of the Pan-American Highway in 1931, as the roadway
expanded from the center of the state south. Many workers, including the Guatemalans hired as
cheap laborers, married into the rapidly expanding villages connected to the highway, and
through these unions, acquired land.

Montes’s father-in-law acquired virgin land under the

authorization of a defunct decree still respected, or at least referenced, in the distant
borderlands.148
In claiming that his father-in-law had applied for land through the Law of Free Lands of
1923, Montes strategically utilized the agrarian reforms of the Mexican government to justify his
land tenure. His reference to that older law was a reflection of the fact that this part of the
central and eastern borderlands had escaped the complicated legal, culture, and economic
conflict that occurred during the 1930’s in the much more populated Soconuscan area. There,
coffee-workers, long-time resident campesinos, and finca owners alternatively fought with and
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appealed to a federal government attempting to enact the numerous post-revolutionary agrarian
reform decrees. Internal and external battles over land ownership frequently turned upon
nationality, as feuding parties claimed Mexican citizenship and hurled accusations of being
Guatemalan at adversaries.149
Perhaps feeling pressure from Trueba, or perhaps wanting to placate the Mexican official,
Montes pointed out other Guatemalan landowners in the region. Trueba questioned them and
other suspected Guatemalan farmers, demanding proof of citizenship and land ownership. All
refused to comply, leading the determined Mexican engineer to denounce his suspects,
recommending that Comitán Customs or the Forest Office of the Secretariat of Agriculture
investigate and presumably take action.
Dissatisfied with the lack of federal response, Trueba then took it upon himself to
negotiate a memorandum of understanding with the municipal authorities of nearby Guatemalan
villages. In Guatemalan territory, on the bank of the Patara river, the self-appointed diplomat
Trueba met with the Auxiliary Officials of Chaquenal, Ixcanzán, and Nacional Río Seco of the
Department of Huehuetenango. Citing the cases of cultivation by Guatemalans in Mexican
territory, and recognizing that some of the infractions were due to ignorance over the boundary
lines, the memorandum allowed the violators four months to collect and clear their crops from
Mexican territory. The memorandum pointed out Montes in particular, mentioning that after an
extensive review of the documents as well as interviews by Trueba, the Guatemalan had a year to
vacate his extensive holdings.150
In a letter to superiors after the riverbank summit, Trueba recognized he overstepped his
authority. His superiors agreed, and Trueba’s actions earned him a stern rebuke after the
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Secretary of Foreign Relations received strongly worded protests from his Guatemalan
counterpart.151 Trueba’s justification for his actions, quoted below, reveals the deep frustrations
of confronting a borderlands that lacked attention from the center. The memorandum of
understanding signed at the river’s edge served as a type of protest against the federal
government’s inattention to Mexican sovereignty, while also providing a stark reminder that
despite sharing a common boundary, Guatemala and Mexico had no diplomatic mechanism to
work out disputes, share resources, or together determine where their countries ended and began.

I recognize having exceeded my duties and on occasion, having proceeded, up to a certain point,
arbitrarily, but in my view I believe that due to the lack of any other authority, and with the
possibility of acting immediately, I attempted, as an Official Representative, as a Mexican, to
provisionally remedy the situation, though I hope that in the near future once the respective
departments become aware of the issue, they will pay more attention to [this] piece of Mexican
land forgotten by us.152

Logging and the Revolution

Trueba’s fears were partly unfounded: the region did not lie as far out of the federal
bureaucratic gaze as he feared. In fact, he was there precisely as part of the increasing efforts by
the Mexican government since 1882 – and growing in intensity since the post-revolutionary
period of the 1930’s – to document the political, demographic and cultural character of the
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southern border. This effort emerged in internal and external (diplomatic) bureaucratic efforts.
The government had authorized studies, formed commissions, enlisted on-the-ground help,
reviewed data and finally decided, in the context of increasing international and national
priorities and pressures, what were the next steps in engagement with a southern periphery
largely forgotten for most of independent Mexico’s existence.
The first step by the Mexican government consisted of simply demarcating the southern
boundary. Article Four of the 1882 Treaty created a temporary binational boundary commission
to survey a border largely defined by local custom and colonial boundaries.153 Until an ad-hoc
border treaty in 1942, the 1882 boundary commission’s acrimonious and difficult existence
served as the only experience the two countries had with a binational organization committed to
resolving problems and improving conditions on the southern border. The often bizarre and
violent events delaying the initial 1882 Commission’s work – it was not until 1895 that both
countries agreed on a common demarcation – presaged the years of mistrust between the two
neighbors and augured difficulty in establishing a twentieth century organization.
It soon became clear from Guatemala’s choice to lead its commission, the U.S. engineer
and astronomer from the Washington Naval Observatory, Miles Rock, that the southern
borderlands boundary survey would not proceed smoothly. Rock served as the major
impediment to a work that the treaty estimated would be completed in a time span of two years.
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In the estimation of the Mexican historian Daniel Cosío Villegas, he seemed to be more of a
partisan for Guatemalan interests than were many Guatemalans.154
From the beginning of his appointment in 1884, the American engineer faithfully
executed the Guatemalan government’s strategy of delaying the demarcation of the border
through the deliberate misinterpretation of the treaty. The Guatemalans took this tack when they
discovered that following the demarcation stipulated in the treaty would mean Guatemala would
lose nearly six percent of the national territory they had not intended to surrender, around the
Lacandon Forest and in the northern department of Petén. As the demarcation efforts moved east
from the Pacific, the Suchiate no longer served as an obvious boundary marker as it turns south
and the border leaves it approximately fifty miles northeast of Tapachula. The lack of reliable
maps of the area added to the confusion that had caused Barrios to push through a treaty that
gave Mexico more land than he had intended; for example, those used during the negotiations
mislabeled the many rivers traversing the Lacandon. Despite the confusion, the 1882 treaty
clearly laid out how the demarcation of the eastern border of Chiapas should proceed: it began as
a line that extended along parallel 17° 49’, named the Santiago Vertex, until reaching the
“deepest channel of the Usumacinta river or of the Chixoy river should the parallel not meet the
first river.” Following that line, the eastern border of Chiapas, according to the 1882 treaty,
extended into what had been traditionally accepted as part of Guatemala (See Map 1). Rock and
the Guatemalan commission’s maps, on the other hand, reflected the traditional boundary: their
border followed the Santiago Vertex for only a few miles and then abruptly turned northeast, as
seen in the map below. This map was produced by the famed Mexican cartographer Antonio
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Garcia Cubas, who labeled Rock’s boundary an “arbitrary line,” as it claimed for Guatemala a
large swath of the Lacandon Forest – which Garcia Cubas labelled on the map as “land invaded
by Guatemala” – which was a clear deviation from the territorial outlines of the 1882 treaty.155
(See Map 2)

Map 1 “Limites de México y Guatemala según el Tratado del 27 de Septiembre de 1882,” Asociación para el Fomento
de los Estudios Históricos en Centro América.
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Map 2, “Copia del croquis del Ingeniero Miller Rock en el que aparece la línea trazada arbitrantemente trazada por
este,” Asociación para el Fomento de los Estudios Históricos en Centro América.
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For ten years both the Mexican and Guatemalan border commissions failed to find a
solution to their competing claims in the eastern borderlands. In contrast, the demarcation and
erection of monuments proceeded fairly quickly in the populous and well-mapped Soconusco
region, taking about six months. There, Guatemala actually gained approximately 2,000 square
miles as Mexico relinquished its right to some land claimed south of the Suchiate river.156 In the
Lacandon region each border commission sent occasional surveying expeditions into the
disputed area, but this political disagreement was mostly carried out in dueling maps and
pronouncements in the press. Rock and the Mexican Border Commissioner Miguel Pastrana
never actually met to discuss their differing viewpoints, and it is unclear how valuable such a
meeting would have been. In this way, for years, the borderlands dispute simmered as Rock and
Pastrana directed surveying expeditions in other, less controversial areas where Guatemala
bordered Tabasco and Campeche. Adding to the difficulty from the Mexican side was Pastrana’s
difficulty in recruiting laborers and engineers to perform the precise surveys as well as the
arduous work of clearing jungle and erecting monuments. News of the difficulties involved,
such as death of 300 macheteros from fever in 1886, along with low pay, discouraged
borderlanders from joining the border commission. In contrast, the Guatemalan commission had
a much easier path into the Lacandon, the land leading up to it consisted of flat plains, which
enabled Rock and his team of surveyors and Guatemalan officials to visit and, as we will see,
exert greater control of the borderlands.157
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Adding to the difficulty in resolving this dispute were the continuing operations as well
as contracts granted to numerous logging firms by the state governments of Tabasco and
Chiapas, and the department of San Marcos in Guatemala. After 1882 Guatemalan officials
continued to accept large amounts of money for extraction rights within territory ceded to
Mexico as outlined in the boundary treaty. These officials justified their actions based on the
maps Rock’s commissions produced. Logging companies, intent on securing access to the
valuable forest, paid off those local officials that had the greatest presence in the region, which
because of the greater ease of access, meant Guatemalan authorities. For example, a new
enterprise called Casa Romano, backed by vast amounts of Spanish capital, competed against
well-established firms such as Casa Jamet y Sastre, for access to the lucrative mahogany trade by
pouring money into the pockets of Guatemalan officials in towns such as San Marcos. As a
result, the logging camps scattered over the vast borderlands territory became sparks of
contention, symbolic of a lack of a mutually agreed upon border. In scattered incidents from
1889 onwards, Guatemalan soldiers dislodged or arrested logging firm contractors under the
pretense of illegally operating in Guatemalan territory. These loggers had fallen in disfavor
because they began to pay Mexican officials for extraction rights in reaction to the spatial
outlines of the 1882 Treaty. The appeal by the logging companies to local and federal Mexican
governments often resulted in official protests against Guatemalan actions, but no binational or
diplomatic steps cleared up an uneasy status quo that often turned violent. 158
Tensions heightened considerably in May and June of 1894, when Miles Rock led close
to one hundred members of the Guatemalan militia on a tour of logging camps granted rights by
local Mexican officials in the disputed section of the Lacandon Forest. Rock and the men under
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his command arrested the loggers for being in “Guatemalan” territory, confiscated material, and
burned camps. They were confronted at one camp by a Chiapan government inspector, leading
to a violent disagreement that forced the Mexican official to flee under a hail of gunfire. In
response to the Mexican government’s protest, Guatemalan officials refused to either condemn
Rock’s action, or curb their surveyor’s provocative violent actions.159
War seemed imminent. In his September 16, 1894 address to the nation, Mexican
President Porfirio Díaz denounced the conflict on the southern boundary. He demanded the
Guatemalan government pay reparations to the logging firms and their employees as well as
punish those responsible for the “abuses” committed in “land that had always belonged to the
state of Chiapas.”160 Despite Díaz’s insistence on attempting a peaceful solution, martial fever
seemed to spread. Eight state governments began to raise militias, plans were drawn up to
invade Guatemala -- columns would march from Tapachula, Comitán, Tabasco, and Campeche -- and the public began to donate funds for an extended conflict.161 In the borderlands,
Guatemalan refugees were fleeing to the Comitán region, reportedly escaping impressment into
the army of Jose Maria Reyna Barrios, the nephew of the late caudillo Barrios.162
Then the two governments walked back from the brink of conflict. Díaz did not want
war. Based on information received from long-time Mexican Ambassador Matías Romero, he
calculated that Guatemala enjoyed the support of the United States, while he became
increasingly alarmed at the funds expended in preparations for a war. In Guatemala, the border
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proved to be a convenient and timely rallying cry for the faltering government of Reyna Barrios,
but no appetite existed there either for an actual conflict. Meeting in Mexico City in April 1895,
Mexican and Guatemalan diplomats came to an agreement. Guatemala dismissed Miles Rock
and reaffirmed the 1882 territorial claims of Mexico in the disputed Lacandon region. Mexico
agreed to not press for compensation for troop mobilization, while as part of the negotiation, they
submitted claims of indemnification to the mutually agreed upon arbitrator, the Spanish Minister
in Mexico, for the damages caused by Rock and his crew.163
Much like the confidence Soconuscan coffee investors obtained from the 1882 treaty, the
1895 agreement between Mexico and Guatemala sparked a capital-fueled race to extract lumber,
and a new commodity, chicle, from the eastern part of the borderlands. Assisting would-be
logging and gum magnates were the land tenure laws developed during the early years of the
Porfiriatio, which laid a legal foundation for the auctioning off of the Lacandon to the highest
bidder. Instead of establishing the state in the borderlands, the Mexican government chose to
contract the use of the border out to the highest bidder; in the offices of the Secretary of
Development, large companies parceled off and bought huge swaths of land, often sight unseen.
The 1894 Regulation for Exploitation of Woods and Unoccupied and National Lands
(Regulación para la Explotación de los Bosques y Terrenos Baldíos y Nacionales) facilitated the
sale of the Lacandon by private interests. The Regulation allowed contractors to lease millions
of acres of national land for the purpose of extracting “lumber, rubber, and resin.” In addition,
key wording allowed the contractors the option to buy the land they leased. 164 An example of
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the magnitude of the process with which Mexico City auctioned the borderlands is the enormous
amount of territory granted in 1905 to the wealthy Spanish nobleman Claudio López Bru, or the
Marqués de Comillas. A recent addition to noble ranks – King Alfonso XII of Spain created and
granted the title to his father in 1878 in recognition of financial assistance to the state – López
formed the Compañía Ibero Mexicana in 1887 to demarcate and colonize parts of Guerrero, one
of the many such enterprises formed under the Law of Colonization of 1883.165 Due to
complications that developed with that lease, the Secretary of Development offered López a
similar sized property in another part of Mexico. In 1904, López’s Compañía Ibero demarcated
nearly 500,000 acres of land in the southeastern corner of the Lacandon. In 1905, the Mexican
government gave the title to 320,000 acres of land to López, while selling the leftover plot of
land allocated by law to public auction to a logging firm.166 In this way, on the eve of the
Mexican Revolution, the Secretary of Development had converted over one million acres of the
Lacandon Forest into the private property of logging firms, one of which, in the case of the
entirely foreign controlled and financed Aguas Azul, controlled close to 300,000 acres.167 It was
only the overthrow of Díaz that stopped the auction, saving thousands of acres of forests from
the logging camps. 168
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The Mexican Revolution jarred loose the Porfiriato, but when the revolution arrived in
Chiapas, it looked very different from the way it did in the rest of Mexico.169 The course of the
revolution in the borderlands revealed the region’s isolation from the political, economic, and
social movements wracking the rest of the country. Instead, the revolution in Chiapas reflected
the interests and struggles of local elites. The border itself became a became a site of violent
utility, as opposing forces crossed back and forth, escaping into a Guatemala eager to foment
political strife in neighboring Mexico.
The first few years of the conflict became defined by the conflict between conservative
San Cristóbal and the progressive stronghold and state capital, Tuxtla Gutiérrez. For example,
the short 1911 rebellion led by San Cristóbal elites, joined by thousands of highland indigenous
troops, against Tuxtla Gutiérrez had little to do with the Madero movement, or events further
north. Instead, it was a rejection of the economic and political changes enacted by the científicos
(technocratic officials intent on modernizing Mexico along positivist principles) sent to govern
during the Porfiriato, such as attempts to modernize labor relations and, above all, the transfer of
the state capital from San Cristóbal to Tuxtla. The Mano Negra rebellion lasted only a few
weeks. With the Caste War of 1867 fresh in the minds of both groups of opposing elites, the
indigenous allies of San Cristóbal were quickly dismissed, and the mestizo elites decided to
conduct their battle through political intrigue and threats of violence instead.170
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Open fighting, if not outright civil war, next erupted in the summer of 1914, when
General Jesus Agustín Castro arrived to consolidate revolutionary leader Venustiano Carranza’s
rule in isolated Chiapas. His address to an assembled crowd upon arriving encapsulated the
approach he and the over thousand-man Carrancista force took towards the now occupied state,
“Chiapaneco cowards, while the north is struggling, you are enjoying peace, but I will teach you
to feel the effects of the revolution.”171 Through the burning of fincas, arrests, and outright
violence, the general attempted to enforce a series of far-reaching progressive reforms. Most
significant were labor laws which, among other changes, abolished debt servitude and introduced
requirements for land-owners to provide a minimum wage, health care, schools, and housing.
A minor landholder, Fernando Ruiz, led a small group of mestizos in opposition,
attacking troop convoys, robbing travelers on the Pan-American highway, and raiding
Carrancista garrisons. The Mapache Rebellion—the rebels were called los mapaches, raccoons,
for their habit of attacking at night—was initially composed of “frontier finqueros and ranchers”
who were fighting against an occupying army, rather than against the progressive reforms
brought from the north. Though at the outset Ruiz adopted the banner of Zapatismo because of
Emiliano Zapata’s opposition to Carranza, the growing Brigada Libre de Chiapas had nothing to
do with the central Mexican revolutionary’s national program. Instead, as in 1911, the revolution
became a civil war for state power, as Ruiz welcomed to his ranks disaffected elites, some even
with family members in the new government.
Though the Carrancista regime was able to implement reforms in key areas of the state,
including in the borderlands region of Soconusco, the inability of the revolutionary regime to
control the traffic of arms and men across the border allowed the increasingly bloody conflict in
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Chiapas to continue until 1920.172 Exacerbating the Carrancistas’ security problem were the
actions of Guatemalan president Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920). In Mexico’s national
confusion, Estrada saw an opportunity to weaken Guatemala’s traditional rival regardless of any
ideological affinity he might have had with any revolutionary group. Throughout the revolution,
Estrada maintained an antagonistic posture to domestic peace in Mexico expressed through his
policy of assistance to the Mapaches. Some authors have even suggested that a dementiainflicted Estrada might have contemplated retaking Chiapas from a weakened Mexico.
Regardless, Estrada’s assistance provided the Mapaches a lifeline. When facing superior forces,
Mapache groups simply escaped across the border. The Guatemalan caudillo also played a key
role in supporting the largely symbolic counter-revolutionary efforts of Felix Díaz, Porfirio
Díaz’s nephew. After a failed uprising in Veracruz in 1916, Díaz and his band of Felicistas
operated out of northern Guatemala until 1920, occasionally joining the Mapaches in their
attacks throughout the countryside.173
In 1920 the former Mapache leader Fernando Ruiz became governor of Chiapas. Ruiz’s
inability to control the emerging social forces demanding reform, along with a lack of support
from the federal government, made it impossible for Ruiz to hold power. Ruiz simply ignored
or, barring that, delayed through lack of funding, the enforcement of the economic and political
reforms brought by the revolution, such as the 1914 Labor Laws, which banned the notorious
engache system that had long plagued Chiapas. Long a source of derision by outside observers-many called it slavery--this labor arrangement tied mostly indigenous laborers to large-scale
fincas through inescapable debt. As far as reconstruction, in part to rebuild the damage inflected
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by his revolutionary band, Ruiz concentrated on the central valley in and around Tuxtla
Gutiérrez, neglecting the borderlands.174
Resistance to Ruiz’s rule came from the borderlands and ensured his downfall. The
Chiapan Socialist Party, which drew its strength from Soconuscan coffee workers, ensured in
1924 that incoming president Calles would not support the Mapache’s hand-picked successor.
The election of the Socialist Party’s leader, Carlos Vidal, to the governorship finally brought a
small degree of the land and labor reform promised in the revolution to Chiapas. For example,
during the Vidal years, newly approved state agrarian laws allowed the distribution of nearly
200,000 acres of land to over six thousand families.175 As Trueba discovered nearly thirty years
later, borderlanders, regardless of nationality, took advantage of these opportunities, and the state
lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure to ensure that only Mexicans benefited from the revolution.
The reforms Vidal promoted came to abrupt halt upon his death in 1927. Opposed to the
dual caudillo team of Plutarco Elías Calles and Álvaro Obregon’s hold on power as Obregón
campaigned to return to the presidency, he was assassinated by their supporters at a military
checkpoint.176 The Calles administration’s choice for governor, Raymundo Enríquez, ensured
that reforms in the valuable coffee borderlands of Soconsuco did not affect the important
generation of funds. Indeed, Enríquez lowered taxes on coffee, while also ensuring that national
agrarian reform did not lead to the partition of the large coffee fincas that were responsible for
nearly 80 percent of all state revenue. The last pre-Cárdenas state governor, Victórico Grajales, a
central valley rancher, concentrated on economic modernization, transforming local government
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into a tool for landowners. The state budget for roads almost doubled, leading to an even greater
demand for labor from Guatemala, while industry taxes were eliminated..177
Between the end of the revolution in 1920 and the election of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934,
the post-revolutionary state paid little attention to issues such as the demographics of the
borderlands or hardening of the border. Coordinated efforts by the federal government to
address the borderlands through policy and direct intervention of officials sent from Mexico City
were ad-hoc reactions to events on the ground. On the eve of the Cárdenas administration’s
intervention into the region, the federal government’s initial examination of who lived in the
borderlands brought up alarming xenophobic denunciations of a Guatemalan invasion. In early
1935 a wide ranging tour of the entire Chiapan borderlands by an official inspector with the
Secretariat of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación) laid bare the result of this migration as
well as the lack of effective border controls from Soconusco to the Lacandon Forest. The
inspector visited the nascent Immigration Inspection Service (Servicio de Inspección de
Migrantes, SM, discussed in detail below) offices, noting the “absolute lack of border vigilance.”
As a consequence, the inspector wrote alarmingly of the composition of the borderlands:

The writer in his tour heard the clamor of [the Mexicans in the borderlands] that see themselves
surrounded by people not beholden to the central government or the Mexican nation, that cheer
Guatemala, and on the smallest occasion insult our country…the sentiment of this grand mass of
humanity, whose numbers grow, it is estimated to be 50,000 souls, is through and through
Guatemalan.178
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Cárdenas and the Borderlands

The elevation of Cárdenas to the presidency in 1934 brought the post-revolutionary
Mexican state to the Chiapan borderlands. If elsewhere in Mexico Cardenismo sought to
transform the countryside, organize the workers, and strengthen the state, in Chiapas Cardenismo
also meant making the region “Mexican.” Federal bureaucrats arriving in the Chiapan
borderlands sought to both transform and incorporate the region into the national fold through
reforms in the areas of education, land tenure, and labor. These benefits, promised to Mexicans
as part of the revolution, became contested in the borderlands as both borderlanders and the state
worried that Guatemalans were enjoying the social and economic fruits of the revolutionary
struggle. In reaction to this alarm, Cárdenas became the first post-revolutionary president to
pursue policies directly related to the perceived demographic problems in the borderlands. The
federal government attempted to tame this fugitive landscape through documentation,
registration, and deportation of Guatemalans, while at the same time trying to establish
binational cooperation with the Guatemalan government regarding shared transnational issues.
Unlike the failure of past national regimes to assert themselves in Chiapas, the Cárdenas
administration made a special effort to bring the federal government to the distant province.
Indeed, Cárdenas scheduled his first state wide tour outside of Mexico City in Chiapas,
promising to a crowd in the borderland town of Comitán to “bring the benefits of the
Revolution.”179 The trajectory of one of these benefits, Article 123 schools, in Chiapas during
the Cárdenas regime reveals the limits of state intervention in the borderlands, as well as the
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reaction by federal employees new to Chiapas to a unique borderlands demographic.180 Named
for the provision which created them in the 1917 Constitution, the curriculum developed by the
Ministry of Public Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública, SEP) in the 1930’s began to
reflect the intellectual elite’s radicalized interpretation of the revolution’s causes, and ultimately
its future. This trajectory culminated in 1934 with an embrace of socialist education. Textbooks
became vehicles to explain the evils of capitalism and the sins of the Porfiriato, such as a slavish
embrace of foreign capital. The revolutionary SEP fashioned an idea of Mexican citizenship
around the ideal of hardworking rural peasants, women and men alike, encouraged to demand
rights enshrined in the progressive 1917 Constitution.181
Efforts like the Article 123 schools brought to the attention of the federal government the
issue of nationality in the borderlands. For example, Stephen Lewis relates how these teachers,
“state-building shock troops for the central government,” in addition to promoting agrarian
reform and workers’ rights, also worried about the suspected national allegiance of
borderlanders.182 In Mexico City, higher ups in the SEP, as well as functionaries and teachers on
the ground in borderlands communities such as La Libertad and Tuxtla Chico, complained about
children and parents suspected to be more Guatemalan than Mexican. One SEP inspector
claimed the emotional reaction by some borderlanders at the appearance of the Guatemalan flag,
a supposed misty reverence, revealed the dangerous patriotic attachment of borderlanders who
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claimed to be Mexican. Schooling — if they could find properly patriotic Mexican teachers, a
worry of officials — became even more important, as it represented a vehicle to mold Mexican
citizens.183
Like education, agrarian reform brought the issue of nationality in the borderlands to the
surface. Instead of forging “Mexicans,” the Cardenista land tenure laws prompted local struggles
over who could claim Mexican citizenship. In her study of the formation of ejidos constructed
by Soconuscan communities from the expropriation of coffee fincas, Catherine Nolan-Ferrell
examines how land petitions among coffee workers turned upon claims of Mexicanness, and
their rights as citizens. In response, landowners anxious to keep land protested to officials of the
SM and the Secretary of Interior that Guatemalans were forming ejidos. In one instance in 1934,
SM officials forcibly deported the men, all laborers in the coffee fields, from the newly formed
community of Colonia Salvador Urbina based on a rival landowners’ accusation of Guatemalan
nationality. After nighttime crossing back into Mexico over the Suchiate River, the returning
men protested to the Secretary of the Interior, claiming their Mexicanness was attacked by the
German landowner. Eventually successful in their petition, the inhabitants of the ejido Salvador
Urbina proved how fluid and potent a claim of Mexican citizenship was for the new rights
promised by Cardenismo in the Chiapan borderlands.184
With the introduction of federal government through the Cárdenas-era reforms, Mexico
City bureaucrats and the president himself turned their attention to the demographic composition
of the borderlands. On March 18, 1935 Cárdenas created, by presidential decree, the
Intersecretarial Demographic Commission (Comisión Demográfica Intersecretarial, CDI).
Composed of representatives from the Secretariats of the Interior, Foreign Relations, and
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Agriculture, the CDI was charged with studying the “demographic problems of the GuatemalanMexican border.” The CDI concentrated on the Soconusco region and adjacent Mariscal
municipality, because of its high concentration of Guatemalan laborers migrating to work in the
coffee fields, and as the most populous region of the borderlands. It operated until July 1941,
when by residential decree Manual Ávila Camacho replaced it with the Intersecretarial
Demographic Commission of Soconusco (Comisión Demográfica Intersecretarial de la Zona de
Soconusco, CDIS).185
The CDI’s charge to study perceived demographic problems occurred in the context of
growing national concerns during the 1930’s about the perceived arrival of unassimilated,
dangerous, or unhealthy immigrants in Mexico. Such concerns led to increasingly strict,
nationalist, and racist laws restricting the right of foreigners to live and work in Mexico. The
1930 Migration Law tightened the control of labor, requiring employers, for example, to pay a
fee in the case of repatriation of their foreign employees. It also established racial and moral
guidelines for the admittance of foreigners barring immigrants with supposed physical and
educational defects, or barring those that practiced national customs perceived to be harmful to
Mexico, such as some Arab immigrants. The growing xenophobia culminated in the 1936
General Population Law. Based on a eugenically inspired view of economic competition, this
law set quotas on nationalities perceived to possess unfair economic advantages, such as
immigrants from China. Ultimately, potential immigrants were judged on their labor and if they
would contribute to the Mexican nation in transferring skills, or if they would simply take away
jobs.186
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Ancillary to the legislation were efforts around the country to understand and “fix” this
perceived immigration problem. For example, in Mexico City, a School for the Mexicanization
of Immigrants opened up in 1934.187 In the early 1930’s the recently formed National
Revolutionary Party commissioned the demographer and economist Gilberto Loyo to write a
study about the demographic composition of the country, which was published in 1935 as La
política demográfica en México (Demographic Policy in Mexico) Loyo considered his work to
be more than mere statistics, emphasizing his duties “in the defense of the life, national
integration, and assuring the historical continuity of the nation.” In his review of expulsions of
foreigners since 1921, Guatemalans occupied the top space.188
Chiapas presented a unique situation to authorities worried about foreign influence as by
the 1930s historical, economic, and political factors created a confusing and chaotic situation
with regard to registration of nationality. A memo justifying the labor of the CDI traced the
existing confusion back to the 1882 Treaty of Limits when, similar to the stipulations in the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Guatemalans living in the Chiapan territory ceded to Mexico
suddenly became Mexicans.189 However, this stipulation only added to the confusion in the
region as the lack of state presence in 1882 meant it was impossible for the Mexican state to
determine in 1935 who had obtained citizenship, or inherited Mexican citizenship, from Article
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V of the 1882 Treaty. Underlining all this uncertainty was the estimation that 95 percent of
Soconusco inhabitants had no form of identification for any country.190
Indeed, since 1882 borderlanders had generally made do without any form of
identification of nationality; whether born in Guatemala or Mexico, many did not need to obtain
proof of citizenship to carry out day-to-day activities. For some, according to the CDI report,
bureaucratic impediments were listed as reasons they never got around to applying for official
documentation. Borderlanders complained that the four or five cent fee demanded by the
Chiapan Civil Register for a birth certificate was too much. A vast majority took their newborns
to Guatemalan churches for free baptisms; all that was needed there was to state the baby was
born in Guatemala. Besides, anti-church revolutionaries had destroyed many Mexican baptism
records. Borderlanders who claimed Mexican citizenship became notorious for refusing to
obtain any form of documentation, claiming they did not need any to prove their Mexicanness.
The coffee bonanza of the early twentieth century further added to the confusion, especially
when world prices jumped during 1921-1934, which brought approximately six to ten thousand
central Guatemalans north into Soconusco each year to work the harvest. Finqueros “spilled
money into open hands” to make this happen, bribing state and municipal authorities, as well as
federal officials in Migration, the military, and the Secretariat of Labor, up to a thousand pesos to
look the other way. Many of the Guatemalans who came to work decided to stay and make a life
in the borderlands.191
The corruptibility of SM officials in Chiapas made it impossible to enforce increasingly
strict immigration laws and to regulate citizenship for both Guatemalan and Mexican
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borderlanders. The SM, reconstituted under the authority of the Secretariat of the Interior in
1926, became an example of the difficulty the federal government faced in carrying out policy
through bureaucratic institutions. Shaped on the model of the United States Border Patrol, the
SM had its primary presence on Mexico’s borders. In theory they worked alongside another
Interior department, the Office of Population and Migration, (Oficina de Población y Migración,
PM) in borderland communities. Population and Migration was responsible for internal
immigration enforcement, working with municipal officials to enforce regulations determining
residency and citizenship.192 In practice, as we will discuss below, the line of authority between
Population and Migration and the SM was never clearly defined, as the Chief of Immigration
Service of the Southern Border directed all federal officials responsible for immigration under
the SM. Perhaps contributing to the bureaucratic chaos was the poor professionalism displayed
by officials, who were poorly paid and underfunded. Rampant alcoholism among higher ups
combined with strict laws utilized to shake down individuals and businesses produced an
institutionalized acceptance of corruption.193
In Soconusco, SM officials, along with their local municipal counterparts, utilized the
new immigration laws, the increasing xenophobia directed at Guatemalans, as well as the overall
lack of individual identification, to demand money from borderlanders and their employers.
Together, Mexican and Guatemalan workers became a “vein of exploitation…an inexhaustible
source of money.” Officials had many ways to abuse their power for financial gain. For
example, borderlanders were picked up on the suspicion of “being Guatemalan” and forced to
pay a fine or be deported to Guatemala even when they were, in fact, Mexican. SM officials
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would often go to fincas to shake down workers, transporting groups over the border to
Guatemala if they failed to pay. Finqueros also bribed the same officials to deport unruly
workers agitating for greater rights, with the result that as they crossed back into Chiapas,
authorities registered Mexican workers as Guatemalans.194
In part, the arrival of CDI officials and greater enforcement from the Secretariat of the
Interior lessened the corruption as federal officials sought to develop an accurate census picture
of the region. However, those working for CDI faced a daunting task in documenting the
citizenship of borderlanders. Setting up in borderland towns, such as Tapachula, Suchiate, and
Unión Juárez, CDI officials required heads of families to register their nationality. Absent a
birth certificate or baptismal record, census takers relied on testimonies of neighbors or, finally,
an individual swearing under oath that he or she was a Mexican citizen. Census workers
especially took into consideration those who had children born in Mexico, claiming they had
“legal and moral ties [arraigo] to Mexican nationality.” 195
In this manner from 1935-1941 CDI registered 46,434 individual heads of household, or
a calculated 151,028 inhabitants of the municipalities of Soconusco and Mariscal as Mexican
citizens, leaving approximately 19,045 unidentified.196 Of those 46,434 heads of household,
37,542 were registered as Mexican, while 1,368 children of foreigners opted for Mexican
citizenship. The CDI registered 6,306 residents as foreigners or Latin Americans, noting that the
majority were Guatemalan. The Guatemalans who chose to come to the municipal office and
register with CDI officials had some form of identification. This fact can be seen in the final
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report, which notes that the majority of those identifying as Guatemalans had or were in the
process of receiving naturalization papers, while others had requested or had an official work
permit from the Secretariat of Foreign Relations.197
Despite claiming to have registered 75 percent of the inhabitants of Soconusco and 25
percent of those of Mariscal, the CDI admitted the likelihood that a large number of Guatemalans
who had recently entered the country had avoided registration. The report noted the probability
that after of few years of work in the borderlands, many of these unregistered Guatemalans
would seek to obtain recognition as Mexican citizens, joining the ejido they worked on or,
echoing the complaints of finqueros, attempt to form ejidos with other Guatemalan finca
workers.198 Finally, as if to indicate the incompleteness of their work, the CDI listed 242 ejidos
in Soconsuco and Mariscal in which they still had not defined the nationality of the ejiditarios.199
Despite the knowledge that thousands of borderlanders escaped registration by the CDI,
federal officials adopted a nuanced view of the threat posed by unregistered Guatemalan
immigration. Officials from the Secretariats of Labor, Foreign Relations, Agriculture, and the
Interior, reviewing the work of the CDI in 1941, concluded that the majority of Guatemalan
immigrants lacked “the education and mental capacity” to cause much harm. Within their
demeaning view of the Guatemalan laborers was a more sophisticated analysis of the
borderlanders’ conception of place. Though some “detestable” Guatemalans might refer to
colonial claims on Chiapas and declare they were actually in their “own country,” for the most
part Guatemalan and Mexican borderlanders had a much more localized sense of belonging to a

197
Informe de los Labores Verificadas por la Extinta Comisión Demográfica Intersecretarial, Tapachula,
June 12, 1941, AH-SRE Legajo 334-4 Expedientes 84-97.
198
Informe de los labores verificadas por la extinta Comisión Demográfica Intersecretarial, Tapachula,
June 12, 1941, AH-SRE Legajo 334-4 Expediente 86.
199
Nombres de los ejidos que tienen sin definir la Nacionalidad de sus Ejidatarios, Tapachula, June 11,
1941, AH-SRE Legajo 334-4 Expedientes 137-142.

98

village in Guatemala left long ago, or a present-day ejido in the borderlands. Indeed, these
officials noted that, for the most part, Guatemalan ejiditarios, in customs indistinguishable from
those of Mexicans, were content with and appreciative of the parcel of land received from their
newly adopted country.200

Controlling the Border

Officials of the newly developed Intersectional Demographic Commission of Soconusco
(CDIS) in 1941 did not take such a relaxed view of Guatemalan immigration as the officials of
the CDI. For one thing, they worried about the potential political and social harm the socialist
education introduced during Cardenismo could produce amongst borderlanders. This attitude
reflected the arrival in power of the more conservative Manuel Ávila Camacho administration
(1940-1946). At a national level, the SEP removed socialist education from schools, replacing it
with an education that emphasized an imagined harmony of the rural countryside and the rapidly
developing urban Mexico. Above all, instead of the development of a socially conscious student,
the new curriculum emphasized the development of complacent workers, ready to contribute to
economic development, without much complaint, and certainly not unrest. 201 In the borderlands,
officials worried about the lasting impact of the “pernicious labor…of rural, especially federal
[teachers], who, imbued with exotic ideas and wanting to play politics, have disoriented the rural
[campesino] class.” Instead of a class-oriented education, CDIS officials “truly urged” the
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“indispensable” work of fostering an education that “created a sense of country and
nationalism.”202 In this instance, the worries of CDIS were soon placated. Since their
introduction local Chiapan landowners had resisted Article 123 schools, and many of the
previous most energetic administrative reformers, in the interest of job security, suddenly
“discovered” the folly of radical education, ensuring that local teachers followed a more
conservative emphasis in schools throughout Chiapas.203
The officials of the CDIS urged additional measures, such as an increase of SM officials
along the border, to guard against the potential impact that agrarian rights under Cardenismo
might have in increasing undocumented Guatemalan immigration. They speculated that
ejidatarios of Guatemalan origin were enticing relatives to come to the borderlands, where they
would eventually demand land as Mexicans. In addition, they worried about the continued labor
flows of workers to coffee plantations and ejidos, as these Guatemalans, after a season or two in
Mexico, would claim the rights of Mexicans. They instead suggested a concentrated effort to
recruit indigenous Chamulans from the Central Highlands; the promised Pan-American
Highway, connecting the border towns of Tapachula and Comitán to San Cristóbal de las Casas,
offered a manner to distribute cheap seasonal labor from the middle of the state to the Soconusco
region.204
Above all, the CDIS suggested a more expansive and active federal government,
coordinating in part with state officials, to halt undocumented immigration, register inhabitants,
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and deport “illegal” Guatemalan immigrants, not just in Soconusco, despite the name of the
Commission, but throughout the borderlands. They envisioned increased patrols of the PM,
suggesting that they increase deportation of unregistered Guatemalans, or ominously,
considering the common lack of documentation, those for whom it was impossible to “determine
their Mexican citizenship.” For those Guatemalans that slipped through the net, or had obtained
legal residency, the federal government would work with the state government to move — how
is not specified — the Guatemalan population away from the border. They recommended
increased staffing in the Secretariats of Agriculture and Development, as well as Labor and
Social Welfare, to carry out investigative functions, as well as the completion of another census
in the areas of Soconusco, Mariscal, and Comitán.205
Finally, after “settling the population” to the extent possible, that is removing
unregistered Guatemalan and establishing effective control of the movement in the borderlands,
they proposed wide-ranging assimilation, admitting the impossibility of removing all
undocumented borderlanders who had made a life in the region in towns such as Tapachula, and
the ejidos established since 1935. They recommended removing any type of legal difference
between Guatemalans and those who were Mexicans by birth, fully incorporating those
Guatemalans, “until the memory of the previous nationality of being Guatemalan disappears.”206
The CDIS lasted until 1947 and it had mixed success in its goals of registering
borderlanders, reducing the continued influx of Guatemalan immigrants, and ensuring the
creation of patriotic Mexican borderlanders.207 In part its work was complicated by Mexico’s

205
Miguel Alvarado, et al., to Secretario de Gobernación, et al., December 29, 1941, AH-SRE Legajo 3344 Expediente 36-41.
206
Miguel Alvarado, et al., to Secretario de Gobernación, et al., December 29, 1941, AH-SRE Legajo 3344 Expediente 42.
207
México, Diario oficial de la federación: órgano constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
October 23, 1947.

101

entrance into the war against Germany in 1942, and the takeover of German-owned coffee fincas
by the newly created Mexican bureau, the Board of Administration and Supervision of Foreign
Property (Junta de Administración y Vigilancia de la Propiedad Extranjera. JAVPE). Rife with
corruption, the JAVPE undermined the mission of the CDIS by hiring cheaper Guatemalan
laborers in order for the new government appointed finca administrators to increase the profits of
the fincas they suddenly found in their possession.
In 1944, for example, President Ávila Camacho’s office received a series of complaints
from the Tapachula region regarding preferential hiring of Guatemalan workers. The Federation
of Chiapaneco Workers (Federación de Trabajadores del Estado de Chiapas) cited in particular
the case of the ex-Guatemalan coronel José Quiñones, who had risen to be the Section Chief of
the Coffee Fiduciary of Chiapas (Fideicomisos Cafetaleros de Chiapas). Quiñones, explained
the complaints, encouraged the hiring of Guatemalan workers over Mexican, while setting a
“despotic” work regimen that violated labor law.208 The note contained a series of complains
about the inaction of the CDIS. It related how in the presence of a Confidential Agent of the
CDIS, Quiñones maneuvered to hire Guatemalans in various managerial posts throughout the
Tapachula coffee region, including some with known criminal backgrounds.209
Whether in the office of coffee administrators or out in the field, officials of the CDIS
began to acquire a reputation as corruptible; indeed the CDIS itself acquired the nickname of
“Manufacturer of Mexicans.” Community struggles over who had rights to land continued into
the 1940’s as ejiditarios accused CDIS officials of having creating Mexicans “out of thin air,”
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giving out the most productive pieces of land to Guatemalans. Some borderlanders demanded a
new commission to sort out the problems of the old one.210 Even the head of the 31st Military
Zone in Tapachula, José Dominguez Ramírez Garrido, complained a year after the CDIS’s
demise of the Guatemalans that, “through magic transformed into Mexicans.” He complained
that they cultivated coffee on prime land while living in Guatemala, occasionally returning to
Soconusco to check on their cash crop. In the event of a referendum on Chiapas’s nationality, he
pointed out, it would surely go back to Guatemala, much as it had belonged to the Captaincy
General during the colonial era. Overall, he warned how this “pacific invasion” constituted a
danger for national security.211
Despite these public and official outcries against Guatemalan immigration, some
borderlanders complained about government efforts at removing a Guatemalan presence from
fincas and ejidos. For example, at the same time as the president’s office received complaints
about a Guatemalan invasion in the 1940’s, borderland ejiditarios enlisted the help of the newly
formed General Union of Workers and Campesinos (Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de
México, UGOCM) to protest deportations of Guatemalan laborers.212 The UGOCM complained
that throughout the region officials from the Secretariat of Agriculture were removing ejiditarios
with Guatemalan backgrounds from their land, even though they were counted in 1935 by the
CDI as Mexican. In essence, the government was taking land from “new” Mexicans simply
because of their Guatemalan background.213
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Corruption in the Borderlands

Part of the failure of the federal government in general to tame their fugitive borderlands
along the lines outlined by ad-hoc groups like the CDIS was due to the incompetence and
corruptibility of officials coming from the center and north of Mexico and their cultural distance
from the borderlands. New financial and economic programs enacted during the years of
Cardenismo, as well as increased vigilance regarding the movement of goods and people across
the border, brought scores of federal officials into the region to manage a transnational flow with
traditions long pre-dating the establishment of the 1882 Treaty, or the Demographic
Commissions of the post-revolutionary governments. An undated memo from the head of the
CDIS, Salvador Cardona, addressed the potential clash between Chiapanecos and representatives
of the center. Though he characterized Chiapanecos as “extremely provincial, violent, and
arrogant,” he explained their “admittedly justified….bad attitude” toward the Federal
government based on the history of their relationship with the center:

Really, the Federation has done little for Chiapas and when it has paid attention to it, it is only to
extract some resources without compensation. The means of communication are horrible; the
state is isolated from the rest of the country. There is no commercial or cultural exchange…You
have to keep in mind…the sending, to occupy various Official Federal positions, by discredited
individuals by the Federal Government is as a punishment, or for them to enrich themselves.
Alcoholism is a prevailing vice, and the government employees live in the worst of ways. 214
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Cardona’s worries regarding the quality of federal employees sent to the borderlands
seemed to be justified in the case of arguably the most important federal official on the southern
border, the Chief of Immigration Service of the Southern Border. The chief led SM officials in
the efforts to regulate the immigration laws within borderland communities. Stationed in
Tapachula, the Chief of Migration regulated the flow of people and goods that entered Mexico
through official ports, including those carried by the increasing number of trains heading north.
In addition, he also ensured the proper registration of borderlanders already in living in the
region. Laborers, employers, and businesses fell under the purview of SM agents who had the
power to demand documentation verifying nationality, or permission to work and live in the
borderlands. This expansive regulatory and investigative power invested in the office led to
numerous abuses from agents, and in particular the Chief of Migration.
In 1941, at the same time that the CDIS was proposing heightened vigilance on the
border and increased regulation, employees under the Chief of the SM, Francisco Ochoa
Zamudio, were writing the Secretariat of the Interior about their boss’s violent, corrupt, and
irregular tendencies.

One accused Ochoa of suddenly pulling a gun on him, threatening to

shoot him for supporting a complaint against him written by the wife of a Guatemalan official.
Once safely ensconced in Guatemala, the woman in question wrote how Ochoa had stalked her
through Tapachula, entering her hotel room, and holding her immigration papers in the hope that
she would attempt to retrieve them so he could take her on a car ride, “to a more discreet place
where nobody would notice.”215
In 1949, the Secretariat of the Interior once again received complaints regarding the Chief
of Migration, Belisario Villa Constantino, from employees. Villa obtained the position thanks to
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his connections to the top of the local and national Mexican political hierarchy, through his
powerful brother-in-law, Dr. Pascacio Gamboa, former Governor of Chiapas (1940-1944) and
the national Secretary of Public Health (1946-1952). Before arriving in Tapachula, Villa had
already obtained an infamous reputation as the former Chief of Sanitary Police in Mexico City
and Mayor of Tapachula, for his “ambitious bribery.” Their list of complaints ranged from
“intolerable” working conditions that included long and irregular hours, as well Villa expanding
the scope of corruption. As before with Ochoa, Interior sent an investigator to check on the
claims of the Chief of Migrations employees.

He shook down tourists, finca owners, and

Guatemalan immigrants, organized and ran gambling rings, protected sexual trafficking and
abused employees, eventually prompting an investigation by the Secretariat of the Interior.216
What troubled the investigating Interior official most were the large-scale violations of
immigration law. The federal government was resigned, in part, to a certain level of corruption;
the inspector attributed many of the employee complaints to an unequal distribution of bribes.
However Villa, through the placement of friends and family members in key SM positions,
converted his office into a fiefdom dedicated to profiting off the avoidance of the federal
governments’ dictates to control the flow of unregistered Guatemalans into the country. In some
respects Villa’s conduct was not unusual. He continued the tradition of officials accepting
money from Soconuscan finca owners to facilitate the entrance of Guatemalan braceros, while at
the request of the same coffee farmers deporting those braceros agitating for better pay or
working conditions. But Villa went beyond the usual abuse of power. The Interior official also
noted the many prominent local businesses in Tapachula owned by unregistered Guatemalans,
who relied on bribes to Villa to stay in the country. In addition, Villa’s border guards were
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facilitating the migration of Guatemalans throughout the state, and indeed all of the country.
Guatemalans, warned the report, were not staying in the borderlands, but moving to the north of
Chiapas, or even ending up in Mexico City or cities on the northern border. Small-scale
Guatemalan businesspersons “know perfectly…the authorities [Migration] and know perfectly
also what the fee [gratificaciones] is for each one.”

Though the official recognized that

unregistered immigration into the Chiapan borderlands was almost impossible to stop because of
the “unpopulated and forested region of the border,” the report expressed concern about Villa’s
attempts to extend his reach beyond the SM to other aspects of the federal bureaucracy on the
border.217
The archives are unclear about the fate of Villa following the Secretariat of Interior
investigation, though the regional press continued to denounce the consequences of the
corruption, and inactivity, of SM officials. A September 3, 1956 editorial in La Voz del Sureste,
headlined “Illegal Entrance of Guatemalans into the Country,” called for the posting of more
immigration agents along the border. In addition to the ease of Guatemalan immigration into
Mexico, the article noted how Mexican chicleros crossed the border south without any
difficulties. Another article claimed SM agents stationed in Comitán were supervising the
contraband trade in corn. It also noted, just as Trueba discovered, the practice of Guatemalans
living “part-time” in Mexico, cultivating their crops in ejidos or vacant land.218
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Guatemalan Immigration post-1950

Beginning in the 1950’s the federal government no longer undertook large-scale efforts
such as the Demographic Commissions of the 1930’s and 1940’s. In part, this might have been
due to the fact that the local struggle over the rights accorded Mexicans prompted by
Cardenismo had largely subsided as borderland communities, of Guatemalan origin or not, had
settled into a new status quo. Nationalist tinged alarms became muted as it became clear that
Guatemala would not attempt to "reclaim" Chiapas. In addition, that country’s Civil War
ensured that the focus of the Guatemalan elite was on quashing internal dissent and maintaining
power. There would be no other large-scale federal government intervention regarding
borderland demographics until the arrival of thousands of Guatemalan refugees in the early
1980’s.
Throughout this time period seasonal Guatemalan laborers continued to arrive for the
Soconuscan coffee harvest. This transnational flow acquired increased importance as the
traditional supplemental Mexican labor from the central highlands of Chiapas went east, to the
opportunities afforded by virgin land in the Lacandon. There, encouraged by governmental
policy, they trudged through the undergrowth, traveled on barely passable roads made by timer
companies, and formed new communities that were relatively free, at least until the 1970’s, of
much of a government presence.219 (The political implications of this move are discussed in
chapter five)
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Coffee finca administrators complained about the occasional instances of federal
government officials deporting Guatemalan workers. For example, in April of 1963, the
Soconusco Coffee Farmer Association (Asociación Agrícola de Cafeticultores del Soconusco)
protested about the years long harassment of Guatemalan braceros by two Secretariat of Interior
employees. These seasonal workers, noted the finca owners, filled out all the proper paperwork,
and were only hired after giving every opportunity to Mexican workers to work the harvest. The
Association claimed that without the labor of these transnational laborers the harvest would
surely be lost.220
It is not clear if the federal employees referenced above had finally exhausted the
patience of local coffee farmers with demands for money, or if they were instead acting on
pressure to make an effort to address the “Guatemalan problem” that occasionally was hyped in
local media. Such was the case of the September 19, 1962 headline that declared, “Mexicans
Displaced in Chiapas by Guatemalans: Five Thousand Guatemalan Braceros Enter Illegally into
Country.” The article attempted to compare Mexico’s two borders, noting that while Mexicans
crossed into the United States because of a lack of land, in Chiapas, a “constant wave” of
Guatemalans continued to appropriate Mexican land and jobs.” 221
Despite the alarming rhetoric Guatemalan migrants had long been a familiar sight in the
borderlands, part of the local economy, though associated with poverty in the eyes of Mexican
borderlanders.222 Women migrants in particular became victims of sexual violence or, for lack
of other opportunities, often became sexual laborers in order to support themselves and their
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families.223 In addition, many households in urban centers such as Tapachula employed
Guatemalan women as maids, as they often accompanied their husbands across the border. 224
Paralleling attitudes of Americans on the U.S-Mexican border, borderlanders increasingly
characterized the work undertaken by Guatemalan migrants as being beneath their dignity.225 By
the latter of half of the twentieth century, in a dramatic change of opinion from the 1930’s,
Guatemalan laborers no longer constituted a silent invasion but a needed workforce for harvest
time, or a cheap alternative labor source to do household chores. A transnational labor flow
established itself, informally regulated by market demands.

Neglected Borderlands

During the 1950’s the borderlands entered a period of budget abandonment by Mexico
City, becoming a landscape of governmental neglect. The 1930’s and 40’s post-revolutionary
federal officials sent south discovered a foreign borderlands, disconnected from the Mexican
state, and upon arriving back to Mexico City adjusted national budgets accordingly. Decreasing
investments in roads, water, and electricity led borderlanders to decry the state of their
communities. For example, in late 1959 the office of President Adolfo López Mateos (19581964) received a series of telegrams and letters from Tapachula protesting the lack of roads and
the delay in building a coastal highway. The Tapachula Chamber of Commerce bemoaned the
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lack of transportation from the border to the rest of the country, “Tapachula and Ciudad Hidalgo
are the principal points of entry for visitors from Central America, and the lack of the highway
connecting the region to the rest of the Republic diminishes tourism.” Though their letter, as
was typical in these types of communications about increasing travel in the borderlands,
substituted Central Americans for Guatemalans, and tourism for the flow of transnational labor ,
it was clear that the business elite in this borderland community desired a firmer connection to
the south. Laborers wanted the same, as evidenced by a coalition of official and non-official
unions of Tapachula signing on to a telegram which pressed for better roads and noted that,
“With sadness we see in the north of the country a network of roads…we are drowning for a lack
of communication.” 226
Regional media frequently pointed out the lack of attention from the federal bureaucracy,
including the lack of potable water. For example, a March 1969 editorial in La Voz del Sureste
began, “The noble people of Tuxtla Gutiérrez ask for water, they have been patiently waiting for
six years for a solution to this grave problem.” The writer notes that finally, after years of
ignoring petitions, the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources indicated a willingness to work with
the state government in finding a solution to supply the capital city with an amount of water
adequate to the population.227
In February 1962, a few months after a presidential visit from López Mateos, the
borderland city of Comitán fell into darkness as the city’s energy supply could not keep up with
the needs of the growing population. The Federal Electricity Commission promised a solution if
the city could supply enough private funding.228 Finally, a December 12, 1965 headline read,
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“S.O.S on the Border.” The emergency was the city of Talisman located southeast of Tapachula,
which the paper found, “abandoned to its fate by official neglect, as underbrush covers and
entombs it with foliage, mildew, and rot helped by the humidity of the sub-tropical climate.”229
The national government had retreated. Xenophobic fears, coupled with alarm that
Guatemalans would take advantage of the economic and political rights garnered from the
revolution and especially the populist administration of Lázaro Cárdenas, prompted a flurry of
attention during the 1930’s and 1940’s regarding the “demographic problem” suddenly
discovered by federal officials. However, bureaucratic corruption, the economic necessity of the
transnational labor flow and, finally, the inability to arrest the binational cultural, economic, and
political reality of the borderlands rendered the federal government’s attempts at control
ultimately fruitless. As we will see in the next chapter, instead of redoubling its efforts, Mexico
City decided to concentrate on extracting resources from the borderlands.
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Chapter Three:
Engineers Come to the Borderlands
Parallel to the effort to register and control the flow of Guatemalans in the Chiapan
borderlands were the Mexican federal government’s attempts to scientifically manage and
exploit the region. Engineers of the growing bureaucracy in Mexico City who were tasked with
providing the rapidly industrializing country and region with resources such as electricity and
irrigation were impressed with the region’s potential. Just as quickly as they arrived on the
border they soon realized they needed Guatemalan cooperation. The nationalism of both
Guatemalan politicians and public -- many still convinced that Chiapas, or at least the Soconusco
region, was stolen from Guatemala -- complicated collaboration. In the meantime, the rivers of
the borderlands stubbornly surged and diverged from their banks, mindless of a line on a map
and demanding a binational response.
Mexico had experience treating with rivals across a border: the United States, in their
northern borderlands. Though imperialist expansion birthed Mexico’s northern border in the
nineteenth century, for much of the twentieth, the binational team of engineers of the
International Boundary and Water Commission between Mexico and the United States
(Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas entre México y los Estados Unidos, or as of 1961,
CILA-Norte) established a productive working relationship. By the time of the Cárdenas
administration, new agreements lent momentum to greater cooperation, leading eventually to the
pivotal 1944 Treaty, “Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande,” which allocated a critical supply of water to the bone-dry northern Mexican
borderlands. As Stephen Mumme, expert on the Commission, has noted, “The International
Boundary and Water Commission may well represent the finest example of functional
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cooperation in transboundary resource management between highly dissimilar countries
anywhere on the globe.”230
Underlying much of this chapter’s examination is how Mexican policy towards the
Chiapan borderlands was based on their experience with the United States. As Mexican officials
sought solutions to similar border issues that arose in the Chiapan borderlands, they referred to
Mexico’s positive experience in CILA-Norte. Their experience with the United States,
especially in the post-revolutionary period, presented key opportunities, such as the Chamizal
Convention of 1963, which returned land previously lost due to a shifting river bed to Mexico, to
exert claims of sovereignty, and attempt to treat on close to an equal diplomatic and political
basis with their traditional rival.

It was a history constantly interpreted in positive tones in the

diplomatic instructions sent from Mexico City to ambassadors in Guatemala, and in on the
ground assessments by engineers from bureaucracies like the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources.
The message: recreate the northern borderlands in the southern borderlands. Through
exploration of the Mexican archives, however, it is clear that Mexico officials felt that a
significant challenge on their southern border was overcoming the objections of a neighbor that
refused to see the value in cooperation.

First Efforts: Presidential Commission on the Study of the Southern Border

Though it only lasted a year, the 1936 Presidential Commission on the Study of the
Southeastern Border (Comisión de Estudios de las Fronteras del Sureste, CEFS) prompted the
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Mexican government to concentrate on a borderlands which, in words of the CEFS, “has been up
to this day almost forgotten.”231 The Commission’s creation sparked more focused studies,
prompted efforts at demarcation, and began in earnest Mexico’s decades-long effort to establish
the International Boundary and Water Commission between Mexico and Guatemala (Comisión
Internacional de Límites y Aguas entre México y Guatemala, CILA). In sum, it brought
engineers to the borderlands.
The goals and conclusions of CEFS revealed the federal government’s anxieties about
and vision of the southern borderlands. The mission of the CEFS was twofold: examine,
manage, and exploit the natural landscape, specifically the watery border’s potential for energy
and irrigation, while also, “preventing the international problems that may occur, sooner or later,
with our neighbor to the south, through treaties that could be managed by a Boundary
Commission identical to that which manages problems that we have on our northern border.”232
The assembled expertise of the CEFS reflected its wide-ranging purpose. Under the guidance of
the Secretariat of Foreign Relations engineers from a number of federal bureaucracies
participated. A pair of petroleum and mining experts represented the Secretariat of Economy,
an engineer, the Secretariat of Communications and Public Work, while another engineer from
the Secretariat level National Commission on Irrigation was tasked to the group. A surveyor
from the Department of Geographic Studies under the Secretary of Agriculture and
Development, and a representative from the Department of Forestry, Fishing, and Game rounded
out the specialists sent to the region.233
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These experts were to focus on exploiting the commercial potential of the border’s
natural wealth, as well as ensuring that the region remained Mexican, either through hardening
the border by protecting the region from incursions from its southern neighbor or through
colonization. Though more scientific in scope, the CEFS also reflected the nationalist anxieties
driving the Demographic Commissions of 1935 and 1941. For example, engineers from the
Department of Forestry, Fish, and Wildlife were to survey the forests of the border, “a vulnerable
source of wealth….and to organize an expedition that would declare said riches as reserved
exclusively as forest.” In addition, they also were to study the most effective locations to
conduct military patrols to prevent foreign exploitation of the vast reserves they cataloged. The
proposed scope of studies by other members of the CEFS reflected this nationalist agenda.
Representatives of the Secretariat of Agriculture and Development were tasked to explore the
most adequate places for colonization in Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Campeche, Tabasco, and the
Yucatan, while alongside them engineers from the Secretariat of Economy would study the
possibility of establishing free-trade zones for the future colonists.234
Many of the CEFS’s proposed studies reflected the federal government’s interest in
utilizing the rivers of the southern borderlands. Representatives from Irrigation were to examine
the potential of the Hondo, Suchiate, Usumacinta, and Chixoy Rivers for irrigation and
hydroelectric use. In addition, engineers from the Secretariat of Communication and Public
Works focused on studying the same rivers for navigation, commerce and the economic

234

Programa de Trabajo de la Comisión Científica de Estudio de las Fronteras del Sureste, Aprobado en
Sesión de 16 de Octubre de 1936 por la Comisión de Estudios de las Fronteras el Sureste, México, October 1936,
AH-SRE Legajo 322-2, Expedientes 198-200.

116

development of the region. These studies and their recommendations would be the basis of a
future binational treaty to regulate and control the watery border.235
Unlike the Demographic Commission, with its calls for increased border enforcement,
officials at the highest levels of the federal government realized that developing the borderlands
resources would require some form of cooperation with Guatemala.

However, Guatemala and

Mexico had agreed on little since independence. This lack of cooperation between Guatemala
and Mexico was laid bare when, in 1936, Cárdenas himself asked in a session with top officials
from the Secretariat of Foreign Relations what border treaties Mexico had signed with its
southern neighbor since the 1882 Treaty and received the response that there had been none.236
The 1931 ascension to power in Guatemala of strongman Jorge Ubico did not bode well
for a warming of relations between the two neighbors. As a former top official in the
borderlands province of Retalhuleu, Ubico had often harassed Mexican travelers, and upon
taking the office of president continually denounced Cárdenas’s reforms as part of an
international Communist plot.237 A fervent anti-communist, he openly denigrated the Mexican
Revolution, cultivated U.S. support in the case of a potential conflict with Mexico, and
denounced supposed Mexican interference in Guatemala’s other long simmering territorial
conflict with Belize.238 Ubico’s rhetoric, coupled with his reputation, was bellicose enough that
by the late 1930’s some Mexican national security officials became worried that he was
contemplating military action to “reclaim” Chiapas for Guatemala. Based on rumors, and
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bolstered by the national security fears commonly associated with the borderlands, they grew
concerned that the Guatemalan president planned on utilizing German-Guatemalan planters in
Soconusco as a fifth column, while a Guatemalan army, supplied with arms from a Nazi regime
that Ubico openly praised, swept across the contested border.239
Despite the history of animosity and mistrust that could cause such outlandish rumors to
be taken seriously in some corners of the Mexican security apparatus, the 1936 study made clear
that Mexico could not unilaterally address the transboundary challenges anticipated by their
engineering teams. The CEFS commission even drew up a draft of a proposal for a binational
commission. Though never presented to Guatemalan diplomats, it stood as a blueprint for future
efforts.240 In late 1937, the ambitious projects of CEFS had run out of money, the many
proposed projects simply stretched the budget as the consultant to CEFS, Lorenzo L. Hernández,
intimated in a letter to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Eduardo Hay. Large-scale colonization
schemes and hydrometric studies would have meant an extensive allocation of funds to a region
long ignored by the government and with no large bureaucratic structure to coordinate such
projects such as existed on the northern border in CILA-norte. Above all, the lack of an
international body served as a major roadblock. In the same letter to fellow engineer Hays,
Hernández laid out the next steps needed for any Mexican government action in the borderlands:

…given the numerous expenditures that the government must make in their intensive
constructive work, it will not be possible to obtain the funding need for next year to carry
out the program, and on the other hand, due to the numerous the problems occurring on the
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border with Guatemala as well as in British Honduras, it is not possible to form an opinion
regarding the correct and convenient action to take for lack of a bureau devoted to its study. It is
undoubtedly necessary to create such a bureau although it be with much more modest proportion
than that imagined for the Commission of the Southeast Borders. This body cannot be anything
but the International Boundary and Water Commission…241

International Park

Despite the long simmering tension with Guatemala, officials at the highest level of the
Mexican government mixed anxiousness with optimism in their efforts to establish transnational
cooperation with their southern neighbor. At times, this enthusiasm to bridge historical
animosity took on a quixotic aspect, such as the proposal by the noted environmental engineer
and head of the Department of Forestry, Fishing, and Game (Departamento Forestal y
de Caza y Pesca, DFCP) Miguel Ángel de Quevedo to build an international park between
Guatemala and Mexico.242
The inspiration for the idea came from a similar project on Mexico’s northern border in
the Big Bend region of Texas.243 Proposed by the United States in part as an extension of the
Good Neighbor Policy, the initial negotiations encompassed even larger goals of borderlands
management, including conservation and reforestation in areas along the Rio Grande in
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Chihuahua and Tamaulipas.

In November 1935, Quevedo met U.S. officials from the National

Park Service and the Civilian Conservation Corps in El Paso, Texas, where talks touched upon
access to the region for tourists. Despite the initial optimism, the park never materialized on the
Mexican side. DFCP officials conducted surveys of the land proposed by U.S. Park Service and
found it inaccessible to future tourists, the main economic motivation for the park. Instead,
Mexican government officials decided to retain the land for the much more economically viable
cattle grazing. Cárdenas’s nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 undermined further
attempts at compromise, and future efforts, most notably during the Manuel Ávila Camacho
administration (1940-1946) were waylaid by trade disputes. It was not until the 1990’s and the
Carlos Salinas de Gortari administration (1988-1994) that the original proposal came to
fruition.244
Despite the inertia on the Mexico-U.S. park, Quevedo proposed a similar project with
Guatemala after being inspired by the natural landscapes of the region. In early 1939, the
environmentalist traveled on the recently completed Pan-American Highway to Tapachula,
continuing on to the Guatemalan capital to discuss a binational conservation treaty. The nearly
300-mile trip, which passed through “beautiful forests” as well as “magnificent coffee and
banana plantations” impressed Quevedo. Upon returning to Mexico he received support for his
proposal for a southern borderlands park from President Cárdenas, no doubt seeing the work
involved in setting up and maintaining the park as fulfilling some of the aims of binational
cooperation he outlined only years earlier for the failed Commission. The former CEFS
consultant, Hernández, also supported Quevedo’s vision, writing this time in 1939 as the director
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of CILA-norte.245 In a letter to Secretary Hay, Hernández expanded on the elements of
Quevedo’s vision of an international park, incorporating many of his previous suggestions
regarding securing the border, many of which had no obvious relation to a park: a government
body to protect the natural landscape, clearer demarcation of the national boundaries, and even
reforestation efforts around population centers to “improve conditions of urban hygiene,
esthetics, and recreation.” Above all, Hernández noted that despite optimism in preliminary talks
with a Guatemalan acquaintance regarding the park, the lack of an international body similar to
that existing between the United States and Mexico impeded efforts to enact Quevedo’s plan.246
Though Hernández envisioned the park’s completion as a means to begin to establish state
control of the borderlands, others imagined its completion as a means to erase the boundary. In
the words of one DFCP engineer sent to scout the planned location outside of Tapachula, the
park would be a place “where the work of the Creation, showing itself in its splendor, would so
encourage man to make them forget the fictitious borders that separate nations.” 247
Despite the lofty rhetoric, the two rivals never built the “living museum” the DFCP
imagined, as international and domestic politics led to bureaucratic foot-dragging, dooming the
project. In a December 1939 letter to Secretary Hay, the Mexican ambassador to Guatemala
Salvador Martínez de Alva put the possibilities for the park at “very unlikely.” Martínez de Alva
questioned the infrastructure building ability of the Guatemalan government, explaining that they
were still attempting to complete surveying work for the Pan-American Highway. Besides,
noted the ambassador, the point man for any project, General Roderico Anzueto, the National
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Police Director and the official in charge of infrastructure development, was maneuvering for a
presidential run and sought the support of the United States government. The Guatemalan
politician needed to avoid cooperation with Mexico due to the controversial oil expropriation a
year earlier. Attempts, suggested by the ambassador, to appeal to the economic benefits the
project would bring to Guatemala, failed to persuade Mexico’s southern neighbor.248

Modus Vivendi and a Bridge over the Suchiate

The optimism behind the international park proposal, Mexican diplomatic actions based
on references to their northern border, and the hesitation from Guatemala encapsulated the
interactions in the initial years regarding the formation of CILA. CEFS consultant Lorenzo
Hernández’s “we need a CILA” memo was quoted in marching orders sent from Mexico City as
each incoming Mexican ambassador to Guatemala in subsequent decades engaged his
Guatemalan counterparts in discussions regarding the formation of a comprehensive boundary
commission. In the decades leading to the formation of CILA in 1962, Mexican diplomatic
efforts produced small, but important steps, in encouraging cooperation against a backdrop of
profound changes in Guatemalan and international politics. The most important accomplishment
was the 1942 Modus Vivendi, the first diplomatic agreement signed between the two rivals since
the 1882 treaty. The accord and its central goal, construction of a permanent bridge over the
Suchiate River, came about from the persistence of Mexican diplomats and the United States’
need for wartime raw material from the Central American isthmus. Crucially, it laid a
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diplomatic framework for CILA, as well as prompting dialogue and the occasional on-theground cooperation between officials of both countries.
Mexican diplomatic efforts leading up to the 1942 agreement were based on their
experience with the United States. They attempted to convince Guatemala of the need for
cooperation by bringing up the lessons they learned in their northern borderlands. Secretary of
Foreign Relations Hay and others at the top level of the Mexican government stressed a
boundary agreement as way to avert future conflicts, in particular those related to water
distribution. During the 1930’s, the communities and agricultural regions of the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands faced the challenge of water scarcity due to the unequal 1906 treaty, “Convention
between the United States and Mexico on the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio
Grande.” Pro-American Porfirian diplomats signed the agreement, ignoring the
recommendations of the Mexican border commission. The treaty only allocated 60,000 acre-feet
of water from the Rio Grande for growing borderland communities like Ciudad Juárez. Postrevolutionary Mexican diplomats such as Hay regarded the 1906 treaty as a cautionary yardstick
in their dealings with the watery southern border. It was not until the 1944 treaty with the U.S.,
“Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande,” which
designated the equal allocation as well as management of the rivers of the northern border that
relief came to northern Mexican communities.”249
Guatemalan diplomats remained unconvinced as Mexican diplomats continually ran into
naked antagonism during the Ubico period. Yet, efforts beginning in 1936 demonstrated that at
least as concerned the border, Mexican diplomats and engineers took a nuanced view of the
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bellicose rhetoric of Ubico, while ignoring the alarming conclusions of such entities as the 1936
and 1941 demographic commissions concerning Guatemalan influence in the borderlands.
Mexico sought commercial, political, and cultural influence in the region, at the cost to a United
States that often backed compliant Conservative regimes, such as in Nicaragua, that were
antagonistic to Mexico’s exportation of the revolution’s liberal domestic polices and the larger
goal of Pan-American unity. The border, in many ways, became the point of entrance to a
productive transnational relationship, even if Guatemala seemed intent on not having one.
Efforts by Ambassador Martínez de Alva towards the end of the Cárdenas Administration
are revealing regarding the lengths the diplomatic corps were willing to go to improve MexicanGuatemalan relations. For example, a lengthy June 1939 letter to Cárdenas recounted Martínez
de Alva’s recent trip to the Chiapan border. There, the ambassador met with officials from the
Immigration Inspection Service, the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works, and the
governor of the state. Visiting during the time of the Demographic Commission and heightened
anti-Guatemalan hysteria, Martínez de Alva expressed concern about how the often corrupt and
overtly hostile actions taken against Guatemalan borderlanders by Mexican officials could
negatively impact relations with Guatemala. In a meeting with the governor, the ambassador
suggested that teachers of the federal 123 schools stop utilizing Ubico and Guatemala an
example of bad government. After touring the official border crossings over the Suchiate River
outside Tapachula, he, like others, complained about the migration and customs officials, the
length of the wait, and the often corrupt practices displayed. He also talked at length with the
Mexican Chief of Immigration, Francisco Ochoa Zamudio, and his subordinates, imploring them
to take an attitude of “mindfulness, gentleness, and cautiousness” in their dealings with
Guatemalans. He urged them, in the case of any doubts of how to proceed with an individual, to
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contact the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala. Finally, he exhorted a representative of the
Ministry of Communications to hurry the construction of an international radio line connecting
the two countries.250
In the final months of the Cárdenas administration, Ambassador Martínez de Alva
continued his efforts to substantially repair the over hundred-year rivalry between the two
neighbors in a few months. In April 1940 he presented a “Draft of a General Treaty of Peace and
Friendship Between Mexico and Guatemala.” This effort should not be interpreted merely as the
work of an energetic diplomat; as the Ambassador noted, “…all this has been possible….through
the instructions received …to erase all the motives of distance that before existed.” The
ambitious, and like Quevedo’s international park idea, idealistic plan for a treaty essentially
sought to end the long history of tension between the two neighbors. The articles in the
documents called for the two rivals to renounce war, interfering in each other’s national affairs,
prohibit the production of harmful propaganda, and submit any future conflicts to international
mediation.251
In addition to the peace treaty, the ambassador worked out a separate draft treaty
concerning the management of water on the border. In his notes on the proposed agreement,
Martínez de Alva alluded to recent developments between Mexico and the United States while
many of points of the treaty echoed the suggestions of the CEFS. The articles called for
arbitration of problems caused by the shifting of the river, regulation of agricultural use and,
finally, cooperation in the establishment of future hydroelectric dams. The treaty also
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anticipated new challenges by calling for the establishment of a binational commission to resolve
future conflicts.252
Despite this last-minute push by the Cárdenas administration, no overarching treaty
between Ubico’s Guatemala and Mexico materialized. It was unlikely that a flurry of
diplomatic maneuvering at the end of the Cárdenas sexenio could erase so much accumulated
animosity between the two countries. Surprisingly then, only a couple of years later, in 1942, the
two neighbors signed their first diplomatic agreement in over fifty years, the Modus Vivendi.
Against this backdrop of the history of antagonism the 1942 accord seemingly came out
of nowhere. Guatemala, however, did not suddenly discover the value of friendship on its own,
but was pushed by the United States’ entrance into the Second World War. The conflict focused
attention on the isthmus’s valuable raw materials. In Central America the United States military
procured sought after resources such as lumber. For example, they contracted the United Fruit
Company in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras to grow the abaca plant to help meet the
growing demand for marine cordage. However, because of German U-Boat fears, it became
essential to transport these crucial supplies over land. In light of the poor railroad and road
networks, the U.S. Congress allocated funding to hire six thousand Central Americans, under the
guidance of the U.S. Corp of Engineers, to complete the still unconstructed Pan-American
Highway. From there, the war material pass into Mexico via Chiapas and the newly created
bridge over the Suchiate river, which was to become the centerpiece of the Modus Vivendi.253
Since being aided by the United States in his ascension to power in 1931, Ubico’s public
and private actions had consistently demonstrated staunch support for Mexico’s powerful
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neighbor to the north. 254 For example, during World War II, despite the potential harm to the
Guatemalan economy, Ubico acceded to United States pressure and expropriated large coffee
fincas run by ethnic Germans who had emigrated to Guatemala decades before. He also forcibly
rounded up and sent thousands of Guatemalans of German heritage to the United States. There,
these suspected “fifth columnists,” many of them anti-Nazi or even Jewish, were questioned by
U.S. military interrogators about their suspected conspiratorial links to their ancestral home.255 It
was likely then that Ubico would be willing to overcome his reticence towards cooperation with
Mexico if the U.S. requested it.
Though archival evidence does not specifically point to U.S. involvement in forcing a
Guatemalan agreement with Mexico, public and private documents suggest it, and that
Guatemala was a reluctant partner. For example, a cynical editorial demonstrated at the least, the
continued resentment many Guatemalans felt towards Mexico. In addition, press censorship
under Ubico, though it did not approach total editorial control, surely must have been taken
under consideration by the writer when commenting on such an important topic, making it
reasonable to assume his viewpoint was not too far off from the government’s own.256 Written
weeks after the signing of the Modus Vivendi doubted the rhetoric of “brotherhood”
accompanying the construction of the temporary bridge, noting that the whole project:
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…was saved by the intervention of Americans, who believe a railroad or a highway is enough to
strengthen the ties of unity between the nations of Central America. The bridge was constructed
because it had to be. 257

A March 1943 letter from the Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala, Francisco del Rió y
Cañeda, to the office of the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs further alluded to the reason
behind the bridge, noting that that so far the Guatemalan government had devoted the entire
railroad line heading to the Suchiate bridge to “sending by railroad to North America those
strategic materials not produced in Mexico.”258
In contrast to the cynicism in Guatemala, the Mexican press celebrated the Modus
Vivendi as a sign of Guatemalan and Mexican friendship. Above all they focused on the
agreement’s most visible aspect, the binational construction of a railroad bridge over the
Suchiate River. This started with a quickly erected temporary bridge, to be followed by a more
permanent one, finally connecting the two countries by rail and road.259
Regardless of the motivations behind the construction, borderlanders had been waiting
for decades for a permanent bridge connecting Mexico to the rest of Latin America. For years,
for the goods and people riding the train down the Pacific Coast of Mexico into the Soconusco
region the Suchiate station represented the end of the line; to cross into Guatemala passengers
disembarked and either walked across hastily assembled planks wobbling over the narrow parts
of the river, or they took one of the innumerable rafts waiting to ferry passengers back and
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forth.260 The bridge’s absence reflected the history of uneasy relations between the two
countries.
Bilateral discussions and efforts to build a permanent bridge stretched back to 1919. In
May of that year, the president of the Mexican National Railroads visited the southern limit of
his domain and confidently predicted a permanent bridge in a few months’ time, the costs split
between the two countries.261 However, funding delays plagued the start of construction, and
the Guatemalan dictator Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) eventually soured on the idea, even as
Mexican engineers from the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works began the process
of selecting the location of the link that would connect the Americas.262 The impetus to build a
permanent railroad was lost. As late as 1939 a New York Times travelogue on the still
uncompleted Pan-American highway wrote of sleeping on the banks of the Suchiate and being
“poled across the sluggish river.”263
Though the bridge represented a long sought after local connection with potential
international economic implications, the Modus Vivendi also laid the basis for the future CILA.
Unable to secure a broader border treaty with Guatemala, Mexican diplomats put within the
Modus Vivendi a framework for future bilateral cooperation. Crucially, Article X designated
the first binational engineering body, the Mixed Commission of Engineers. Later renamed the
International Commission of the Suchiate River (ICSR), these engineers were tasked to erect a
permanent bridge, to study the utilization of the Suchiate River for irrigation, and to prevent
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flooding, which could lead to major deviations of the border itself. Unlike past governmental
bodies devoted to the study of the southern border, the Mexican officials in the ICSR worked
with Guatemalan counterparts.264
Though the Modus Vivendi established the foundation for the future border commission
and further focused the attention of Mexican engineers on border issues such as demarcation, its
passage did not lead to the binational resolutions Mexico wanted to enact regarding resource
management. In part, Guatemalan reticence to commit funding or follow through on diplomatic
advances continued to delay the comprehensive border treaty Mexico desired. This situation
remained consistent throughout the period, despite the dramatic change in Guatemalan
governments in 1944 and 1954.
As before, Mexico acted with a greater sense of urgency than Guatemala to secure a
binational treaty and expand the parameters of the Modus Vivendi. In matters of water rights,
especially, Mexican economic planners envisioned the borderland rivers, the Grijalva and
Usumacinta, which began in Guatemala, contributing hydroelectric energy to the rapidly
industrializing country. For example, a 1948 article by Andres Garcia Quintero, Director
General of the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources, noted the scarcity of water in the deserts of
the country’s northern and central plains. However, the article emphasized, “Mexico has just
started to develop her hydraulic resources… Mexico to date has utilized less than one-tenth of
her hydraulic resources.”265 A 1954 study done by noted water expert Pablo Bistrain spoke to

264
Modus Vivendi entre Los Estado Unidos Mexicanos y la Republica de Guatemala con relaciona al
Puente Internacional Sobre el Rio Suchiate, AH-SRE Legajo 335-2, Expediente 73.
265
Andres Garcia Quintero, “Hydroelectric Potentiality of Mexico,” Transactions of the American Institute
of Electrical Engineers 67 (1948) 993-994.

130

that potential in the southern borderlands. Bistrain wrote, “The Grijalva and Usumacinta system
potentially represents 50% of the possible developable hydraulic energy in the nation.”266
For a short time after the signing of the 1942 agreement the binational cooperation
needed for such ambitious goals as shared hydroelectric development seemed to be progressing.
In early 1943 Guatemalan and Mexican ICSR representatives conducted a joint survey of the
region outside of Tapachula. Tracing the footsteps taken by Barrios and Matias Romero nearly
fifty years earlier, the two new colleagues walked along the Suchiate River mapping the
vegetation, population centers, tributaries, and the ad-hoc works on both sides of the river
erected against flooding. For the first time the representatives from the two nations treated the
body of water separating them as something shared, with the understanding that what one did on
one side would affect the other. They planned a future topographic survey, beginning from the
Pacific Ocean to go upriver a distance of approximately fifty miles, to Talismán, Chiapas. In
addition, they planned to erect four hydrometric stations, to measure the speed and flow of the
river.267
The Mexican delegation urged speed in the study and the creation of new works to
“defend” the northern banks before the annual floods arrived. For years levees on both banks
had warped the path of the Suchiate and, coupled with natural erosion, had literally caused
Mexican land to become Guatemalan in some parts; in others, the bank simply fell into the water.
For example, an investigation of the region in 1936 by an engineering team sent from Mexico
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City found that the locations of the Mexican and Guatemalan border posts outside of Talismán,
Mexico and El Carmen, Guatemala had actually switched places years ago, as the local officers
reacted to a rapidly changing river course.268 A typical complaint was the one sent in 1945 by
Colonia Libertad ejidatarios. Located along the Suchiate River, they wrote that surging water
caused by the recent cyclone season stripped away nearly 85 percent of their crop. In addition,
they had lost nearly 500 acres of land to their Guatemalan neighbors across the river because the
latter had prepared defensive measures along the banks, changing the course of the Suchiate.269
The symbolic centerpiece of the 1942 Modus Vivendi, however, the construction of a
permanent bridge, faced a lack of diplomatic cooperation during the Ubico regime. The
construction of a permanent bridge became plagued by setbacks, false starts, and negotiations
defined by a history of mistrust. For example, a May 1943 visit to Guatemala by representatives
of the National Railways of Mexico (Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México) with the leading
executives of the International Railroads of Central America (Ferrocarriles Internacionales de
Centro América, FICA) resulted in angry denunciations by Mexican officials regarding the lack
of Guatemalan cooperation. Suggestions by the Mexican engineers to improve the efficiency
and reach of service were rejected. For example, Mexican Railway officials suggested selling
transnational tickets throughout Central America, as was done for Mexico’s northern border, as
opposed to only at the border station. The suggestion to build additional rails in Guatemala to
speed up the transfer of goods sent across the bridge, meanwhile, was rejected out of hand by
Guatemalan representatives. A Mexican embassy official reporting to the Secretariat of Foreign
Relations angrily denounced FICA and Guatemalan diplomatic obstructionism, noting that the
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meeting “gave the impression that the same spirit of opposition exists for a stable connection
between Guatemala and Mexico.” The official prognosticated that “at the end of the war, when
not confronted…with the vested interests that oblige them to maintain the movement of goods
and people between Mexico and Guatemala, at the precise moment they can, they will cut
communications, leaving the two republics isolated.”270
The overthrow of Ubico in 1944 and the election of the October Revolution government
under President Juan José Arévalo (1944-1951) in December of that year symbolized the
possibility of a new positive chapter in diplomacy between the two rivals; as Guatemalans shed
their repressive past, Mexican officials were hopeful it meant forgetting old antagonisms. In
Guatemala a broad based middle-class and intellectual coalition, supported by a peasantry that
demanded an end to institutionalized repressive measures such as vagrancy laws, became an
unstoppable force for change. Demonstrations demanding democracy and an equitable economic
policy signaled a wide-spread frustration with the nineteenth century caudillo governing style of
Ubico and his predecessors. Suddenly, Guatemala seemed like it had renewed hope for the
future.
Despite political optimism, the incoming October Revolution government faced a
daunting financial situation, hindering Guatemala’s capacity to contribute to the construction of a
permanent bridge, and also serving as a reminder of Mexico’s more dominant economic role in
their relationship. For example, the Guatemalan economy was dominated by agriculture,
especially the export of banana of coffee which accounted for 90 percent of the country’s foreign
exchange. Any price fluctuation in the international market for either crop would have halted
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any economic growth.271 In addition, for the length of the October Revolution, the Guatemalan
government had to deal with a substantial trade deficit, dating back to 1935, due to the high
freight charges demanded by the United Fruit dominated national railroad. As the October
Revolution seemed to become more radicalized under Árbenz, nervous foreign governments
began to call in bonds issued by the Ubico regime, in part to intimidate the revolutionary regime
from initiating drastic nationalizing reforms. In 1951 alone, a British bond payment of $1
million counted against an overall budget of $60 million.272 This debt made it difficult for the
government to enact large and expensive social programs, in part based on the New Deal, the
scope of which embodied the key promises of the revolution, and which were urgently needed to
combat decades of corruption and bad government.273
For Mexican diplomats, the bridge project became a priority, a symbol of a more amiable
and constructive relationship with Guatemala’s new “revolutionary” government. In March
1946, the Mexican ambassador to Guatemala, Vicente Benítez, wrote back to the Secretary of
Foreign Relations in Mexico City:

Fortunately, the good sense of prosperous and Revolutionary governments like those of
Guatemala and Mexico, have decided in a practical form, the immediate execution of such an
important project [bridge construction] which in other times and for reasons incomprehensible
and unjust, was systemically combated by the previous administration….The Secretary
[Francisco Castillo Nájera] knows well the eagerness and effort that have marked my activities
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since my arrival to this country….[I have been] attempting to resolve in the best manner the
obstacles and difficulties confronting border life on the Suchiate.274

Benítez assured the Secretary that he had achieved success in his goals of strengthening the
cross-border relationship between the two countries, noting that President Arévalo “had been
very cooperative in the terrain of the ideal and the practical.” Mexican President Ávila Camacho
should be told, added the diplomat, that the success of the bridge was a certain fact.
Representatives of the Guatemalan Ministry of Communications and Public Works had
signed an agreement with representatives of the National Railways of Mexico in Guatemala City
on March 11, 1946.275 Mexican Railway engineers would lead the design and building of the
bridge, and they were to start the planning stage right away to take advantage of the dry season.
An appointed Guatemalan engineer would lend oversight and assistance, while companies from
each country had a chance to bid to supply materials. The approval and presence of Porter King,
representative of the International Railroads of Central America, further added to Benítez’s
enthusiasm about the agreement.276
As had happened with regard to past premature pronouncements, newspaper articles
appeared assuring the imminent construction of the permanent bridge. An April 21, 1946 article
in El Universal noted that “only small details are left…and all the materials are ready to
construct the bridge.” 277 However, as in the past this latest agreement did not lead to the
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erection of the elusive structure. In part, Guatemala’s financial limitations played a role, as the
Guatemalan Secretary of Foreign Relations Eugenio Silva Peña intimated to Benítez during their
meetings, noting, “since Mexico is infinitely wealthier than Guatemala, and considering it as a
gesture of fraternal friendship, maybe Mexico could cover more than the 50 percent share as
stipulated in the Modus Vivendi.”
Despite his enthusiasm for transnational cooperation, Benítez did not take to the
suggestion. Instead, he responded with a complicated logic: he insulted the former Ubico
regime, “whose cooperation left much to be desired” but which nevertheless approved the 1942
pact, and gave a roundabout approval to the present “revolutionary regime,” imploring them not
to “try to put themselves in an inferior position as the previous administration had done to save
an insignificant amount of money.” At the same time, he recommended that Mexico City not
dramatically change the Modus Vivendi to alter the financial obligations of Guatemala. In fact,
he suggested extending the agreement to include platforms for foot traffic, allowing individuals
to avoid the ubiquitous small rafts going back and forth, as well as the inclusion of houses for
custom and immigration agents.278
In addition to the financial disparities between Mexico and Guatemala, bureaucratic
miscommunication between Mexican officials also served as a roadblock as the region lacked of
a CILA like bureau to coordinate infrastructure along the expansive border. The president’s
office in Mexico City quashed the ad hoc plan crafted in Guatemala City because Mexican
engineers had already planned the location of the bridge to coincide with the creation of a town,
Ciudad Hidalgo, along with other improvements alongside the river. Located just two miles
from Suchiate, the new community would eventually blend with the larger city and, in 1952, the
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much more patriotic, Mexican-sounding city became the seat of the Suchiate municipio
(county).279 In addition, engineers planned extensive irrigation works that would bring water to
over 18,000 acres along the Suchiate. A planned free trade port at the mouth of the river would
complement these efforts. The location of the bridge as stipulated in the Benítez led agreement
would be close to two miles away from the heart of these ambitious plans to develop the
communities along the Suchiate, too far in the estimation of the president’s office.280
Ultimately, weather trumped bureaucratic miscommunications and financial difficulties:
surging waters caused by Pacific storms destroyed the temporary bridge in the middle of 1946.
The destruction proved to both sides just how important the new link had become. Immediately
after its collapse, Ambassador Benítez sent an urgent letter to President Ávila Camacho asking to
speed up repairs or risk damaging commerce for both countries. He claimed that raft traffic was
too congested to carry out the transport of goods, in particular Guatemalan demands for
petroleum.281 Indeed, the language in an agreement parceling out funding commitments for
repairs between the Secretariat of Communication and Public Works, the Secretariat of Treasury
and Public Credit, and the Mexican Railway noted, “it is indispensable to repair the bridge.”282
Weather proved to be a persistent obstacle to the construction of the permanent structure.
In 1944, 1945, 1949, and 1953 a flooded Suchiate destroyed, or severely damaged the temporary
bridge. As stipulated by the Modus Vivendi, Mexican National Railroad engineers repaired the
bridge, charging Guatemala after the fact. This funding going to frequent repairs siphoned
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money away from the permanent construction. Indeed, by 1947 Guatemala refused to pay its
corresponding part of the repairs, claiming that they had only agreed to fund a permanent bridge,
not constant repairs to the temporary bridge.283
The Guatemalan government, however, did not direct funds to the construction of the
permanent bridge despite persistent Mexican lobbying at the highest level. For example, in
March 1951 the head of National Railways of Mexico, Manuel R. Palacios, met with newly
sworn in Guatemalan president Árbenz the day after his inauguration. The over hour-long talk
touched upon the Guatemalan’s appreciation of the Mexican Revolution, “the only triumphant
Revolution in Latin America,” and in an ominously prescient statement, the Mexican
government’s support of the October Revolution as it weathered increasing “imperialist
pressure.” Past the diplomatic niceties, on the subject of “concrete issues,” the railroadman
turned diplomat reported that the new president of Guatemala promised to include in the next
annual budget money for the bridge.284
In late 1951 Mexican Railway engineers identified a site, developed a new plan for a
permanent bridge, and sent the blueprints to Guatemala. There was little response back. Indeed,
the matter went no further until 1955, when frustrated representatives from the Mexican Railroad
suggested that the government of Mexico simply pay for the bridge itself. The Secretariat of
Foreign Relations rejected the idea. Later in the year, echoing previous assurances, the Mexican
ambassador sent back messages that the Guatemalan Secretary of Foreign Relations expressed
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interest in finally paying for a definitive bridge. Mexico sent back copies of the 1951 plan to
Guatemala, but momentum once again stalled until 1961.285

Managing Water

Much like the bridge, the pressing issue of water rights also seemed to have stalled
despite the importance attached to achieving a broad agreement by Mexican diplomats and
engineers. An extensive 1952 memorandum issued by the Secretariat of Foreign Relations for
the Mexican Ambassador in Guatemala, Primo Villa Michel, detailed the pressing concerns.
Authored by longtime experts on the southern border, former CEFS consultant, Lorenzo
Hernández and the head of the 1941 Demographic Commission, Salvador Cardona, the memo
frequently referenced the United States-Mexican border.
The meandering Suchiate River, noted the memorandum, continued to threaten
communities and change course in ways that called the location of the border into question.
Despite a clause in the 1942 Modus Vivendi tasking flood control work on the Suchiate to a
binational team of engineers, no work had been done. Indeed, the two engineers assigned to the
task, one from the Mexican Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources and his Guatemalan counterpart
had not even met, as the authors noted vaguely, for “various reasons.”286
The authors recommended addressing the issue of a shifting watery border with a treaty
modeled after the 1905 Treaty of Elimination of Bancos between Mexico and the United States.
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This agreement addressed the problem of the nearly sixty bancos formed on the Rio Grande at
the time of the treaty. These bancos were pieces of land that had shifted from one bank to
another due to the gradual change in the river’s course, effectively ceding territory to the
opposite shore. Without any intervention the bancos often grew to large sizes. The 1905 treaty
had called for the binational body of engineers to eliminate the development of bancos, while
also assuring sovereignty of those bancos which had detached from their respective sides.
However, the Treaty asserted a provision that those bancos of over 250 hectares, and containing
over two hundred people, would not be subject to the treaty.287 This provision pointedly
referred to the Chamizal tract, which the United States had claimed over Mexican objections
since 1884. Cardona and Hernández recommended a treaty between Mexico and Guatemala
similar to the 1905 agreement, hoping to avoid a similar Chamizal type dispute on the Suchiate
River.288
Equally as pressing for the two authors was forging an agreement regarding the
utilization of the borderland rivers for irrigation and energy. Since the Modus Vivendi of 1942
and renewed Mexican engagement with Guatemala, Mexican diplomats had been frustrated in
moving dialogue towards a comprehensive agreement with their Guatemalan colleagues.
Cardona and Hernández claimed that the engineers from the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources
expressed such frustration that they were contemplating unilaterally beginning work on shifting
and damming parts of the Suchiate for planned projects.289
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No unilateral project went ahead. Though some members of the government had lost
patience with the false assurances given by a stream of Guatemalan officials, Mexican officials
avoided any confrontation, as they hoped to replicate their positive experience with the United
States. Cardona and Hernández noted that “…keeping in mind the experience on our northern
border and with the sense of being a good neighbor, it will be better to make a new effort…to
arrive at an understanding.” The recent 1944 Treaty between the United States and Mexico
regulating shared water resources had, in the words of the authors, “proved to be a magnificent
experience for Mexico, and demonstrates that neighboring states, even when their powers are
varied, can come to an understanding in a spirit of equality and justice.” This breakthrough came
despite “the differences, which many years [Mexico] had with United States, proving that it is
much more sensible to arrive at an international accord before local and national interests trouble
such an agreement.”290

Demarcation

The one bright spot in cooperation between Mexico and Guatemala involved demarcation
of the border, which had proceeded in small steps since the Cardenas-era and did not cause the
same kind of diplomatic wrangling occasioned by bridge construction despite the territorial
implications of the work. This suggested that questions of financing, bureaucratic
miscommunication, illustrated by the failure of Benítez bridge deal, and just where the bridge
would be placed -- close to a new population center or not -- played a large role in the delay. In
1938 a small team of binational engineers trekked through the isolated regions of the
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borderlands, tracking and fixing a handful of border monuments erected during the chaotic
survey following the 1882 treaty; vandals, weather, and environmental growth had destroyed or
damaged many of them in the decades since their initial construction. This group included the
young associate topographer Trueba. The 1938 journey demonstrated the need for the effort as
they corrected a major mistake in the placement of monument 35, or Aguas Turbias, at the
parallel 17° 49’.291 Surveyors from decades earlier had placed this monument on the eastern end
of the border 200 meters inside the territory of Mexico. Utilizing more advanced “astronomic
and geographic” techniques, the engineers now moved the monument to the south, which
ensured, in the words of the Secretary of Foreign Relations Manuel Tello, that “our country
recovered around eight square miles of territory.”292
The slow and arduous work of demarcation continued in fits and starts. In May 1950, the
newly formed Mexican Boundary Commission, operating under the auspices of the Secretariat of
Foreign Relations, planned for a more extensive revision of the placement of the Chiapan border.
Despite the auspicious name — the Mexican press labeled the group the International Boundary
and Water Commission — it was a small ad hoc bureau that mainly consisted of a now veteran
Trueba leading loaned out experts from other government departments in the demarcation
mission.293 Significantly, though, the commission could count on Guatemalan cooperation in an
extra-official capacity.
Starting from Tenosique, Tabasco Trueba lead a small survey team composed of a
topographer, a meteorologist, a geographer, an archeologist, and two radio operators from the

291

Manuel Tello to J.E. de Leguizamó, Mexico, January 16, 1950, AH-SRE Legajo 339-12 Expediente

129.
292

Manuel Tello to J.E. de Leguizamó, Mexico, January 16, 1950AH-SRE Legajo 339-12 Expediente 130.
Boletín para la Prensa, México, April 22, 1950, AH-SRE Legajo 339-12 Expedientes 107-109; El
Excélsior, April 23, 1950; El Nacional, April 23, 1954
293

142

Secretariat of National Defense. Their planned month-long trip would lead them west through
the Lacandon jungle to Tapachula, to “investigate the state of [border]monuments…collect all
class of information regarding demographic data…[and] study the possibility of utilizing the
water of international rivers.” A Guatemalan engineer planned to rendezvous with the group
close to the border.
The remoteness of the region, as well as the difficulty in recruiting federal officials to
work in the borderlands –as examined in chapter two -- seemed to allow Trueba wide latitude in
how he chose to carry out the expedition. For example, the day before he began his journey he
wrote his superior Lorenzo Hernández — author of the closing memo of the 1937 border study
urging the creation of the CILA — to tell him he would not be waiting for the assigned, and a
few days tardy, archeologist, Carlos Margáin, to arrive in Tenosique. Trueba took offense at a
telegram Margáin had sent, accusing it of containing “veiled orders.” The famed archaeologist
asked Trueba to arrange mules, guides, and planes in order for him to catch up with the
expedition as he had been pulled away to first accompany President Alemán and his wife on a
tour of Palenque. Trueba did not follow through on Margáin’s suggestions. When the
archaeologist arrived in Tenosique, there was no transportation available. He wrote a frustrated
telegram to Hernández, explaining that he could not make sense of Trueba’s instructions and that
nobody knew when or exactly where he had gone.294
Margáin’s inclusion in the trip revealed the Mexican government’s estimation of the
unknown nature of the region: the trip could uncover ruins such as recently unearthed in
Palenque since Trueba led his expedition through territory untouched by any arm of the Mexican
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government for decades. Utilizing mules and breaking ground through the rough Lacandon
Forest, the surveyors traveled up to the Mayan archeological site of Bonampak and later down to
inspect the Usumacinta, Chixoy, and Salinas Rivers, and eventually to the city of Comitán. Due
to the challenges of this kind of travel, they failed to complete the trip in the planned months’
time; instead the expedition lasted almost three. As the engineer explained, since the decline of
both the logging and chicle industries, there were no paths and no bridges over the innumerable
rivers. Trueba noted of the border monuments he found: “…I can almost assure you that nobody
has seen them since their construction.” The planned meeting with Guatemalan engineer Ernesto
Alvarez at the prescribed meeting spot of monument 47 never occurred. The harsh terrain,
coupled with the lack of roads and dwindling supplies, stopped the Guatemalan delegation from
arriving.295
The difficulty and delays caused by the trip also stopped Trueba from completing the
surveying goals that called for him to continue west out of the Lacandon Forest and along the
border to the mouth of the Suchiate River outside of Tapachula. He would not complete the
second part of this trip until 1956. After finally leaving the jungle, Trueba found himself and his
team “isolated at the Santo Domingo River,” behind schedule and, most importantly, without
sufficient funds to continue the rest of the trip. This forced him to travel quickly to the closest
city, Comitán, to contact the Border Commission. In Comitán Trueba wired his superior,
Manuel Medina, for more money. He claimed that though some of the crew was tired and all
were owed more salary due to the delay, most were ready to continue the trip. Trueba tried to
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convince Medina of the necessity of continuing by stressing the important work of demarcation
along with the same issues that would cause controversy during his 1956 expedition. He noted:

In my travels I realized that besides the business with the border there were other issues related to
demographics and forestry management, as well as customs related, that you could characterize
as illicit and would interest the nation.296

Although Trueba had “the working train on the border ready to continue,” lack of funding
stopped him from completing the trip. Indeed, the renewed focus by the Mexican government on
maintaining monuments and clearing away brush from the entire border, all the way to British
controlled Belize, accounted for a large amount of resources. In March 1951, a few months
after Trueba’s trip ended in Comitán due to lack of funding, the Secretariat of Communication
and Public Works asked Medina’s Mexican Boundary Commission for assistance in situating the
entrance of the Pan-American Highway into Mexico at Ciudad Cuauhtémoc. Located
approximately forty miles southwest of Comitán, and formerly known as El Octotal, the
borderland city took on the more nationalistic Mexican name in 1943. Medina, pleading poverty,
arranged for the Department of Roads to loan Trueba a car, a driver, and seven assistants. Once
there, Trueba worked with his Guatemalan counterparts to ensure that the Pan-American
connection corresponded to the political border.297
Following the relatively easy work of the Pan-American highway, Trueba set off at the
beginning of 1952 on another tough expedition, this time a two-month tour through the jungles
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of Quintana Roo and Campeche. There he toured the line, demarcating and clearing the border
between Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize, jumping from spot to spot by securing a plane to land
his team in small clearings in the middle of the jungle. Due to the remoteness of the region, the
Mexican Commission assigned a doctor to the trip to take advantage of the group’s travels and
visit the local population. Trueba, as was his style, made several on the spot decisions he later
explained and justified to his superiors. For example, he discovered and reprimanded a series of
Mexican loggers and chicleros who crossed over into Guatemala. As Trueba finished his trip,
Medina wrote the Forestry Commission and the Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock to halt
the Mexican incursions into Guatemala described by the engineer.298

Diplomacy, Threat of War, and the Formation of CILA

As Trueba continued his demarcation work, Mexican diplomats continued to push for the
establishment of an international border commission into the 1950’s despite the often heightened
tensions between the two traditional rivals. The possibility of cooperation over the shared border
became a path towards a normalization of relations between Mexico and Guatemala. Continued
negotiations over the construction of a permanent bridge over the Suchiate allowed Mexican
diplomats the opportunity to discuss a broader agreement over water rights and demarcation to
be monitored and supervised by an international body. The continued delays, though, regarding
the construction of a single bridge seemed to suggest the impossibility of establishing a
binational body such as CILA.
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In addition, the dramatic changes in government in Guatemala following the 1954
overthrow of the October Revolution — discussed in detail in chapter four — played a role in
disrupting a larger border agreement. In July of that year, Castillo Armas (1954-1957) a former
Guatemalan military officer, led a United States supported coup against an Árbenz regime
deemed a security threat to the region because of the president’s socialist leanings. Only a few
years later, Miguel Ydígoras (1957-1962) a former presidential candidate and a military official,
overthrew Castillo Armas Both Castillo Armas and Ydígoras represented a return to the Ubicostyle form of government: authoritarian, tied to United States foreign policy, and possessed of a
reflexive antipathy towards Mexico.
Regardless of the changes in government, Mexican diplomats continued to push for
increased cooperation. As before, Mexico’s extensive experience with the United States served
as a touchstone. This experience, especially the unequal power dynamics between the two
neighbors, influenced from Mexico’s perspective its continued patience in the face of
Guatemalan intransigence. Mexico, on its southern border, could take the role of the good
neighbor. They did this because, ultimately, they understood that cooperation assisted Mexico,
just as, on the northern border it helped both countries. A deliberative body like CILA could
take politics out of the process of border management. As on the northern border, the history of
the border between Mexico and Guatemala was defined by historical accusations of theft, but on
the northern border Mexico had been able to transcend its historical resentment. If the U.S. and
Mexico could compromise over the Rio Grande, then some type of agreement could be made
over the Suchiate.
In August 1958, Luis Padilla Nervo, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, tasked the
Mexican ambassador in Guatemala, Francisco de Icaza, to “restart negotiations” with the new
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government of Ydígoras. As a guide, the ambassador received a ten-page history of Mexican
negotiations with the United States regarding the manner “they have resolved terrestrial and
fluvial problems since 1848 until the present.”
This history touched upon the key border disputes and agreements since the end of the
U.S. War with Mexico, optimistically summarizing a century of potentially explosive
disagreements involving the placement of the border itself and the allocation of resources
resolved through negotiation. At points the memorandum distilled for the ambassador the key
lesson learned by Mexican diplomats regarding the challenges of managing and negotiating with
a neighbor over a border defined in substantial part by a river: listen to the engineers.
The summary placed special emphasis on the negotiations and work by the International
Border Commission between Mexico and the United States since the 1933 Treaty for
Rectification of the Rio Grande in the El Paso-Juárez Valley. Through the work of the binational
body of engineers assigned to advise their respective governments, potentially much larger
conflicts were avoided. For example, the 1933 Treaty, based on the studies done by the
Commission, called for the construction of an artificial channel of the Rio Grande in an attempt
to control the annual flooding that frequently shifted the border itself, causing the loss of land for
one side or the other. The channeling of the river set a precedent, replacing the 1905 ad hoc
work of eliminating bancos where and when they arose and instead allowed the engineers greater
control of the river.299
The spirit of cooperation between Mexico and the United States culminated in the 1944
“Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande.” Managed by
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the engineers of the border commission, it allowed both countries equal rights to the Colorado,
Rio Grande, and Tijuana Rivers for the purposes of irrigation and hydroelectric power. The
groundbreaking agreement led to the construction by Mexico of the Morelos Dam, diverting
water from the Colorado River to the dry Mexicali Valley. It also led to the international Falcon
Dam, which provided hydroelectric power to both countries.
The memorandum made clear to de Icaza just how important the 1944 Treaty was to
Mexican agricultural and hydroelectric needs, illustrating similar potential in the Chiapan
borderlands. For example, it noted that whereas before farmers in the Mexicali Valley only
planted 80,000 hectares of land, irrigation allocated by the 1944 treaty allowed them to plant
close to 200,000. Indeed, the water proved so important to improving the economy of Baja
California that “it could convert from a Federal Territory to a State of the Republic.” Results in
the expansion of agriculture for the communities straddling the Rio Grande between Fort
Quitman and the Gulf of Mexico were equally dramatic: it covered 27,000 hectares before the
treaty and 240,000 hectares after. To top it all off, the Falcon Dam supplied 125 million
kilowatts of electricity for Mexico, while a second dam, El Diablo, already in advanced planning
stages, could dramatically increase the electric supply and irrigation of the both countries in the
coming years.300
Mexico’s interest in exploiting the energy potential of the Chiapan borderlands was
finally equaled by its ability to execute large scale hydroelectric projects. Under the auspices of
new technocratic agencies such as the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources (Secretaría de
Recursos Hidráulicos, SRH), founded in 1947, plans to tap borderland rivers to supply the
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energy needs for the growing national economy could become a reality. The dams constructed in
Chiapas during the fifties, sixties and seventies were the culmination of a decade’s long efforts
by politicians, consumers, and labor organizations to secure the country’s energy independence
from the dictates of foreign owned utilities. Like many key resources, such as oil, electricity
remained in the hands of foreign companies after the revolution. For years these private
monopolies, such as the largest, the American Foreign and Power Company, weathered
consumer and industry resentment over high prices. In addition, they refused to expand a small
electric grid to rural areas, where the profit margins were small or non-existent, leaving many
Mexican communities literally in the dark. Legislation such as the 1926 National Electric Code
declared in principal that electricity was a “public good,” yet failed to chart a path to more
regulation over the industry and the resolution of issues such as prices and access. Calls for
nationalization were met with hesitation by Mexican officials, as American ownership of the
private utilities ensured that any intrusion into the industry would cause a diplomatic fight with
the United States.301
Cheap, accessible energy, however, became a rallying cry for the country in the 1920’s
and 1930’s. Calls for dramatic changes in the industry took concrete shape with the 1937
creation of the Federal Electricity Commission (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, CFE). In
addition to developing new energy sources, the CFE began to regulate private utilities, including
rate hikes. As result of increased regulation, as well as rhetoric calling for nationalization,
foreign owned utilities dramatically reduced their investments in Mexico. The restrictions on
resources and capital caused by World War II ensured that from 1936 to 1945 the energy
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capacity of Mexico increased by barely one percent, leaving the country with a severe
shortage.302
The CFE and the newly created SRH became the arms of a federal government
determined to develop the country’s electric grid to promote economic development, and as a
concrete example of the fruits of the revolutionary government. Under the presidency of Miguel
Alemán (1946-1952) dams became a major tool to achieve this growth. During his historic tour
of the United States in 1947 the Mexican chief executive made an impactful visit to the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Impressed with the TVA’s ability to provide electricity,
irrigation, and jobs to a rural population, Alemán decided to import the model to Mexico. His
administration formed four river commissions throughout Mexico, including the Grijalva Valley
River Commission (Comisión del Río Grijalva, CRG) in Chiapas.303
Beginning in the Sierra Madre of Guatemala, the Grijalva River snakes its way across the
Mexican border, passes by Ciudad Cuauhtémoc, travels through the Central Valley of the state
and the famous Sumidero Canyon, and finally links up with the Usumacinta River in Tabasco.
The two rivers discharge nearly 105,200 million cubic meters of water, representing 30% of
Mexico's freshwater. This large volume of water, wrote Secretary Padilla in 1958 to the
Mexican Ambassador in Guatemala, made the Usumacinta “one of the seven most important
rivers in the world.” Acting on that appraisal, engineers of the SRH had already begun plans to
build Mexico’s largest dam, the Malapaso, to take advantage of the powerful borderland river.
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As construction started in 1959 it became even more crucial to obtain Guatemalan cooperation to
ensure that there would be no disruption upriver.304
Actions by the Ydígoras administration suggested the impossibility of compromise, as
highlighted by an attack on a Mexican fishing fleet on December 31, 1958. That day, boats from
the Guatemalan navy, accompanied by fighter planes, attempted to interdict and escort to the
nearby Guatemalan Pacific Coast port of Champerico, a pair of Mexican fishing vessels
supposedly operating in Guatemalan territorial waters. Ignoring the instructions of Guatemalan
authorities, the planes strafed the boats, killing and wounded a handful of fishermen and
disabling much of the fleet. Guatemalan authorities arrested a handful of the survivors and
brought them back to shore as prisoners, while others escaped to Mexico to tell the press
shocking details of the unprovoked attack. 305
The attack on the fishing boats was the culmination of years of tensions between the two
neighbors regarding Mexican intrusions into Guatemalan territory and foreign policy towards
Belize. Throughout 1957 and 1958, Guatemala complained in the press and to Mexican
diplomats about fishing fleets entering their coastal waters, as well as illegal logging expeditions
in the Petén.306 In addition, Ydígoras clashed with Mexico regarding his aggressive policy
towards Belize. Like Chiapas, Guatemala claimed the British controlled territory as a preindependence possession. In early 1958, Ydígoras symbolically crossed into Belize with a
handful of supporters and Guatemalan newspaper reporters, vowing to the accompanying press
to return the region to Guatemala by force if necessary. Mexico repudiated the bellicosity of
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Ydígoras’s actions and rhetoric. On October 1958, in a speech to the United Nations, Mexican
Secretary Padilla Nervo announced for the first time his country’s support for Belize’s right to
self-determination, an action which drew a stern and inflammatory rebuke from the Guatemalan
press and Ydígoras himself.307
Accordingly, Ydígoras defended the Guatemalan attack on the fishing boats and refused
Mexico’s request for arbitration at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Instead,
Guatemalan newspapers printed the “confessions” of the captured Mexican fishermen, which
indicated they knowingly entered Guatemalan territorial waters. On January 23, a day after the
fishermen were returned to Mexico, President Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) announced to
the nation that he was breaking diplomatic relations with Guatemala.
López Mateos set the tone of public outrage in his address, blaming the Guatemalan
government, and not the Guatemalan people, for the hostility. His attitude replicated Mexico’s
dealing with Guatemala on the border: stern, but leaving room for some form of diplomatic
rapprochement.308 In the borderlands, the Chiapan Governor Samuel León Brindis assured
Guatemalans that they were welcome to stay, and even hinted to the press that many
Guatemalans sought refuge in Mexican lands to escape the policies of the bellicose Ydígoras. In
Comitán public officials, the Chamber of Commerce, as well as local labor organizations offered
support to the government’s effort to “safeguard national sovereignty.” Yet they emphasized
that, “like the whole of the border region, [from Comitán] to Ciudad Cuauhtémoc,” they
continued to support the friendship between the two countries.309 Meanwhile, President López
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Mateos received scores of letters offering support and denouncing Ydígoras. As evidence of the
patriotic fervor the attack stirred up is the message written by Colonel Francisco Abreu Marin, a
“veteran of the Revolution of 1913,” who offered his services for his “Patria.”310
Between the break in diplomatic relations on January 23 and their resumption on
September 15 of the same year, tensions between the two neighbors remained high. As in the
past, the fear of exiles influencing Guatemalan politics (a subject taken up in greater detail in
chapter four) contributed to the animosity between the two rivals. In March, Ydígoras
announced that Guatemalan exiles from the Árbenz government were plotting to invade from
Chiapas, supported by undisclosed foreign powers who opposed his planned forcible takeover of
Belize. Incidents in the borderlands threatened to escalate the situation, such as when
Guatemalan borderlanders vandalized the temporary bridge over the Suchiate, or when a handful
of Mexicans vandalized the Guatemalan border town of Santa Anna. Finally, Guatemala
attracted the support of other Central American nations, included El Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, which saw an opportunity to embarrass Mexico by denouncing their supposed heavyhandedness with their neighbor.311
Despite the continued aggressive rhetoric of Ydígoras, in his September 1 Informe de
Gobierno, López Mateos signaled a willingness to reengage with Guatemala, indicating that
Mexico would be open to a third party to mediate. The Chilean ambassador in Mexico became a
de facto mediator in the reconciliation effort. Both sides agreed to share blame in the New
Year’s Eve incident. Mexico admitted its boats had strayed into Guatemalan waters, while
Guatemala admitted to overreacting, and provided indemnification for the sailors killed during
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the attack. Both agreed to have their respective navies patrol and monitor their fishing fleets to
prevent future incursions into each other’s waters. Finally, they would refer future
disagreements to the International Court of Justice. The matter seemed to be closed.312
Ydígoras faced internal and external pressure to settle with Mexico. In his own
administration, Vice President Clementine Marroquín Rojas publicly urged the chief executive to
compromise in his newspaper La Hora.313 Meanwhile, the United States sought to clamp down
on Guatemalan aggression. In 1958 the Eisenhower administration withheld military aid when
key policy makers became alarmed over Ydígoras’s rhetoric about Belize. The United States
added the Guatemalan attack on the Mexican fishing boats as a reason to continue to withhold
aid in early 1959.314 The loss of millions of dollars in aid, as well as the potential protective
curtain of a United States that had previously toppled a Guatemalan regime, presented powerful
motivations for Ydígoras to reconcile. In the meantime, though Mexico had broken relations, it
did not resort to inflammatory rhetoric.
Improved relations on the border became a symbol of reconciliation between the two
rivals. In the beginning of March 1960, newly reinstalled Mexican Ambassador Efraín Aranda
Osorio and as well as diplomatic General Counsel General Raúl Michel, joined Ydígoras and his
wife in a trip to the border. Along with a score of local Tapachula politicians and officials, they
were honored guests in a name-changing ceremony for the borderland town of Aytula, to Tecún
Unam, named for an indigenous Guatemalan hero.315 After a traditional meal accompanied by a
Guatemalan Army marimba band, the president and the ambassador inspected the repaired
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temporary bridge connecting the newly baptized Guatemalan border town to Ciudad Hidalgo.
The two discussed the dimensions of a permanent connection not so susceptible to destruction
from the surging river. They then retired to the house of the Mexican Consul, where the whole
party joined in refreshments and pictures. The ambassador and General Michel then returned to
Guatemala City with Ydígoras and his wife.316
A few weeks later, Ambassador Aranda negotiated directly with Ydígoras regarding the
final details of indemnification, as well as broader issues of reconciliation. Despite the public
pronouncements only weeks earlier, Ydígoras tried to change aspects of the deal as the
Guatemalan pleaded diminished state coffers due to falling coffee prices. He suggested Mexico
pay the families of the killed and wounded sailors, which would settle the outstanding debt
Mexico owed to Guatemala for previous borderland incursions into their territory. As for the
fishing companies, Ydígoras offered exclusive fishing rights instead of monetary
compensation.317
The bulk of the agenda, according to Aranda’s notes, focused on finalizing border
agreements concerning water rights, the bridge over the Suchiate, Guatemalan braceros, and
trade. Ydígoras agreed to the building of a permanent bridge over the Suchiate, and based on his
recent visit suggested a location closer to the towns of Ciudad Hidalgo and Tecún Unam, even if
that increased the cost. Ydígoras also agreed to a joint study of the implementation of a
Guatemalan bracero program, similar to the one that existed between Mexico and the United
States, to help with the Soconusco coffee harvest. And finally, the countries agreed to a
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reduction in Guatemalan tariffs on Mexican trade goods, which was subsequently announced to
great fanfare.318
This economic agreement coincided with the completion of a Guatemalan highway
connecting Tecún Unam to the interior of the country. With the presumed completion of the
long-awaited bridge, this policy shift towards liberalizing trade had the potential to spark greater
economic ties. Reflecting the historical underdevelopment of trade between the two neighbors,
Mexico had not previously had a full-time commercial attaché in Guatemala City, but instead
had the ambassador fill the post along with his other duties. Now, for the first time, it appointed
one.319
Most significantly, Ydígoras endorsed a speedy resolution to a comprehensive
borderlands water treaty. Ambassador Aranda indicated that Ydígoras’s motivation stemmed
from a plan to build a binational diversion dam on the Suchiate, nearly fifty miles upriver from
the river’s entrance into the Pacific Ocean. Since the beginning of 1958, Mexican engineers
from the SRH had been developing plans for a diversion dam to supply the communities
straddling the Suchiate outside of Tapachula. Led by Antonio Coria, the Mexican representative
of the International Commission of the Suchiate River, the SRH measured the flow and runoff of
the river, estimating that the 1302 million cubic meters of water could be utilized to irrigate both
sides of the river.320
This proposal would be similar to projects developed on the northern border, such as the
Morelos Dam, which was built in 1950, a mile from the meeting point of California and Baja
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California. Mexican engineers, under the auspices of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, maintained and controlled the water passing through the structure. In concert with
the United States commissioners, they diverted water from the Colorado River, providing
irrigation to the Mexicali Valley and flood control for both sides of the border. The construction
as outlined by Ydígoras envisioned Mexican engineers leading the effort in dam building, much
like had earlier been decided for the much-delayed bridge, with Guatemala contributing fifty
percent of the funding.321
From February 20-23, 1961, parallel teams of seven engineers and one government
representative from both Mexico and Guatemalan convened in the Tapachula Health Center to
discuss “issues of international cooperation of great interest for both countries.” The binational
group elected Medina of the Mexican Boundary Commission to head the proceedings. He set the
overall agenda the first day, announcing the goal of “study[ing] the possibility of a Mixed
Commission of engineers of both countries.”322
Though Medina did not mention it to the assembled group, clearly he and the Mexican
delegation envisioned the meeting as an opportunity to replace the 1942 Modus Vivendi by
forming a permanent and active working group of engineers to study the most pressing
borderlands issues within the context of a comprehensive treaty. Months before the Tapachula
meeting, Mexican diplomats began to lobby their Guatemalan colleagues and Ydígoras for a
border commission. A detailed eight page list of instructions sent in March 1960 from Manuel
Tello, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, to the Mexican Ambassador in Guatemala as well as to
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Medina, outlined the familiar list of talking points and details regarding the Suchiate Bridge and
the need for cooperation for the utilization of the borderland rivers. However, instead of simply
expressing general optimism or imploring the Mexican ambassador to continue convincing his
Guatemalan colleagues of the benefits of a treaty, as such instructions had done in the past, this
time Tello outlined concrete steps that would lead to a border commission agreement. In
addition, the secretary planned for Medina to meet with Ydígoras to hear the Guatemalan
president’s thoughts on the Suchiate Bridge and share the detailed plans of the bridge designed
by Mexican engineers. Medina also was to present Ydígoras with a general proposal for a border
treaty. 323
In addition, Tello suggested the agenda and proceedings for the February meeting of
engineers. At Tapachula small groups would break out to discuss the myriad of issues affecting
the borderlands, such as bridge construction and water management. Upon reconvening, the
assembled engineers would realize that the complexity of issues demanded the need for a border
commission modeled after the one between Mexico and the United States. Following this,
Mexico would fly the Guatemalan engineers to Ciudad Juárez. There the new members of CILA
would have the chance to meet with American and Mexican engineers of the northern border
commission for a crash course on the workings of transboundary resource management.324 From
the perspective of the Mexican archives, the lead up to the establishment of CILA seemed to
have been choreographed by a Mexican government which had prepared for decades for this
moment. This demonstrated a diplomatic savvy in turning a potential conflict with a rival, to a a
long-desired bilateral agreement.
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As outlined months before by Tello, the engineers at the historic Tapachula meeting
convened in working groups the first two days to discuss such issues as the permanent bridge
over the Suchiate River, and the utilization of borderland rivers. The notes from the working
groups reveal that discussions mostly revolved around technical aspects, such as the hydrometric
flow of the Suchiate. For example, the group devoted to bridge construction focused on
obtaining accurate readings of the surging river as well as its effect on irrigation.325
Like in the general meeting, Medina led the discussions on the utilization of the Suchiate
River. Reflecting their greater technical presence on the border, the Mexican engineers shared
details of data collected from aerial and on-the-ground surveys regarding the path and volume of
water surging between the two countries. The working group agreed on a pair of main points
that demonstrated that the problems of the Suchiate required binational cooperation. First, a joint
government commission would study the divergence of the shifting river and a common
approach to ensuring that the flooding and twisting Suchiate would ruin neither borderland
communities nor the bridge. Second, a similar commission would study potential hydroelectric
uses of the borderland rivers.326
On the last day of the meeting the engineers convened and, as expected, recommended
that both governments “consider the creation of an International Commission” that would be in
charge of studying of all the questions of limits and international waters between Mexico and
Guatemala.”327 In April of that year, however, Manuel Tello wrote to Ambassador Aranda that
Ydígoras had begun to express reservations. As before, the Guatemalan executive pleaded lack
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of funds, and worried about committing to any borderland project, such as the bridge or a
Commission, without first being assured that Guatemalan finances could cover any expenses
incurred. Tello instructed Aranda to assure Ydígoras that Mexico would pay for all the planning
and designing of the permanent bridge and that, “a Boundary and Water Commission did not
imply expenses of any importance, and that in fact it could bring great benefits, which the
Commission between Mexico and the United States has demonstrated since its creation in 1889.”
That commission’s total expenses, Tello added, “have remained, without a doubt, below the
results and advantages its existence has provided.”328
In December of that year, in an exchange of diplomatic notes, Guatemala formally agreed
to form a commission based on the 1958 organizational outline presented by then Mexican
ambassador in Guatemala Francisco de Icaza, who “restarted negotiations” in the closing
moments of his appointment.329 The basis of CILA followed the outlines of the U.S.-Mexican
border commission. Finally, the engineers in the Chiapan borderlands could work within the
binational organization they requested since they first arrived in a region that the 1936 CEFS
claimed “had been forgotten.”

Dams and Energy on the Border

The Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations wasted no time in bringing the new
Guatemalan engineers of CILA north to the United States and Mexican border. A few weeks
after the Tapachula meeting -- as suggested by Tello months before -- Mexico flew the
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Guatemalans to Ciudad Juárez for a two-day meeting with engineers from the International
Boundary and Water Commission between Mexico and the United States. Upon arriving, the
Guatemalan engineers, as well as a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Relations,
received a history lesson. It was a familiar one, told by countless Mexican ambassadors to
reluctant Guatemalan officials for years, an optimistic story of cooperation dating from 1848.
CILA-norte engineers recounted how for example, demarcation efforts of 1848, 1853, and 1891
were efforts of cooperative success, ignoring the rather acrimonious history of dueling surveying
teams.330 The 1905 treaty eliminating bancos, the 1933 rectification of the El Paso-Juárez
Valley, and the 1944 distribution of water were all examples of two rivals able to work together.
The Guatemalan engineers also heard about the joint projects bringing water and economic
activity to the barren north: the Amistad and Falcon dams, the water treatment plants on the
Sonoran-Arizona border that eliminated “aguas negras,” and the diversion dam on the Colorado
River.331
For the remainder of the visit both the American and Mexican engineers answered
questions from the Guatemalan engineers and the representative of Foreign Relations. Their
queries demonstrated that despite the agreement announced in Tapachula only weeks before,
they did not quite understand the extent of the functions, privileges, and responsibilities of a
binational border commission. For example, the Guatemalan delegation asked exactly what the
“international character” of CILA meant in a practical sense. They were curious about funding:
was there a common budget and how were the costs of projects decided? They had questions
about particular stipulations of the treaty, such as why each country’s section had to be headed
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by an engineer when a lawyer seemingly could handle the responsibilities. Finally, the
Guatemalans asked probably the most fundamental question, what happens when the
commissioners disagree?332
It is not clear whether the answers provided by the American and Mexican engineers
satisfied the Guatemalan delegation, but it was clear that the spirt of cooperation the American
and Mexican engineers were proposing did not fit with the recent history of Mexico and
Guatemala. An American engineer’s answer that in the case of being unable to resolve any
serious disagreement, either country could take its case to the International Court of Justice in the
Hague must have seemed especially striking as Guatemala had specifically refused to refer the
fishing fleet incident to that body.333 The Guatemalan delegation learned that what Mexico had
proposed and what they had agreed to meant a fundamental revolution in relations between the
two countries.
As CILA settled into its offices in Tapachula in early August of 1962, the national press
in Mexico recorded this bold step in bilateral relations with little fanfare. Typical was the small
article that appeared in the August 7 El Universal, which essentially was a press release,
reporting that both countries’ delegations permanently moved to Tapachula and that their most
important work was to “take advantage of the borderland rivers for the benefit of both
countries.”334 The local borderland press interpreted the agreement differently. There journalists
framed the beginnings of CILA as an example of a benevolent Mexico treating with an
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aggressive borderland neighbor. For example, the August 1 article in El Diario del Sur stated
that:

Mexico, which has not sought any reprisals from territorial invasions and violation of its
sovereignty, has sought this meeting with great interest. Forcing the meeting are the dams placed
in the Suchiate River by Guatemala, and the new boundary markers appearing all over the border
up to Belize. But Mexico, authentic Paladin of the doctrine of Good Neighbor, has sought the
natural path of the “Conference Table,” and that reason and justice will resolve problems.335

The immediate work of the newly formed CILA reflected local and federal Mexican
governments finally able to act on long delayed plans. A June 1963 progress report
demonstrated that Mexican engineers from such departments at the SRH and the CRG
immediately set out to complete the studies and on-the-ground work not previously possible.
CILA served as a coordinator, the umbrella organization that took in engineers from other
government bodies and ensured that the work was done in concert with their Guatemalan
colleagues. For example, engineers from the SRH and CRG led hydrometric studies of the
Suchiate River to determine how to channel the restless stream. Such efforts included
destroying, with Guatemalan permission, three small diversion dams on the southern banks that
were causing erosion on the Mexican side. CILA engineers, meanwhile, continued the terrestrial
demarcation effort, which sometimes led to territorial reversals. For example, more precise
surveying in the borderland municipality of Amatenango de La Frontera, located north of
Tapachula, recovered approximately forty acres of land for the El Pacayal ejido to the north of
the border, “that had been invaded by Guatemalan farmers.” Finally, engineers from the
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Mexican Secretariat of Public Works began more detailed tests on the water flow of the Suchiate
and the soil density of the banks to determine the placement for the permanent bridge as the
temporary one once again, noted the report, was in danger of being swept away.336
In addition, Mexican engineers continued and expanded the diplomatic aspect of the
commission, which had begun with the trip to Ciudad Juárez. From 1962 to 1964, the Mexican
members of CILA, joined by representatives from the SRH and GRVC, led the head of the
Guatemalan delegation Ernesto Alvarez and his colleagues on a tour of Mexican projects
connected with the Mexico-Guatemala border, in the interior of the country, and of course, on
the U.S-Mexican border. Given the recent threat of war, the Mexican engineers demonstrated a
remarkable degree of openness in sharing design plans, cost estimates, and all the other
intricacies that went along with massive engineering projects. They took the Guatemalan
delegation to the Falcon and Amistad Dams, the Infiernillo Dam on the Balsas River in
Guerrero, and most importantly, the recently completed Malpaso Dam on the Grijalva River in
Chiapas. The group flew over the border where they could see the entrance of the river into
Mexico and the first major project of the many Mexico planned in the Chiapan borderlands.337
This cooperation hit a roadblock in 1967, when the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign
Relations sent a note hinting at Guatemalan projects upriver that would potentially disrupt the
flow of the Grijalva, representing potential problems for the future of hydroelectric energy
production in Chiapas. The letter came at a particularly key moment in Mexico’s infrastructure
development program, as CFE engineers had already begun the preliminary work on the La
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Angostura dam, the first of the projected three mega-dams to be built along the Grijalva, which
already constituted an initial investment of nearly three billion pesos.338 Preliminary studies of
the dam site, located in the Sumidero Canyon between Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Chiapa do Corzo,
had begun in 1964, with American and CFE geologists confirming the possibility of a
constructing a rock-fill dam. By 1966 the CFE had nearly twenty years of hydrometric data on
the flow of the Grijalva, and concluded that the projected site would be the biggest in the history
of Mexico, taking advantage of nearly 10,000 million meters of runoff and generating a massive
amount of energy.339
Claims by Guatemalan officials that Mexican development threatened potential
Guatemalan projects or might increase did not exactly ring true, as the proposed dam lay nearly a
hundred miles downriver from the border.340 Instead domestic Guatemalan politics, as well as the
feeling that Guatemala was not being treated as an equal partner, played a role in the note of
“respectful protest” sent on July 25, 1968 concerning Mexico’s failure to officially notify
Guatemala of work on the Grijalva.341 This made the construction of La Angostura dam the first
major test of the CILA, as both Mexico and Guatemala had to learn how to deal with resource
management disputes through the deliberative body, ignoring over a century of hostility.
Since the formation of CILA and the friendly joint flights over border, the political scene
in Guatemala had changed dramatically. The Guatemalan backer of the CILA in 1963,
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Ydígoras, had fled into exile, a victim of one of the all-too frequent violent changes in
government in twentieth century Guatemala. The new military leaders controlling Guatemala
reverted to the country’s standard posture towards its neighbor to the north: resentment and
suspicion.

The Mexican ambassador to Guatemala, Delfín Sánchez Juárez, intimated as much

in a September 1969 cable in which he warned that the vice president, and former exile in
Chiapas, Clemente Marroquín Rojas had been loudly denouncing Mexican improvements on the
Grijalva in government circles. Author of México jamás ha poseído territorio propio al sur del
Río Hondo, the nationalist Guatemalan argued, like many of his countrymen, for the nation’s
boundaries to reflect its colonial past, an issue he also frequently touched upon in his newspaper,
La Hora.342 Attuned to the feelings of the country in which he was posted, Ambassador Sánchez
warned that unless Mexico resolved the situation, the vice president and the press were likely to
“make a campaign against our country as is their custom.”343
Mexican diplomats attempted to utilize the CILA to smooth relations while also reverting
to their standard narrative of cooperation on the U.S.-Mexico border. A note from the Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations, Antonio Carrillo Flores, advising Mexico’s ambassador in
Guatemala emphasized the CILA’s role in resolving the issue, while also referring to Mexico’s
relations with the United States. Carrillo utilized the example of cooperation on the northern
border to express the concern many Mexican officials had of an upriver Guatemalan project
curbing the flow of water to Mexico. The “peaceful policy” Mexico had with United States
regarding the distribution of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers, noted Carrillo, should be had
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with Guatemala.344 Mexican CILA engineers also invited their Guatemalan colleagues to visit
the construction site of La Angostura, an offer only taken up after the 1970 inauguration of
Guatemalan President Carlos Arana Osorio. In internal memos strategizing their approach, the
Mexican diplomat corps emphasized the role of the CILA to mediate. They also advocated
sharing plans and designs with their southern neighbor to allay any fears. Though Mexico
strongly asserted its sovereign right to development, the diplomats also emphasized that any
“reasonable utilization” by Guatemala of the Grijalva “would interest Mexico because of the
possibility of a negative or positive effects.”345
The political usefulness, if not necessity, of attacking Mexico revealed itself a week
before the inauguration of Guatemalan President Carlos Arana Osorio in July 1970. As
expected and subsequently reported by the Mexican ambassador, the Guatemalan newspapers La
Hora and Impacto ran articles denouncing Mexican projects on the Grijalva River. The stories
featured quotes from individuals expected to constitute a key part of the new administration,
warning about flooded Guatemalan borderland communities caused by the dams downriver.346
It was only after Arana took the reins of the presidency that Guatemalan engineers finally visited
the Angostura construction site.347 The timing of the visit suggested that Arana wanted to
ensure that the Guatemala public believed his administration ensured that the Mexican project
would not harm Guatemala. The visits and cooperation continued well into his administration.
In early March 1971 two more Guatemalan engineers visited the Angostura site. Their visit is
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not well documented in the CILA archives except for a short note informing the Mexican
Secretariat of Foreign Relations of the visit. No doubt already in possession of detailed plans for
the massive project, the Guatemalan engineers learned nothing new except to confirm the
ambitions of the Mexican government.348
Their visit, and the CILA had proven its utility in de-escalating a potentially conflictive
situation between the two traditional rivals. The political leadership of both countries could
point to engineering reports and studies, the neutral language of science, to assure the public, and
their own government officials, that national interests would not be harmed, though in the case of
La Angostura that threat did not seem plausible. In 1975 the Angostura dam came online,
causing no problems upriver in the Guatemalan borderlands.
The Guatemalan government demonstrated their approval of the dam construction
when, shortly after Arana came to power, he visited the Chiapan borderlands in May 1971. In
the lead up, the Mexican press reported that the two executives would be discussing
hydroelectric projects on the Grijalva and Usumacinta rivers.349 In an interview before the
encounter, the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Relations made clear that Guatemala was no
longer concerned with the potential harm caused by a Mexican project; in fact, they were focused
on restarting a joint project on the Usumacinta.350 Repeating the steps of Ydígoras, the
Guatemalan executive met with Echeverría at the border city of Tecún Umán and later Ciudad
Hidalgo on May 9, where the guayabera wearing presidents affected a mood of friendship and
relaxation. This border summit moved to Tapachula the next day, where the two visited the
offices of the CILA, and in a roundtable with Mexican supporters Arana Osorio noted that,
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“Guatemala has always been a friend of Mexico, we embraced yesterday, we embraced today,
and we will embrace forever. And together we will resolve our problems through dialogue and
sincere and frank friendship.” 351

Conclusion

A couple of months after the border summit, Echeverría visited Angostura to oversee the
mega project, and to personally shepherd the removal of thousands of villagers from their soon to
be flooded homes.352 The CFE promised nearly ten thousand displaced persons from La
Concordia and Venustiano Carranza compensation for their land as well as placement in a series
of model villages. For the most part these assurances of new accommodations and payment on
the estimated loss of land went unfulfilled. When La Angostura finally came on line in 1974
many of the petitions of the displaced were still unanswered, leaving them to search elsewhere
on their own for home and livelihood.353 This loss of land, coupled with governmental
incompetence and corruption, added to long-simmering historic tensions in communities such as
Venustiano Carranza. There the indigenous community rallied behind local leaders with the help
of the activist group, Casa del Pueblo, protesting and agitating against the local landowning
clique and its government allies. In addition to local agrarian tensions caused by finquero
takeover of communal lands, the lack of compensation from the flooding caused by La
Angostura became a key point of contention.354
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As La Angostura began to impound its reservoir in early May 1974, the governor of
Chiapas, Manuel Velasco Suárez, and the commissioner of CFE, Arsenio Farrell Cubillas,
accompanied the President to inspect the monumental work. The front-page of the regional
newspaper La Voz del Sureste communicated the spirt the government sought to convey: threefourths of the page was covered by a photo of the assembled officials gazing at what was then
Mexico’s largest hydroelectric development. Above the photo was a quote from Echeverría:
“Chiapas is a sleeping giant that will not awaken by itself, but only with the participation of
Chiapanecos.”355
As the dammed water of La Angostura flooded the homes of thousands, work began later
that year on the second big mega-project on the Grijalva, the Chicosaen Dam. Completed
downriver of La Angostura in 1980, the next Grijalva dam, Las Penitas, came on line in 1987.
Once they were finished, the three Grijalva dams contributed approximately fifty percent of the
hydroelectric energy of Mexico.356 All that energy flowing across the border did not, however,
translate into more development for Chiapas. Only a week after completion of the construction of
Chicosaen a conference in Tuxtla Gutiérrez discussion the repercussions of the fact that Chiapas
was the state with the least access to electricity.357
As the waters of the Grijalva fueled a mega-project boom in Chiapas, in 1980 the binational
team of engineers attached to the CILA began to explore joint projects on the Usumacinta. They
replaced the original plan, a diversion dam that in part enticed Ydígoras to form the CILA, with a
series of hydroelectric dams. 358 Already in 1965, Mexican engineers had conducted geological
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surveys at the site of Boca del Cerro, located in the southeastern corner of Chiapas in the Lacandon
Jungle. Beginning in 1980 the new working group visited that site, along with three others in
Guatemala, to conduct up to date surveys. At the same time, methods of financing were explored,
principally through World Bank loans. 359 By 1987, the Boca del Cerro site was projected to be
the pilot project. The CILA, along with the CFE and a Guatemalan government seeking to extract
itself from a bloody civil war, were ready to complete another mega-project in the Chiapan
borderlands.
This time, however, there were new political considerations. Fierce worldwide
opposition met the projected dam as its construction threatened to flood the important Mayan
archaeological sites of Piedras Negras in Guatemala and Yaxchilán in Chiapas. In Mexico, in
April 1987, the Grupo de los Cien, composed of such cultural luminaries as Octavio Paz, Rufino
Tamayo, and José Emilo Pacheco, wrote an open letter to President Miguel de la Madrid
protesting the planned dam. This particular hydroelectric project, claimed the group, threatened,
“the historic inheritance of Mexico and Guatemala, as well as that of humanity, and the
equilibrium of nature and society.”360 Archeologists from around the world and even United
States Senator Robert Kasten of Wisconsin joined the protest, asking the multinational loaning
institutions to delay financing. The March 31, New York Times editorial entitled, “Don’t Flood
the Maya Vatican,” encapsulated the high cultural stakes felt by many opposed to the project.361
The protests achieved their desired effect, and the Boca del Cerro dam was shelved.
However, both Mexico and Guatemala continued to explore the possibilities, and in 2001
Mexican President Vicente Fox revived the effort, wrapping it within the context of the Plan
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Puebla Panama. This ambitious neoliberal vision to connect Latin American markets across
borders aimed to usher Mexico and its new conservative president into a larger regional
leadership role. A binational dam seemed to encapsulate this effort at bridging boundaries,
though critics of the Plan claimed it sold the region’s resources to multi-nationals.362 Once
again, opponents of the dam around the world and in Mexico mobilized to stop the plan. The
Grupo de Los Cien wrote an open letter to the president, who also received pressure from other
groups, including the rebel Zapatistas whose followers occupied the region.363 Defeated once
again, the plan was recently revived again in 2012, and environmental groups in Mexico and
around the world have come together to see if they can hold off this stubborn and destructive
example of binational cooperation in the Chiapan borderlands.364
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Chapter Four:
Exiles in the Borderlands: Generals, Intellectuals, and the October Revolution:
1944-1954
In February of 1897 the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations Ignacio Mariscal
received a letter from San Salvador about a visit from a General Fadeo Trabanino and a
revolution in Guatemala against President José María Reina Barrios.365 From his diplomatic
perch in El Salvador the Mexican consul was privy to the political machinations of a group of
Guatemalan, Honduran, and Nicaraguan exiles conspiring against their home governments, one
another, and in the case of General Trabanino, soliciting the help of the Mexican government to
overthrow the Guatemalan president; the would-be revolutionary complained that at the moment
he had only managed to secure “sympathy” in the Chiapan border. ”366 The Mexican
government offered Trabanino and his fellow revolutionaries no support. Later, Mariscal would
learn of the efforts of the Barrios government to plant “spies” in Chiapas among exiled
Guatemalans conspiring in the borderlands for a return to political power.367 The 1897 revolt,
led by disaffected ladinos (Spanish speaking mestizos that had held political and economic
power in Guatemala since independence) concentrated in the Guatemalan highlands, ended in
defeat.368
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In 1898 English traveler Edgar Zollinger shot Barrios for unknown motives, though
speculation pointed to a plot led by his vice-president, Manuel Estrada Cabrera. Regardless,
soon after he was taken into custody, Guatemalan police killed Zollinger.369 Estrada seized
power soon afterwards, leading to another revolutionary effort, led this time by the former
Minister of War, Prospero Morales. Morales, a participant and loser in the failed 1897 conflict,
who at the time of Barrios’s death resided in Mexico City, prepared his would-be march to
power in the Chiapan borderlands, where he recruited men and supplies.370 Morales left the
border city of Tapachula with a contingent of both Guatemalans and Mexicans sometime in early
August. By the end of the month he and his revolution were defeated.371
Both Morales and Trabanino knew they needed support in Chiapas, as already at the turn
of the century the borderland comprised part of a long running political tradition in Guatemala:
since independence from Spain, Guatemalan exiles, refugees, and revolutionaries had fled to and
utilized the Chiapan borderlands as a platform to organize violent political change in the seat of
power, Guatemala City. In 1848, for example, the deposed Rafael Carerra rode to the city of
Comitán to plot his return to power. His arrival prompted the Mexican federal government to
send troops to head off any potential problems among the indigenous population that might have
been prompted by the arrival of the charismatic “indio.” To Mexico City’s relief Carerra left in
1849, riding to power with the help of borderland Chiapanecos.372 Nearly three decades later
Justo Rufino Barrios began his “Liberal Revolution” from his finca in Soconusco. There Barrios
found a warm welcome among the local elites, who sheltered and supplied him. Most
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importantly they solicited aid on his behalf from the recently triumphant Liberal government of
Benito Juárez. Barrios received thousands of pesos from the Liberal Mexican Regime, assuring
his political victory.373 Morales’s gambit and Trabanino’s solicitation of aid were both part of a
political playbook for insurrection by Guatemalan exiles that would last until the end of the
twentieth century.
This chapter examines the trajectory of this tradition between 1944 and 1954.
Specifically it examines the Mexican government’s policies towards the Guatemalan exiles
produced by the October Revolution in 1944, as well as toward those that fled the country after
the October Revolution’s overthrow in 1954. It examines these two periods of exile in relation
to the Chiapan borderlands and how the Mexican national security apparatus utilized the
personnel of the Department of Political and Social Investigation (Departamento de
Investigacion Política y Social, DIPS) of the Secretariat of the Interior to track, monitor, and
control the movements of prominent ex-politicians and military personnel that fled to Mexico
after 1944. These officials managed the borderlands, ensuring that these exiles could not
effectively foment revolution. During the decade of the October Revolution, the Mexican
government ensured that any violent political change in Guatemala would not be coming from
the Chiapan borderlands.
The right-wing generals and politicians that fled to Mexico in late 1944 and early 1945,
represented the last wave of the traditional Guatemalan political exile.374 Composed of
prominent politicians, landowners, and military officials, they did not attempt to hide as they
plotted a return to power and lambasted the “communist” revolution taking place in their
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country. The Mexican government’s security apparatus generally was able to keep track of them
and move them from the borderlands where they could potentially threaten the October
Revolution. Through its own intelligence efforts, the Guatemalan government also tracked the
location of these prominent exiles in the borderlands and worked with the Mexican government
to ensure they would be removed from the traditional springboard for a return to power. In the
Mexican government’s national security approximation the exiles in the borderland posed a
threat facing south and not to the body politic in Mexico in the way that later exiles of the
Guatemalan Civil War would be perceived to do. Instead, the borderlands hung like a powerful
sword of Damocles over the Guatemalan Revolution.
This chapter ends by examining the Guatemalans that fled in 1954, in particular those
that crossed into the borderlands. They were not prominent generals or politicians whose plight
was recorded in Mexico City newspapers. The fall of the October Revolution government
changed the nature of who sought exile in the borderlands. Campesinos, labor organizers, those
who participated in or were assisted by the progressive policies of the previous regime, were
forced to leave their homes and seek shelter in the borderlands as exiles, but without the
resources of national political figures.
Before moving forward a definition of exile is needed. Many scholars have adopted the
straight-forward characterization of Hungarian social scientist and exile Paul Tabori,

An exile is a person compelled to leave or remain outside his country of origin on account of
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion: a
person who considers his exile temporary (even though it may last a lifetime), hoping to return to
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his fatherland when circumstances permit-but unable or unwilling to do so as long the factors that
made him an exile persist.375

In his review of European cold-war exiles, Idesbald Goddeeris defines the word exiles as,
“refugees or immigrants engaging themselves in opposition politics against their homeland.”376
Or as political theorist Judith Shaklar succinctly notes, exiles are those who simply “cannot
accept their political obligations and loyalties as simple habits.”
Taking into account the numerous variations on the theme of forced emigration, I utilize
a rather broad definition of exile, which includes the political activist forced abroad, the refugee
fleeing counter-insurgency and its scorched earth policies, and even the guerrilla who voluntarily
chooses to utilize Mexico as a place from which to launch revolution. Including these varied
groups under the rubric of exile binds their flight to the political structures of their home country.
Above all it gives refugees’ agency, a distinction many scholars fail to assign them. In this
estimation all the exiles in the borderlands throughout the four decades examined, between 1944
until the mid-1980’s, were politically active and presented a challenge to the Mexican state’s
attempts to control the borderlands. The refugees I explore in chapter six, for example, were not
wards to be cared for, but like their fellow exiles, had political agendas developed in large
measure in response to the political conditions in Guatemala from which they fled.
In my estimation, the differences that scholars have assigned an individual being either a
refugee or an exile hinged on political and economic status. An often unmentioned distinction
between the two is method of travel and the economic status that reflects: refugees tend to walk
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across borders, carrying only the clothes on their back. On the other hand, exiles’ travel are
usually arranged and they are reasonably assured of some economic future once settled. One is
poor and uneducated, the other connected to power, or in the case of the middle-class students of
the 1960’s and 1970’s, someone who willingly gave up a bourgeois future because of committed
political beliefs. All, though, are forced to leave their countries. Expanding on Shaklar’s
definition, I think it is important to add that political circumstances consistently follow the exile
whether he or she desires it or not. In this conceptualization, whether exiles were politicians or
laborers with no overt political affiliation, they were irrevocably tied into a violent political
milieu that made exile necessary.
For the host government of Mexico, though, these academic distinctions were not
important when identifying who was a potential threat to national security or, as examined in this
chapter, to the Guatemalan government. It is important then to take into account awareness of
the host government of the who, why, and where of the exiles or refugees (were they former
government officials, did they have money and connections) in order to understand how that
government came to view developments in the region throughout the long conflict. Despite
Mexico’s reputation as a place of refuge, Mexican officials knew that the Chiapan borderlands
were a fugitive landscape and that the presence of exiles there in 1944 could have dire
consequences for a new, potentially friendly, Guatemalan government.

1944-1950: Protecting the Revolution

The October Revolution of 1944 that dislodged Jorge Ubico, like wholesale regime
changes that occurred before it, prompted a flow of exiles to Mexico. This new wave of rightwing exiles, composed of high-ranking Guatemalan military officers, landowners, and political
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activists unwelcomed by the new Arévalo government, fled across the Mexican border on their
way to what would be a ten-year sojourn away from home.
Metaphorically they passed exiles from Ubico’s Guatemala coming home after a long
stay in Mexico, which for most of them had meant living in the Chiapan borderlands. Notable
individuals such as the journalist Clemente Marroquin Rojas, the aviator Miguel Garcia
Granados, namesake and grandson of the Liberal caudillo who had also spent a period of exile in
Chiapas, came back to a friendly Guatemala from their borderland exile.377 Less notable exiles
joined them, such as the Tapachula members of the Democratic Guatemalan Front (Frente
Democrático Guatemalteco) who had written to Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho in
February 1943 to express their thanks for Mexico’s warmth and their hopes for the dictator to the
south’s fall from power.378 Before his fall from power Ubico worried the about these scattered
opposition figures in the borderlands. For example, in 1939 he sent a request through the
Mexican ambassador in Guatemala to Mexican President Cárdenas. Though dismissed by the
Mexican ambassador as lacking veracity, Ubico accused Garcia Granados as well as other exiles
such as Rojas, of being “pseudo-immigrants” intent on subversion, urging the Mexican
government to move them away from the border to México City.379 The antagonistic Ubico
found no assistance from the Cárdenas government.
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Those fleeing the October Revolution, however, found in the borderlands a growing and
more ambitious post-revolutionary Mexican state. The Secretariat of the Interior created the
DIPS, for instance, in 1942 to control political dissidence. They therefore encountered a much
more restrictive atmosphere than that in which previous exiles had lived. In addition, the
support of the Mexican public and government for the revolutionary government of their
neighbor to the south meant a Chiapan borderlands unfriendly towards those Guatemalan exiles
intent on regime change.380 These right-wing exiles, like the eventual coup leader of 1954,
Carlos Castillo Armas, were former military officers, or landowners, adrift in their expulsion
from power. Their first months of exile found them in Tapachula hotels, or guests in the fincas
of sympathizers. They traded correspondence, plotted or, just as frequently, merely complained
about their plight. They were not hard to find.
This made it possible for the Guatemalan government, through its own networks in the
borderlands, to identify and pass on to the Mexican government the names, locations, and
activities of exiles deemed a threat to the new government. For the majority of the ten-year
duration of the October Revolution, the Guatemalan government found a willing partner in the
Mexican government: the Secretariat of Foreign Relations received and passed along information
about suspect exiles to the Secretariat of the Interior, which handled national security. For the
tumultuous first few years of the revolution the Mexican government protected the Arévalo
regime. Officials referred to it as the “friendly government” to the south, and it was, besides that
of Costa Rica, perhaps the only ideologically compatible, non-despotic ally in the Isthmus. The
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Mexican policy towards Guatemalan exiles helped to protect a Guatemalan government that, for
the first time since Independence, was not openly hostile to Mexico.
Beginning in January of 1945 the Guatemalan government began to send its first lists of
names of prominent exiles, and if possible their addresses, through the Mexican embassy,
requesting the assistance of the Mexican government to relocate them away from the border. On
many occasions, in addition to requesting action to remove a threat from the borderlands, the
government also cited Mexican and international law. For example, a typical letter sent in
January 1945 listed thirty four military exiles and twenty-five civilian exiles along with their
addresses in Mexico. It also referred to article one of the accords at the 1928 Sixth International
Conference of American States in Havana, Cuba, which noted that governments should make
efforts to stop foreign residents from “gathering forces, crossing borders, or utilizing their
territory to start or foment a civil war.”381 The letter especially noted the presence of former
Ubico strongman, General Daniel Corado, and his son, along with Ada Manrique Rios, all of
whom resided in Tapachula and were accused of sneaking arms into Guatemala to opposition
groups.382
An October 1945 memorandum prepared for the Mexican president based on complaints
passed on by the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Relations cited the volume of propaganda
produced by a group of prominent exiles. It suggested the Mexican government prosecute the
offenders through the 1917 Press Law (Ley de Imprenta) and its prohibition against inciting

El Diario Oficial de la Federación, March 18, 1929.
Ezequiel Padilla to Secretario de Gobernación, México, January 9, 1945, AGN-ADGIPS. Caja 750 (No
Expediente listed) At least one of the listed Guatemalans, Adan Manrique Rios, reappeared in Guatemala in 1954 as
part of the group supporting the CIA backed coup of Castillo Armas. See “CIA Memorandum: Guatemalan Exiles,
June 17, 1954.” Accessed January 9, 2014, http://216.12.139.91/docs/DOC_0000921821/DOC_0000921821.pdf.
See also Victor Perera, Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993), 65-66.
381
382

182

attacks against “public order.”383 It listed the names of eighteen exiles who, like former jefe
político General José Domingo Juárez Aragón, were connected to the Ubico regime. Focusing
specifically on the borderlands, the memo noted the attempts by the group to spread rumors of
discontent and rebellion in Guatemala, which had the potential to deter travel and commerce
along the shared Chiapan border, as individuals sought to avoid a region supposedly mired in
political violence As a solution to the problem, Guatemala suggested moving the group to a
northern border state —the costs associated with such an action to be paid for by Guatemala —
and requiring them to check in with a Mexican official occasionally to ensure they were not
involved in subversive activities.384
Though the Mexican government did not move the exiles to the opposite border, they did
require many to relocate to Mexico City, where they were placed under the eyes of security
services. The federal government sent directives to local and federal officials in Chiapas listing
the names and, if possible, the addresses, of those Guatemalans required to move to the capital.
In this way, through the DIPS, Mexico tracked and monitored suspected Guatemalans to ensure
their distance from the border. One such instance, of exile José Luis Garcia Aceituno, who
moved to Mexico City and then returned to the border, reflected the federal surveillance of the
region. Granted a twenty day leave to attend to business in Tapachula, Garcia wrote to an
official in the DIPS in early November claiming train problems were delaying his return beyond
the granted period.385 A few weeks later Modesto Solís Domínguez, the Jefe de Población of
Tapachula, received a telegram from Mexico City tasking him to track down Garcia and another
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exile, José Ernesto López, and have them report back to Mexico City immediately or risk
expulsion from the county.386
Despite momentarily losing track of a few exiles targeted for their potential subversion,
the Mexican government had relatively few problems finding most of the Guatemalans it sought.
The former colonels, generals, and wealthy landowners staying in the region did not attempt to
hide. For example, the directive sent to many to relocate to Mexico City prompted obsequious
letters to government officials, instead of flight, citing a variety of reasons requiring their stay in
Chiapas, such as poverty and health. The aged General Miguel Castro Monzón wrote in July
1945 to the Secretariat of the Interior, claiming surprise at the summons to the capital. After
pledging his fidelity to his newly adopted land’s law, the seventy-five year old Castro claimed
poor health, which was helped by the humid climate of Tapachula, and which also prevented him
from making the long trip to Mexico City. He even produced a note from a doctor and suggested
as an alternative a move to Minatitlán, Veracruz, it being of a similar altitude to the border city
where he currently resided.387 The Mexican officials refused his request; he was forced to move
to Mexico City, where upon arrival he was required to check in with DIPS officials. 388
The Mexican press seemed to have the same amount of sympathy for the “plight” of
generals like Castro as did the DIPS. This was evidenced, for example, by headlines that
appeared in newspapers like El Imparcial, “The Oppressors of the Guatemalan People Pass
Themselves off as Victims in Mexico.”389 Or, in another instance, an article in El Nacional
condemned the former jefe político of Quetzaltenango, Arturo Ramírez, for comments
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denigrating the progressive influence of Mexico on Guatemala. The newspaper reproduced his
inflammatory statements and shared the name of the hotel where he stayed.390
By 1947 the Guatemalan government stopped submitting lists of dangerous exiles to
move away from the border as most of the prominent Ubico exiles were accounted for in the
capital, safely under the watch of the national security forces of Mexico. The last letter I found
requesting to stay in Chiapas was from February 1947. It was addressed to President Alemán
and signed by eight Guatemalan generals, including two members of the short-lived, right-wing
triumvirate of 1944, Eduardo Villagrán Arizas and Buenaventura Pineda. Claiming poor
finances, they asked to stay in Chiapas. The fact that this group produced this request together
suggests, as would be expected of former colleagues and fellow exiles, that high-ranking Ubicoera officials maintained contact with each other after being ousted from power. This
communication no doubt attracted the suspicion of the DIPS and the Guatemalan government,
whether they were actively plotting a return to power or just complaining about their fall. 391
The removal of the exiles did not stop the rumors of conspiracies and revolutions ready to
be launched from the borderlands by prominent exiles: the borderlands became a region of both
real and imagined subversion. For a period in 1947 both Guatemalan and Mexican newspapers
connected the former short-lived president General Federico Ponce to a borderlands-launched
coup attempt. For example, the front page of the October 4, 1947 edition of the Guatemalan
newspaper El Imparcial, told of a Ponce led-scheme that included recruitment of an eighty man
borderlands-based force led by a man simply known as “El Machete,” a coordinated reactionary
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uprising in Guatemala City, and a shipment of arms passed through a local businessman in
Tapachula.392 A front page story on November 8 in the Mexican newspaper Novedades
repeating the charges prompted Ponce to write a published letter, in which he did not refute the
charges, but instead lambasted an earlier article in which the Guatemalan ambassador in Mexico
refuted charges of Arévalo leading a communist regime.393 Regardless of the newspaper
accounts, the Mexican government must have felt it had Ponce under some type of control, as a
DIPS agent had visited the ex-president only months before in his Mexico City hotel room.
Ponce chalked up any rumors floating around — which at that point charged him with financing
subversive propaganda — to the Arévalo government, claiming that similar accusations arose the
last time he visited the borderlands two years before to meet friends. Ponce promised to meet
with Dr. Pérez Martínez -- the head of the DIPS -- the following day, presumably to clear up any
misunderstandings.394
Though many of these rumors of plots amounted to nothing, there was evidence of
actual attempts by exiles to actively oppose the October Revolution government. It is difficult,
though, to sort through the conjectures, which were in part fueled by the paranoia of the
revolutionary Guatemalan government that with good reason imagined conspiracies among the
exiles that would in fact eventually overthrow it.395 It is helpful then to examine in short detail
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one would- be plan connected to a prominent exile in 1947 to pass arms to Guatemala through
Tapachula, which may or may not been responsible for nearly 24,000 bullets ultimately
confiscated by DIPS officials. The case illustrates not only that such conspiracies probably
existed, but that exiles found optimal conditions to engage in actions like smuggling in the
borderlands due to the lack of any expansive state vigilance on the border. As opposed to
prominent exiles that were easier to keep track of, the presence of corruptible Mexican officials
accustomed to looking the other way for the right price meant experienced borderland smugglers
could play a key role in political conspiracies.
In early 1947 the Guatemalan government alerted the Mexican embassy of a plot led
from Mexico City by the exiled coffee hacienda owner and losing candidate in the 1945
presidential election, Ovidio Pivaral, to introduce arms into Guatemala.396 The embassy
provided a supposed letter to Pivaral from an Arab storeowner in Tapachula, Tobías José, in
which José notes he could not procure all the suggested product but could obtain ten thousand of
the items. The embassy charged Tobias with previously suggesting an arms deal to the current
Guatemalan ambassador Adolfo Monsanto, which could also explain the worries of the Arévalo
government.397
DIPS agents promptly launched an investigation into both José and Pivaral. Interviewed
in his Mexico City residence, the aristocratic Pivaral denied knowing José and even the city of
Tapachula; the ex-presidential candidate claimed to have nothing do with business or politics.
Talks with a couple of Pivaral’s fellow Guatemalan exiles, such as noted historian and translator
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-- and like Pivaral, loser of a recent presidential election -- Adrián Recinos, also painted the
coffee magnate as a man disinterested in politics. Recinos claimed Pivaral was resting in exile,
living off the money gained from the land left in Guatemala and from children who lived in New
York City.398
The DIPS official that visited Tapachula found a much different situation with Tobías
José, who appeared to exemplify the possibilities available to a borderlander willing to traffic in
contraband. Living in a rented house that contained his store, “Estrella del Oriente,” the
notorious José had come into town from Huixtla, a small town approximately 40 miles north,
with a reputation for swindling business partners. Once settled in the port city, he began to
threaten his elderly landlady to force her to sell him her residence at a below-market price. A
neighbor reported how the “pernicious foreigner” under the cover of trading vegetables made
frequent trips to the border to sell guns, a trip of only thirty minutes, with one of the two cars he
kept on the premises.399 When questioned, the governor of the state, César Augusto Lara Ramos,
merely commented that José was an “international businessmen,” which the DIPS agent took to
mean he engaged in contraband. Though he did not find any connection to Pivaral, he heard
stories of José and his supposed connections with important Mexican officials. For instance,
José often showed off two form letters from officials in the Secretariat of the Interior thanking
the merchant for gifts sent, as evidence of his friendship with people in high places. The
merchant did seem to have a degree of official protection; the DIPS agent noted the widspread
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rumor that José’s activities fell under the protection of the ex-commander of Mexico’s 31st
Military Region, General Lorenzo Muñoz Merino. The rumors appeared to be validated by the
fact that José had obtained a one year permission from the Defense Department to sell
ammunition rounds within Mexico. Clearly the Tapachulan merchant, despite the stories
painting him as some low-rent hood — intimidating old ladies, unable to read or write —
obtained some degree of political accommodation for contraband activities. In other words, if
Pivaral, or any other exile, was looking for a partner on the border to smuggle in guns, then
Tobias José seemed to be a good fit.400
Despite having little success in finding any link between the Arab merchant and Pivaral,
the DIPS agent did find bullets, 24,000 of them, in a truck on the road from Tapachula to
Talismán. Though officials were able to name a guilty party, a Honduran named Jorge Hasbun
Hasil, the suspect walked away from custody due to efforts made at “the edge of the law.” The
investigation into the source of those bullets as well as their ultimate purpose came up against
stone-walling by a federal official. The agent blamed the frequency of contraband passing
through Tapachula on the ex-military commander, Muñoz, who had already been accused of
providing protection for Tobias José. The current chief of the 31st military zone, General
Roberto Calvo Ramírez, told the DIPS agent that his predecessor continued to use official
vehicles in his nefarious dealings. Before returning to Mexico City, the stalwart Calvo Ramírez
assured the DIPS investigator he would end the “pistolerismo” of the region, perhaps alluding to
the corruption explored in chapter two, and would work to add morals to the Customs Office in

400

Inspector I.P.S. 36 to Lamberto Ortega Peregrina, México, March 25 1947, AGN-ADGIPS Caja 750
(No Expediente listed)

189

Tapachula and continue to follow up clues to track the true culprits behind the intercepted
contraband.401
After Hasbun Hasil disappeared and the thousands of bullets were confiscated and
ultimately returned to a company in Tuxtla Gutiérrez — to the consternation of the DIPS agent
— the reported plots originating from the border subsided. 402 The concentration of prominent
exiles in Mexico City no doubt significantly helped. Safely in their hotels or residences, they
could be easily followed, and their actions were mostly limited to printing propaganda against
the October Revolution regime as discussed below.
It is also possible that the naming to the military command of Calvo Ramírez contributed
to the decline of plots, due to his politics rather than scrupulous morals. The opening of the
Soviet Intelligence Archives revealed that he was a key agent in Mexico for the burgeoning
NKVD, predecessor of the KGB. The committed Mexican communist found that being stationed
on borders served up opportunities to help the cause. Previously stationed on the northern border
in Ensenada, Baja California, Ramírez had been instrumental in assisting Soviet agents in
clandestinely crossing into Mexico from the United States. 403 Clearly being posted to the
southern border offered an opportunity for “Zapata,” his code-name in recognition of his
revolutionary experience, to safe-guard a Guatemalan regime he must have felt affinity with due
to his political leanings. He certainly would not have found much in common with Pivaral or
Recinos. 404
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Indeed, the border became secure enough for the current Guatemalan regime that it
utilized the large population of Guatemalans nationalized as Mexican citizens to manufacture
votes for Jacobo Árbenz in the 1950 presidential election by transporting borderlanders to nearby
Guatemalan precincts to vote. Mexican military officials reported on Guatemalan civilians and
officials connected to the government visiting the Mexican border towns of Talismán and
Suchiate, where they attempted to hire seventy-five trucks to bring 1200 persons over the border,
offering four pesos for each vote delivered. They noted that once back on their native soil the
large number of nationalized Guatemalans living in the region “recovered automatically” their
citizenship. Members of the opposition took pictures of the passing trucks to use as evidence of
fraud, as well as to register complaints with the federal Mexican government of their citizens
influencing foreign elections.405

1950-1954: Árbenz, the United States, and the Coup

The November 1950 election of Jacobo Árbenz was a pivotal moment, the first
democratic transition in Guatemalan history. His victory also put the revolutionary regime into
the crosshairs of an aggressive United States anti-Communist foreign policy, while also
alienating one-time domestic allies. The death of the more moderate and presumed first-choice
of outgoing president Arévalo , Coronel Francisco Arana, cleared a path for the much more
progressive Árbenz, who enacted controversial agrarian reform laws and further restrictions on
previously unfettered U.S. capital.406 As the Árbenz government gained important support from
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often indigenous rural Guatemalans and the growing industrial labor force through measures
such as recognizing union organizing, it in turn lost the backing of previous middle-class allies
that looked with fear on the mobilization of these historically marginalized groups. Indeed, the
fall of Árbenz was more than the work of U.S. intelligence agencies or the machinations of the
United Fruit Company. A variety of factors, economic, political, social, and individual, led to
the coup of 1954.407
However, due to the efforts of the Mexican government the removal of the October
Revolution government did not come from the Chiapan borderlands. Though the increasingly
conservative governments of Miguel Alemán Valdés and Aldofo Ruiz Cortines found the
reformist land policies of the Arévalo and Árbenz governments to be potentially troublesome
examples for a Mexican populace they hoped to channel through recently organized PRI
corporate structures, they certainly did not want the American intervention that it increasingly
seemed the incoming Eisenhower administration might undertake.408 Indeed, by 1952 the U.S.
government had decided on the need for covert action against Guatemala.409 Already the “case”
against Guatemala’s supposedly devious communist connections was being laid by the powerful
United Fruit Company’s propaganda team, which included, for example, the public relations
innovator Edward Bernays, a member of Joseph McCarthy’s staff, who successfully promoted
lurid stories of the horrors of “red” Guatemala in the U.S. media.410
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In addition to Mexico’s opposition to an overt U.S. intervention in their backyard,
government officials had other motives to try and protect the October Revolution: Mexican
diplomats had finally found a friendly Guatemalan government after years of hostility. Often
this newfound friendship utilized the imagery of their shared border. For example, in 1951, upon
visiting the Chiapan border, Alemán and Árbenz exchanged public notes of friendship; Alemán
noted that “the border between our countries is not a line that divides but on the contrary,
stimulates friendship.”411 Following the diplomacy of Alemán, in 1953 President Ruiz Cortines
bestowed the Great Necklace of the Aztec Eagle upon Árbenz.412 At least publicly, Mexican
diplomatic efforts began to thaw some of the ice that had built up during the tense Ubico years. It
is interesting to wonder how far the rapprochement might have progressed if the events of 1954
had not occurred.
Though the border became a site, at least rhetorically, of friendship between the two
neighbors, the government of Ruiz Cortines allowed the Guatemalan exiles and opponents of the
regime safely installed in Mexico City to ratchet up their propaganda efforts through groups such
as the Pro-Liberation Committee of Guatemala (Comité Pro-Liberación de Guatemala, CPLG),
which formed in 1952. Tied to Mexican politicians such Jorge Prieto Laurens of the Popular
Anti-Communist Front of Mexico (Frente Popular Anti-Comunista de México) the broadsides of
this group served to help the PRI regime discredit the left, and the still active ex-President
Lázaro Cárdenas, as much as it aided their battle against the “communist” Árbenz.413 The
latitude given to the group to produce inflammatory propaganda stands in sharp contrast to just a
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few years earlier, when a 1946 pamphlet produced by exile M. Antonio Archila Obregón
reproducing a purported letter from then President Arévalo to the U.S.S.R expressing the
subjugation of the Guatemalan regime, prompted a presidential memorandum kicking him out of
the country for violating the terms of his exile.414
It is difficult to establish if the Mexican government, which had DIPS investigate, knew
about the CPLG’s connection with the CIA.415 Given the code name Lionizer, and run through
an exiled Guatemalan with the handle Libethene-4, the CPLG and the hundreds or so pamphlets
they printed and mailed to newspapers under the group’s name was simply another tool of
psychological warfare in the larger assault on the October Revolution government.416 There was
a possibility that the Mexican politician Prieto was involved in anti-Árbenz activities beyond
simple propagandizing. A DIPS investigation into the activities of exiles suggested by the
Guatemalan embassy in 1952 uncovered links between a hitman for the Dominican Regime of
Rafael Trujillo, Felix Bernardino, Prieto Laurens, and activities on the Chiapan border.417 The
DIPS followed the Dominican to a meeting of Guatemalan exiles in Chiapas. Not mincing
words, the report stated that Bernardino, Prieto, and the CPLG were working to attack the
prestige of the Guatemalan government to affect a “golpe de estado.” They also noted, though,
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that the exiles lacked the financial means or political power to pose a threat to the neighbor to the
south..418
For those like Castillo Armas and other prominent exiles auditioning for the role of future
caudillo of the counter-revolution, the setting to impress the United States intelligence
community was in Guatemala’s antagonistic neighbors to the south, such as Nicaragua and
Honduras. There, in Guatemala’s southern borderlands, Castillo Armas had free rein to
organize, and he eventually led his invasion from northern Honduras.419 The first day of the
“liberation,” June 15, 1954, the CIA reported no activity on the Mexican-Guatemalan border.
Bucking a tradition dating back to its independence, Guatemala’s latest violent change in
government did not come from exiles plotting from the Chiapan borderlands: the Mexican
national security apparatus had managed to specifically control for a brief period one aspect that
contributed to the fugitive nature of the borderlands, Guatemalan exile activity.420 This
management of movement by the DIPS, though, was specific to the circumstances that emerged
after 1944, and the type of persons, prominent right wing figures, that sought exile in the region.
As we will discover in the next chapter, as the nature of exile changed, this control was not
possible to maintain.
A Mexican public followed the lead up and the aftermath of the Castillo Armas invasion
through a press sympathetic to the October Revolution. Many Mexicans expressed their support
for the embattled Árbenz government through established pro-Guatemalan groups such as the
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Sociedad de Amigos de Guatemala. Formed in 1953 under the initiative of former Ambassador
to Chile Robert Alvarado Fuentes, the Sociedad organized diverse sectors of the Mexican
political, labor, and creative class to channel public support for the October Revolution
government, concentrating on defending its achievements in promoting economic justice while
attempting to rally support in the face of increasing U.S. attacks in the international arena.421
When Castillo Armas began his march to power by leading a small five-hundred man
force into Guatemala from the border of Honduras, local chapters of the Sociedad, individuals,
labor organizations, and other pro-Guatemala groups sent telegrams to President Adolfo Ruiz
Cortines imploring that the Mexican nation defend the Árbenz government. Typical were
telegrams such as that sent from the Electric Union of Oaxaca, which noted, “we have faith the
government will support the cessation of the invasion of the sister republic of Guatemala.”422
Pro-Guatemalan support also took place in the form of public demonstrations as thousands of
students, labor leaders, and intellectuals stepped into the public void left by a Mexican
government afraid of being labeled communist by a belligerent United States.423 Notable public
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figures such as David Alfaro Siquerios, Frida Kahlo, and Diego Rivera marched through Mexico
City shouting slogans like, “Estados Unidos, ¡Asesinos!”424
As the October Revolution regime fell, expressions of outrage turned to pleas that the
Mexican government grant exile to the hundreds of regime supporters that were certain to be
caught up in the right-wing sweep. For example, at a large July 19 rally in Mexico City,
attended by prominent Spanish and Dominican exiles there as reminder of the country’s history
of sanctuary, the speakers promised to send a letter to both President Ruiz Cortines and the
United Nations to intervene with the Guatemalan military to grant the right of asylum.425 It is
not certain how many Guatemalans eventually sought exile in the wake of the CIA backed coup.
In her exhaustive work exploring the issue of exile, Guadalupe Rodríguez de Ita cites estimates
ranging from 50,000 to as low 2,000 individuals leaving the country, many heading towards
Mexico. The most celebrated example of the flight towards a safe-haven from counterrevolutionary terror took place blocks from the presidential palace in Guatemala City, in the
Mexican embassy. In the ensuing hours and days after the resignation of Árbenz, officials from
the embassy sheltered countless officials of the ousted government, including the ex-president
himself. Journalists, labor officials, leftist politicians, and even a large number of Spanish exiles
who had sought safety in Guatemala only years before fled with their families into the soon
crowded Mexican compound. Throughout the following months, Mexico negotiated safe
conduct passes with a Guatemalan government hesitant to allow potential future dissidents to
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escape. The nearly 800 future exiles trapped in the embassy endured the harassment of groups
organized by the archbishop and right-wing gangs, who banged on the gates and threatened to
storm the embassy.426 Eventually, private flights were arranged, principally to Tapachula and
Mexico City, no doubt saving the lives of many, and marking the beginning of a four decades
long saga of forced exile for thousands of Guatemalans during that country’s long civil war.427
As Rodríguez de Ita notes, those who along with their families sought safety behind the
walls of the embassy fit a classic profile of Latin American exiles: prominent, politically active
individuals.428 However, in addition to the numerous officials that flew to safety out of
Guatemala City, the Chiapan borderlands sheltered those who could only escape by foot. Many
of the Guatemalans requesting asylum in the borderlands did not figure prominently in the old
regime. Laborers and campesinos escaped to Chiapas depending on sympathetic Mexicans to
petition for asylum on their behalf. For example, on July 10, 1954, the Agrarian Committee of
Soconusco wrote President Ruiz Cortines requesting political exile be granted to Guatemalans in
the frontier region of Tapachula.429 A year later, in July 1955, the committee wrote again to the
president, this time complaining about the attempt of a Ciudad Hidalgo immigration officer, C.
Hector Larazo Martínez, to force out nearly 38 exiles and their families, or 128 people
altogether. The letter noted that Larazo had earlier expelled some 34 Guatemalan campesinos
that had fled the “terror and persecution” of their country. Basing their request on Mexican law,
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citing article 15 of the Constitution, the group claimed that if ejected from Mexico the
Guatemalans, like their fellow workers and “campesino leaders,” would be massacred.430 A
telegram sent that same month by the employees of a Mexico City clinic of the Mexican Social
Security Institute denounced the extradition of Guatemalans in Chiapas, suggesting that the
plight of these first refugees of the Civil War elicited the sympathy of some sectors of the
Mexican public.431 Above all, these Guatemalans elicited the compassion of the Mexican public
that could identify better with the farmers and laborers running across the border than with a
wealthy coffee magnate like Pivaral and other right-wing exiles.
It is likely that much of the local effort to expel Guatemalans that had fled to borderland
communities such as those listed in the letter of the committee had to do with the already
existing animus toward Guatemalans in the borderlands explored in previous chapters. During
the same time as Ruiz Cortines’s staff handled requests for asylum, they also received letters
from residents exhorting the government to expel pernicious Guatemalans taking resources from
Mexicans. For example, a letter sent in 1956 from five residents of Tapachula detailed a list of
complaints against local employers and politicians it accused of catering to Guatemalans —
including a gas station attendant accused of only serving Guatemalans — leading the petitioners
to ask if Chiapas still belonged to Mexico.432 In addition, the normal corruption of border
officials also might have played a part. It is reasonable to assume that those that suddenly fled
into the borderlands did not easily adapt to the intricacies of the transnational movement that
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other Guatemalans had learned, such as bribes. They would often not have contracts to work in
the coffee fields and thus a finquero who might encourage border officials to look the other way.
In addition, their presence might have been seen by corrupt immigration officials as an
opportunity to extract money from a vulnerable source. For example, in August 1956, a Mexican
resident of Ciudad Hidalgo wrote to the president’s office to complain about local authorities
demanding thirty six pesos from Guatemalan political exiles to stay in Mexico.433
Finally, these messages from Mexicans protesting the removal of these exiles must be
seen in the context of the more official accounts of activity in the borderlands, and the beginning
of attempts by the Mexican federal and state governments to project the region as free from the
strife plaguing the neighbor to the south For example, the August 1 edition of La Voz del
Sureste reported absolute “tranquility” on the border and complete ignorance among the
populace of the conflict raging miles away. 434 The article attacked the “capital papers” that
always seek to “disorient” the public. Instead, the regional paper claimed that borderlanders
were more interested in a bribery scandal concerning local officials than Castillo Armas and
Guatemala.435 The newspaper’s tone echoed the sentiment of Chiapan Governor Efraín Aranda
Osorio, who in an update to the president after a recent tour of the region following the Castillo
Armas coup reported a sense of calm.436
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Conclusion

The US supported overthrow of the October Revolution in 1954 prompted a new
beginning of exile activity in the borderlands, shaped by over four decades of military coups,
revolution, and counter-revolution in Guatemala. This political chaos continued with the
overthrow of Castillo Armas in 1957. From the beginning his hold on power was shaky as he
contended with challenges from both the left, in the form of student and labor protests, and from
ambitious politicians on the right, such as the old Ubico stalwart, Miguel Ygídoras. The downfall
of the self-styled “Liberator” came from those closest to him, as his government faced a variety
of internal threats he seemed unable to squash from right-wing leaders that were not in exile, but
rather were in Guatemala City.437
As before, the borderlands managed to fit themselves into narratives of conspiracy. For
example, nearly a year after Castillo Armas took power, the Guatemalan police captured
supposed members of the Caribbean Legion, the multi-national group of Latin American exiles
that conspired to overthrow the authoritarian regimes of the region. The Guatemalan
government reported that the men in custody were attempting to cross into Mexico to join fellow
conspirators in a communist plot to take power. The captured revolutionaries turned out to be
Mexican government employees who were visiting the Guatemalan border town of Ayutla for its
annual fair. Like many borderlanders, the men had crossed over the Suchiate to enjoy the
festivities.438
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Unlike in 1944 and 1945, the Mexican government did not attempt to track exiles in the
borderlands to protect Castillo Armas. This can be attributed to who went into exile there, such
as campesinos and local political organizers, individuals who relied on Mexican borderlanders to
write on their behalf, and unlike the past right wing exiles, did not seem likely to launch a
revolution. In addition, it could also be attributed to the general antipathy of the government to
the new Guatemalan regime. For instance, in late June 1956 after violent protests in Guatemala
City, in what would become the first of many states of siege declared by the Guatemalan
government, parts of the border were closed and only those with government passports were
allowed to cross.439 The Guatemalan press launched accusations about conspirators in Mexico
plotting revolution. The Mexican ambassador in Guatemala was instructed to tell the
Guatemalan government that the DIPS had “called” leading exiles to remind them of “their
obligations.” There was none of the large-scale round up of individuals in the borderlands that
occurred after Ubico’s ouster.440
Three years later a nearly successful rebellion by junior army officers in 1960 birthed
Guatemala’s first guerrilla movement and irrevocably changed the nature of exile. As we will
examine in the next chapter, unlike the right-wing exiles of 1944, these exiles clandestinely
utilized the Chiapan borderlands for a revolution armed with an ideology that threatened not just
the Guatemalan state, but also that of Mexico.
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Chapter Five:
Students, Guerrillas, and the First Wave of Revolution:
1960-1972

In 1964 the Mexican journalist, historian, and Trotskyist, Adolfo Gilly, visited the
Guatemalan bush to interview guerrillas. Gilly spent weeks traveling with and interviewing
leaders such as Yon Sosa, providing insight into the gradual radicalization of the movement that
emerged from the failed uprising of army officers on November 13, 1960.441 The members of
the Revolutionary Movement of November (Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre. MR-13)
as well as the many rural sympathizers Gilly met along the way, traced the genesis of their
struggle to the overthrow of Árbenz. Villagers harkened back to the famed land distribution of
1952, complaining of how the so-called Liberation of 1954 had brought nothing but economic
reversals. Guerrilla leaders like Sosa and Luis Turcios Lima, both former junior military
officers, reflected optimistically on a future triumph of the revolution. They sketched for Gilly a
few broad policies they’d enact if they managed to dislodge the military controlled government
from power, like nation-wide land distribution and the dissolution of the counter-revolutionary
national security apparatus -- military, extra-official militias, secret police -- that ensured through
violence the continuation of Guatemala’s unequal political and economic structure. The struggle
Gilly encountered, the grievances fueling the long treks through the countryside were particular
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to Guatemala, though these rebels clearly articulated the placement of their Guatemalan struggle
within the wider struggle of Latin America and the world.442
Like other Marxist guerrillas of the period, MR-13 envisioned their fight as part of the
wider struggle against capitalism and imperialism in Latin America. In an interview over a
dinner of roasted monkey, Sosa and the Mexican Trotskyist talked about MR-13’s struggle
against the Guatemalan latifundistas in the context of the struggle of Latin America, “We ask for
support from our Cuban, Venezuelan, and Colombian compañeros. We also ask it of the
Socialist and Communist compañeros in Chile; the nationalist compañeros in Brazil; the
Uruguayans; the Argentine Peronista compañeros; the miners' unions and the peasants of
Bolivia; the revolutionaries of Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, all Central America; all the workers,
peasants, revolutionaries of our continent.” Sosa and the Guatemalan guerrillas that followed
argued an intellectual, operational, and even spiritual connection to a regional and global
struggle.443
This chapter examines how the nature of Guatemalan exile in the borderlands changed,
from the politicians described in chapter four, to guerrillas like Sosa. That transformation, in
concert with national challenges to the PRI regime, transformed how key elements of the
Mexican national security apparatus viewed and operated in the borderlands. By the 1960’s the
Mexican state had fully developed the institutions to better control the region, consisting of the
Mexican military, the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad, DFS), and
the newly reconstituted Department General of Political and Social Investigations (Dirección
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General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, DGIPS) formed from the DIPS, with an
additional mandate to monitor the social issues –student groups – in the country.444 Starting in
the 1960’s and the beginning of the insurgent movement in Guatemala, these bureaus worriedly
observed how the borderlands were utilized by the leftist guerrillas of Guatemala to rest, escape
counter-insurgency operations, and gather supplies. They were also used as an entrance point
into Mexico, as Guatemalans traveled to meet with sympathetic leftist students in Chiapas and
Mexico City. This chapter focuses on these border crossings between 1960 and 1972. In the
latter year it seemed the insurgency which produced insurgents like Sosa had been defeated.
That same year, however, the second wave of the Guatemalan insurgency emerged from the
borderlands and crossed into Guatemala. That second wave of insurgency, discussed in chapter
six, would culminate in the bloody counter-insurgency of the 1980’s, and the arrival of thousands
of refugees to the borderlands.
Examining the Mexican the actions of the DFS, the military, and the DGIPS, towards
these waves of insurgency demands that we look through the lens of national security at the
history of political activity and state intervention in the region. The Mexican national security
apparatus’s attempts to manage the borderlands reflected their estimation that Guatemalan
insurgents had the potential to threaten the state by encouraging or facilitating Mexican
dissidents, or by bringing their revolution to Mexico. These exiles, in contrast to previous
periods, no longer only presented a danger to Guatemala, but to the political and economic
structure of Mexico.
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As social scientists such as Sergio Aguayo Quezada and Agustin Maciel Padilla have
commented, the study of national security in a Mexican context has long been ignored. The term
became — and to many still is -- associated with the horrific justification utilized by the PRI
regime, as well as other Latin America regimes, to stifle dissent during the Cold War. It became
a euphemism for repression, the study of it ignored in order to avoid giving justification to the
terror of the past. 445 Also discouraging analysis of national security, perhaps, were the
discredited machinations of a global United States security apparatus whose Cold War-era
rhetoric of liberty was drowned in the hypocrisy of CIA trained torturers.446 Beyond the
violence, however, committed in what became known as the Dirty War in Mexico, the state had
the simple goal of promoting domestic tranquility through the stifling of dissent.
Members of the Mexican national security apparatus had reason to be concerned with
organized revolutionaries operating and possibly inspiring insurrection in Chiapas, as the social
and economic conditions prevailing in the state had fueled rebellion elsewhere in Mexico. The
2006 report published by the Office of Special Prosecutor Ignacio Carrillo Prieto regarding the
Mexican government’s role in the Dirty War describes a domestic intelligence system that
worked, above all, to ensure elite control of the economic and political levers of the state through
official and extra-official means including torture, espionage, and corruption.447 For example,
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O’Neill Blacker Hanson’s examination of Genaro Vázquez, Lucio Cabañas, and the rural
guerrilla movement of Guerrero touches upon the crushing of labor movements, and the
continuing plague of cacicazgo which exacerbated the issue of land distribution.448
In many ways the Chiapan borderlands were similar to Guerrero: a small, powerful
group, the so-called “familia chiapaneca,” utilized official and extra official means to dominate
the resources of the state. This group of powerful families, which traced its economic weight to
extensive landowning during the Porfiriato, dominated the political and economic landscape,
choking off access to the rich resources of the borderlands from the majority indigenous
population.449 Concentrated in the center of the state in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and nearby Chiapa de
Corzo, they deftly managed the mechanisms of control that the mass politics of postrevolutionary Mexico offered: top-down social, political, and labor groups that ultimately served
elite interests. Even powerful revolutionary momentum towards change, such as Cárdenas-era
agrarian reform, was rendered mostly ineffective. As Thomas Benjamin notes regarding the
history of Soconusco, after the surveying and parceling of land for new ejidos in the coffee-rich
borderlands, large private farms held on to the best land, and for years afterward welcomed the
cheap labor provided by ejidatarios that could not live off the poor soil given to them.450
Only a few miles to the south, across a border that the recently established CILA had
only just begun to measure and know, a pulsing leftist guerrilla movement fought against a
political and economic reality that resembled that of Chiapas. In their pronouncements, and
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serving as a foundation for their ideology, was the goal of spreading the revolution over borders.
It was a time of worldwide change, at least as envisioned by men and women in fatigues who
carried copies of Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare. As Daniel Castro notes, the
success of the Cuban Revolution, as well as the articulation and popularity of the foco theory
expounded first by Guevara and later by Régis Debray, led to the sprouting of Marxist insurgent
movements throughout Latin America. These groups believed that dramatic military action
could topple the right-wing governments throughout the region and each national guerrilla group
could celebrate its own ride into Havana. Though, like the Guatemalans, these groups focused
on national struggles, their struggles went beyond the local; they made up what Greg Grandin’s
has succinctly labeled “Revolutionary Time” in Latin America, a shared experience and
struggle.451 It was an experience that the Mexican government was trying to avoid, and they
saw the Chiapan borderlands as possibly sucking them in.

Student Problems and Border Contraband

On October 1, 1968, a day before the tragic massacre at Tlatelolco’s Plaza de Las Tres
Culturas, a lengthy DFS report entitled “Student Problems” detailed the pulse and activities of
Mexico’s vibrant student movement at UNAM. Reported were the plans for the fateful rally the
following day, the inability of UNAM officials to reach any type of agreement to stop the
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general strike, and the summary of speeches given by student leaders and even a mother of a
student killed by security forces Around two o’clock in the afternoon in the main walkway of
the Ciudad Universitaria, Rosario Lerida Ida de Ríos told an estimated crowd of three thousand
that “her son, [Lorenzo Ríos Ojeda] was the proof that the President has substituted force for
reason….[and] that his spilled blood should serve as a stimulus for all those that have the
privilege to be alive and free.”452 One student, Leopoldo Ernesto Zepeda Camarena, missed the
dramatic speech. The DFS, along with the city’s police, picked up the second-year law student
earlier that day at his apartment in the Multifamiliar Alemán, along with two Guatemalans,
Carlos Rolando Segura Medína and Mario Rene Solórzano Aldana, and a German, Otto Hans
Zoeller. There, in a second floor apartment, the police found an R-2 rifle, fifteen rounds of
ammunition, and two grenades.453
Under interrogation the group ostensibly told a story of transnational revolution and
murder linking Yon Sosa and the Guatemalan guerrillas with the tumultuous activities and
dreams of the radical-left organizations driving the Mexican student movement of 1968. The
two Guatemalans had arrived in Mexico as “political exiles” the previous April, fleeing a
government crackdown for forming part of an urban cell of MR-13. In Mexico they connected
with Mario Suárez Jiménez, an economics student and member of the Trotskyist organization,
Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, POR). Suárez connected the
exiles with other Trotskyists, including Gildardo Islas Carranza. Islas had recently been released
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from prison, having been arrested two years previously with seven others, including Adolfo
Gilly, and accused of planning to use student unrest to try to overthrow the government.454
Once across the border, the Guatemalan revolutionaries ostensibly joined their new
Mexican companions in a violent campaign to gather resources for the revolution to the south.
First, according to the DFS report, they murdered and stole a weapon from an army private
serving as a night watchman at the Palacio de Deportes in early July. They then borrowed a
Volkswagen from their German friend to go to Puebla. (The DFS emphasized that Zoeller, a
manager at the Volkswagen plant, seemed clueless as to the extent of his involvement. He met
the Guatemalans on an earlier trip to Guatemala, he was not a Trostkyist, and did not know about
any of the revolutionary activity. As if to explain his involvement with this odd crew, the DFS
speculated he most likely was a homosexual.) In Puebla, they robbed a car to later use to rob a
bank in Mexico City, though they also managed — without explanation by the DFS of the
motive — to gravely assault a daughter of former President Avila Camacho in Puebla, placing
her in the hospital. The report ends by noting that members of the group knew noted student
leader Socrates Amado Campos Lemus. Mario Rene Solórzano Aldana had talked with the
prominent Mexican activist about the cause of the MR-13 and discussed urban guerrilla
tactics.455
Mexican intelligence services had managed to infiltrate many of the student groups
formed during the tumultuous 1960’s, and no doubt this is how they discovered the Guatemalan
exiles’ activities. They were privy to the rumors, boasts, and plans of the various groups formed
before and after the watershed year of 1968. That year, Mexican students were part of a global
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wave of dissent, as they protested government corruption and rigged elections among other
issues. In the lead up to the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, a harsh government crackdown
culminated in the massacre on October 2. In part, the violent response by the government was
fueled by reports from the DIGPS, which enhanced the paranoia of politicians such as President
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. The DGIPS failed to put into context, or analyze, the real possibility of the
student groups they infiltrated actually carrying to fruition their ambitious plans, such as
obtaining arms, scouting the Mexican military and police, and incorporating peasants from
throughout the republic into a revolutionary force.456
The Mexican students who formed the POR and gathered arms in piecemeal fashion for
the Guatemalan Revolution by attacking lone soldiers, formed part of the leftist tumult surging in
1960’s Mexico. Established following the IV International in 1959, the perpetually small POR
traversed the ideological battles that wracked Marxist groups of the time period. Though the
POR enjoyed a short period of recruiting success after the Cuban Revolution, its numbers fell in
1961 when it broke with Castro over his alignment with the Soviet Union. It would regain some
organizational strength in the years leading up to 1968, as its members, mostly students,
recruited and organized on campus.457
Inspired by the wave of rebelliousness sweeping through Mexico, the POR’s small
numbers did not dissuade them from formulating grandiose plans, such as supporting
Guatemalan guerrillas. Though it is unclear how much contact the group had with its fellow
Trotskyists in Guatemala, their talk certainly must have alarmed those government officials
reading intelligence reports. In April 1966 the group’s “Political Executive Committee”
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organized a weekend retreat to discuss their national and transnational revolutionary plans at a
house in southern Mexico City, close to the UNAM. As an indication of the breadth of
penetration by the DFS, this small group of Trotskyists included one undercover DFS agent.
During the meeting they talked about working with and agitating among the nation’s unions and
students until they achieved their “final goal, which was to overthrow Díaz Ordaz.” They also,
according to the DFS report, focused on the fortunes of the MR-13 movement, noting that
“...they would continue to send help [elementos] to reinforce” the guerrilla group.458 Unlike later
boasts in the meeting, such as that they had penetrated the Armed Forces, contact with the MR13 seemed possible according to DFS reports. For example, only a year later three Guatemalans
approached the DFS in Mexico City, one an incoming professor at the UNAM, another a student,
offering to reveal Guatemalan guerrilla contacts in Mexico City to “avoid problems” during their
stay.459
Any support for Guatemalan revolutionaries, such as a transfer of arms, would no doubt
pass through the Chiapan borderlands. The DFS frequently followed up on intelligence passed
to them from their Guatemalan counterparts, investigating Mexican borderlanders’ complicity in
supplying the insurgency across the border. For example, based on a tip from a police official
from the northern Guatemalan city of Quetzaltenango, the DFS investigated an individual in the
Ejido Santo Domingo in the municipality of Cacahoatán, located on the Suchiate River. There a
nationalized Guatemalan, Victor Manuel López Pinto, had supposedly provided arms to three
Guatemalans later arrested after they passed over the border. The DFS did not find any
conclusive evidence of contraband activity; instead, all they learned was that Manuel had held
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local government positions with the city government and that he was a nurse with Social
Security, and also a teacher. Though they concluded that “at the moment” no arms were passing
over their border, they also noted that due to the terrain and the lack of a permanent national
government presence on the border, “it’s probable that at any moment these activities could start
again.”460
Closing off the border would have been a key concern for Guatemalan security forces
during this period as they were in the midst of a United States trained and funded counterinsurgency campaign. Beginning in 1966, future president Coronel Manuel Arana Osorio led a
nearly 8,000 man army to eradicate the remnants of the MR-13, as well as those of a group that
had splintered off from it a couple of year earlier, the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas
Rebeldes, FAR).461 With the help of right-wing paramilitary groups like the Mano Blanco
composed of off-duty police, the army murdered, in secret or openly, labor leaders, students, and
anyone else suspected of sympathy with an increasingly decimated insurgency. A favorite of the
ruling oligarchy, Arana was elected president in 1970, returning the military to power, and
ensuring the continuation of the counter-insurgency campaign.462
To the consternation, however, of Guatemalan officials, Mexico could not seem to close
the Chiapan borderlands to contraband traffic. At times this frustration, plus the heightened
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vigilance by the Guatemalan military at the border, led to violence. Such was the case on
February 28, 1966, when five Mexican borderlanders were shot at, and two were killed, by the
Guatemalan National Guard as they were swimming across the Suchiate River. The incident,
only a few years after Guatemalan fighter planes strafed a Mexican fishing fleet, caused
widespread condemnation in Mexico. The national press reported the Mexicans were simply
swimming innocently in the Suchiate River, while Guatemala claimed they were smugglers.463
On March 2, Mexico presented the Guatemalan government with a formal note of protest. In
reaction, Guatemala temporarily closed the border.464
The Guatemalan government defended its actions as protecting against guerrillas
receiving supplies, while investigating Mexican security forces discovered it to be a simple case
of smuggling. Early in the morning on the second, Secretary of Interior Luis Echeverría phoned
the Mayor of Ciudad Hidalgo to personally hear about the details behind the incident. He, and
the DFS, found out that the two dead Mexicans were known smugglers, bringing over cigarettes,
chilies, and cookies to Guatemala in exchange for cheap clothes and toys from Japan. That day,
as evidenced by a large bag found on the Mexican riverbank, the men were transporting tequila,
aguardiente, chilies, and beer instead of innocently swimming in the Suchiate. They drew
attention from the military police only because one had tried to rob a Tecún Unám merchant,
who alerted the authorities regarding the fleeing men. As further proof of just how pervasive
smuggling was, as DFS investigators were visiting Ciudad Hidalgo they caught two men from
Tuxtla Gutiérrez in the middle of the Suchiate River, floating a bag of goods across to
Guatemala. Unaware of the heightened vigilance on the border, the would be smugglers were
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caught with dice, cards, and other material for games of chance to sell in Tecún Unám in
anticipation of an upcoming fair.465
By the early evening of March 2, as the Mexican investigators finished their
investigation, the border reopened. As reported by local Mexican officials, the Guatemalan
Consul crossed the border to meet with them, declaring that “some Mexican smugglers…were
not motive enough to close the border.”466 The incident gave some Mexican editorialists
motivation to drag up the tense and often violent history of the Chiapan borderlands. On March
2, El Universal highlighted the nineteenth century territorial dispute over Soconusco, the attack
on La Fama in 1939, and the recent episode regarding the Guatemalan fishing fleet.467 Other
editorials did point out, however, the recent successes in binational cooperation, as evidenced by
the work of the International Boundary and Water Commission between Guatemala and
Mexico.468
As tensions died down, in part helped by the Chiapan governor sending an extra force of
Judicial Police to the border, rumors and accusations of guerrilla contraband continued.469 For
example, in July 1965 the DFS reported that Guatemalan authorities had informed them that a
yacht with a United States flag was carrying arms down the Mexican coast, from Ensenada to the
Guatemalan town of Sipacate, a few miles south of the border.470 On, November 3, 1966,
Coronel Manuel J. Alfaro, the recently appointed head of the Guatemalan Ambulatory Police,
announced that Mexico was a major source of contraband arms for the country’s guerrilla
movements.471
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Though it is possible that Mexican arms smugglers were motivated by profit as much as
by ideology, there is evidence that Guatemalan guerrillas also found Chiapan borderlanders
sympathetic to their cause. Guatemalan intelligence services continued to provide the DFS with
information about the Mexicans aiding the guerrilla movement. For example, in December 1966
the DFS investigated the finca of Carlos Avendaño outside of Huixtla, a few dozen miles north
of Tapachula, after Guatemalan intelligence services reported that the Chiapaneco was using a
radio transmitter in his house to broadcast anti-government propaganda to northern
Guatemala.472 A similar investigation a few years later focused on Felipe Roberto López,
Commissioner of Ejido Santo Domingo in Unión Juárez, which as the report noted, was only a
kilometer away from the border. There, according to the rumors, in the home of a local
campesino, López often met with an executive member of the Mexican Communist Party from
Mexico City and Guatemalan guerrillas, who often sought refuge in the Mexican community.473
One of those guerrillas seeking refuge in Mexico was Yon Sosa, a fact made clear to the
public on the morning of May 20, 1970, when the Mexican government announced the
successful pursuit and killing of the Guatemalan guerrilla leader in the Lacandon Jungle,
southeast of Comitán, by Mexican military personnel. The revolutionary Mario Payeras, who
only a few years after Sosa’s death became intimately acquainted with the Chiapan borderlands
as his point of refuge in the next phase of the Guatemalan Civil War, described the site of his
predecessor’s death: “all the water in southeast Mexico and the Guatemalan Sierra Madres seems
to seems to converge here, forming the vast basin of the Usumacinta. It’s a water world, with
cities of stone and parasitic flora…Above, a universe of parrots and other noisy species confer a
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sense of invisible paths. Here was the site of death.”474 A less poetic version of the
revolutionary’s demise appeared in the weekly regional paper La Voz del Sureste. Its coverage
followed the official government line of denigrating the revolutionaries as bandits and its
headline sounded like a warning to future adventurers: “Mexico is not, and will not be a Refuge
for Foreign Criminals.”475
A few days after his death, the DFS issued a twenty nine page history of Sosa’s life based
on testimony from four former members of MR-13 who currently lived in exile in Mexico City.
They included Armando Solis, who grew up with Sosa and fought with him, and a Dr. Jorge
Flesh, a Mexican national and acquaintance of the dead revolutionary, who claimed he did not
belong to MR-13. At times the details about Sosa’s life as a revolutionary had nuances of
sympathy and admiration, describing, for example, his sense of humor in camp, his habit of
snoring loudly at night, and his “cold blood” in the face of danger. They also revealed Sosa’s
confidence in his contacts in Mexico and the possible reasons behind his death. The four former
companions of Sosa revealed that fifteen days before the ambush by the Mexican military, Sosa
had obtained a large amount of money from a kidnapping. He and two companions took the
payoff north to Chiapas, traversing well-traveled and known routes to buy arms from contacts,
whom the four claimed not to know. They said that Sosa knew the jungles and paths of the
Chiapan borderlands well enough not to be ambushed. The only explanation behind his demise,
claimed the four to the DFS, must have been a betrayal by his former communist comrades to
both the Mexican and Guatemalan armies.476
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Beginning in April 1970, in part in response to the state of siege called for by President
Arana, the Mexican military worked with their Guatemalan counterparts to help close the vise on
the insurgents, redoubling their border patrols.477 The 29th Infantry Battalion based in
Tapachula worked in concert with the Guatemalan military to prevent any insurgents from
escaping north into the Chiapan borderlands. Mexican military personnel traveled on
Guatemalan helicopters down the Suchiate River, scouting out crossing points and arranging
maximum coverage of the borderlands for both nations’ patrols. In Tapachula, security forces
concentrated on hotels as well as railroad and bus stations.478 So intense was the Guatemalan
effort to patrol the border that a military helicopter surprised employees of the Mexican Federal
Electric Commission at a remote hydrometric station near the Lacandon Jungle. Upon landing, a
Guatemalan patrol asked if they were in Mexico, apologized, explained they were looking for
guerrillas and flew back south.479
The heightened vigilance did not round up any significant number of subversives
escaping into Mexico, in part due to the inability of the Mexican security forces to control a
relatively unpopulated and, until recently, undeveloped border long ignored by the state. At
times the DFS acknowledged this in their reporting. For example, a patrol by officials from the
Military and Immigration Services outside of Ciudad Juárez around the Tacaná Volcano,
approximately twenty miles northeast of Tapachula, found an isolated coffee estate straddling the
border. There only border monuments every two kilometers demonstrated where the
international boundary lay, and with “no natural or constructed boundaries… with total liberty,
anyone can enter either country.” In interviews these officials conducted with the majority
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Guatemalan workforce, no one claimed to have seen any guerrillas, but they claimed to have
seen a number of Guatemalan military patrols.480
Finally it must have been difficult to distinguish between suspected guerrillas and the
normal flow of transnational workers, travelers, and smugglers that, like members of FAR,
sought to avoid representatives of the Guatemalan and Mexican states. For example, In April
1970 members of the Mexican military investigated the claims of a number of articles written in
the Guatemalan press indicating that a large number of FAR guerrillas had slipped through to
Mexico. Articles like these, insinuating that the Mexican government offered safe-haven to
“terrorists,” often prompted the security forces to react. However, through a source in the
Guatemalan military they learned that the revolutionaries mentioned in the articles were more
likely smugglers and robbers than revolutionaries. Utilizing caves as hideouts and wearing the
uniforms of the Guatemalan police and military, they had been traveling and committing crimes
up and down the border around Malcatan, Ocos, and El Tumbador. Regardless of who they
were, General Luis Casillas, commander of Mexico’s 31st military zone, order a “meticulous
search” of the border.481 It might have been these patrols that, a few weeks later, arrested a
group of luckless Guatemalan laborers at the border and brought them to Comitán for
questioning. They determined they were not guerrillas and instead were contracted by a
Tenosique businessman to cut trees.482
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Gaspar Ilom and the End of the First Wave

By the time the Mexican army caught the contract laborers passing through the Chiapan
borderlands, the armed revolutionary movement in Guatemala was a shell of its former self.
The death of Sosa effectively ended the MR-13. The remaining group, the FAR, in addition to
suffering tactical defeats under the Arana-led counterinsurgency, also suffered from schisms
within the Guatemalan left. In 1968, for example, the FAR broke with the PGT over the latter’s
lack of commitment to armed struggle, thus losing some of its support in urban centers.483
An August 1971 police raid on an apartment in the Condesa neighborhood of Mexico
City, the reported FAR propaganda center in the country, seemed to indicate the declining
fortune of the group as well as the importance that Mexican borderland communities still played
in the revolutionaries’ contact with Guatemala. There a mimeograph produced pamphlets,
stamped with “printed in Guatemala,” with titles like, “Third World,” which provided details on
guerrilla tactics, and “New Politics in Culture, Science, and Education,” which provided
instructions on bomb making. In addition, the police found a pair of guns and a small amount of
plastic for bomb making. Most significantly, the search uncovered the organizational chart of
the FAR, including their plans for propaganda in Mexico.484
Interrogation of the occupants revealed an operation attempting to continue its work in
the face of increased pressure. One occupant of the apartment, Manuel Barrios, had recently
arrived from Guatemala. Weeks earlier, wounded with a bullet in the stomach, he had managed
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to slip by army patrols monitoring the Suchiate to rest at a safe house in Ciudad Hidalgo. From
there, a contact in Tapachula transported him and the guns found in the apartment to a Mexico
City doctor, who removed the bullet from an alleged “hunting accident.”
The other three occupants, the Guatemalans Alvaro Carpio, Rodrigo Asturias Amado,
and his wife, the Bolivian exile María del Rosario Valenzuela Sotomayor, claimed they had
begun producing propaganda only three months earlier. The DFS certainly had reason to doubt
the claim of at least one of them, Rodrigo Asturias. Son of the Guatemalan Nobel Prize winning
author, Miguel Ángel Asturias, in 1962 the younger Asturias joined a short-lived attempt by the
PGT to lead an insurgent action. Led by a rebellious colonel, Paz Tejada, the movement barely
managed to start as a tipped-off Guatemalan military unit ambushed the two dozen man wouldbe guerrilla force as it headed into the Sierra. The action killed most of the men, while Paz
Tejada escaped north, swimming across the Suchiate. He eventually ended up working with a
sympathetic Lázaro Cárdenas on the Balsas River Commission in central Mexico, part of the
massive public works projects begun by Miguel Alemán and explored in chapter three.485
Asturias, meanwhile, was captured and held in jail for months until President Ydígoras sent him
into exile in Mexico out of respect for his father. Later in life, while campaigning for president
of Guatemala in 2003, Asturias sardonically remembered his entrance into Mexico, saying “I
was thrown in the Suchiate River.”486 Both he and Paz Tejada found refuge in Mexico through
the Chiapan borderlands. In Mexico, the young Asturias quickly dried himself off and became
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one of the many Guatemalan exiles living in Mexico City, some dating from the Árbenz years.487
He taught courses at the National University, and worked as an editor for the Fondo de Cultura
Económica, and later at Siglo XXI.488
One month after being caught by the DFS, Asturias was free. It is likely that his famous
father, as he had before, pulled some strings to arrange his release. At least we know that he did
for his son’s wife. According to the couple’s son, Sandino Asturias Valenzuela, the DFS only
released his mother, and did not follow through on its plan to turn her over to the Guatemalan
military because of the intervention of his grandfather. Asturias explained that the Nobel-prize
winning author called President Echeverría, saying simply, “they kidnapped my daughter.”489
Soon after being let go, Asturias was back into Guatemala. He broke with FAR, and
adopted the nom de guerre, Gaspar Ilom, borrowed from the indigenous leader in his father’s
novel, Men of Maize. He lived in the Sierra leading the new rebel group, Organization of the
People in Arms (Organización del Pueblo en Armas, OPRA). The OPRA was critical of FAR’s
foco approach and failure to incorporate indigenous Guatemalans.490 Asturias and the OPRA’s
approach marked a dramatic change in organization from the first wave, as they sought to learn
from the defeat of previous groups by including whole communities in the struggle against the
Guatemalan regime. For the next eight years, the OPRA and Asturias were quiet as they
concentrated on organizing indigenous laborers and communities in the western Pacific coffee
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zone of Guatemala. In 1979, they announced their presence in a dramatic fashion by attacking a
finca in Quetzaltenango, and later the border town of San Marcos.491

The Kidnapped Hunters

Soon after Asturias left Mexico to continue the armed struggle, another group did the
same, but in a spectacular fashion that captured the attention of the whole of Mexico and put in
doubt the Mexican government’s claims that no guerrillas operated in the Chiapan borderlands.
On January 19, 1972, in the Lacandon Jungle, a little more than a dozen of the incipient members
of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP) briefly kidnapped a
group of hunters from Mexico City, burned a pair of planes, and robbed a remote hydrometric
station of the CILA. They then crossed the border, pursued by both the Mexican and
Guatemalan armies.
In his 1982 memoir, Days of the Jungle, EGP co-founder Mario Payeras explained how
the group established itself in the Chiapan borderlands. A small handful of Guatemalans, many
having broken off from FAR, others student activists like Payeras, arrived in early 1971, on the
banks of the Río Ixcán, close to where Sosa had camped and died. Like other Guatemalans
living in the borderlands they posed as Mexicans, or at least claimed to be Mexican if anybody
asked. They cleared out some of the jungle, built housing, and planted a few crops. To all
appearances they appeared to be just another group of borderlanders that frequently utilized the
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resources of the region regardless of nationality. Like exiles before them, they constituted a
base, a rear guard, for a Guatemalan revolution.492
For months they adapted to the jungle – when needed they bought many of their supplies
in Comitán -- utilizing their house as a base from which to strike out into the heavy undergrowth
and establish camps just across the border in Guatemala, where they hid supplies and arms.
These frequent incursions demonstrated the large gaps in the Mexican military’s vigilance of the
border, which was explained in part by the focus on the more heavily populated areas of
Soconusco and in part by the simple fact that any vigilance of the region was hampered by a
dense forest that boundary surveyors from CILA had found to be almost unpassable.493
This clandestine existence was threatened at the beginning of 1972 as the group began to
receive occasional visits by hunters. Payeras’s group, alone and without external support,
recalled “Che’s defeat in Bolivia” as well as Sosa’s death and became afraid the hunters would
tell the Mexican authorities. Upon the next visit by a group on January 19 they decided to act,
accelerating the schedule of their planned entrance into Guatemala. They kidnapped the hunters,
attacked an isolated CILA landing field on the border, took provisions, and set two planes on
fire, whose owners Payeras claimed to have collaborated with the Mexican military in Sosa’s
death. They then stole motor boats and set off down the Lacantun River to Guatemala.
Avoiding the Mexican and Guatemalan armies who were searching for them, they managed to
make their way south to the Xaclbal River, floating into the bush with medicine, arms, and food
stolen from the Mexican camp. They then started a guerrilla war which would last over twenty
years.494
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Payeras and his companions left behind a sensational story for the Mexican press about
guerrillas living in the borderlands and kidnapping hapless hunters. A typical headline appeared
in El Sol de México,”Guatemalan Guerrillas Kidnap 6 Mexicans: Threatened to Kill Them to
Avenge Yon Sosa.” Readers could learn about the anguished wives of the hunters, or how one of
their brothers had left from Mexico City to find and rescue his sibling by himself.495 Speculation
ran rampant that the guerrillas had already killed the men, or took them across the border to
Guatemala.496 In a hastily conceived press conference, President Echeverría declared that the
defense department had taken charge of the investigation. A reported three squadrons of troops,
along with the Chiapan State Judicial Police, were headed to the region, though one article
warned that the area, “is swampy and full of undergrowth. The search will be difficult.”497
But even as the papers seemed to be ready to fill their pages with stories of grieving
widows, the hunters were released and in Mexico City. According to the men, they had been
dropped off by guides on January 10 close to the Ixcán River, a new spot to hunt on what
constituted their third trip to the region. After setting up camp they noticed a “ranchito” close
by, with pigs, chicken, and various plantings. Soon, a man identifying himself as Paco (Julio
César Macias) arrived at the hunter’s camp, inviting them to stay at his ranch with himself and a
couple of men identified as his workers. For eight days, claimed the hunters, they slept with the
guerrillas. They ate, shared stories, and even in one case went on a jaguar hunt with Paco.
Finally, one morning a man arrived to talk with Paco and suddenly, according to the startled
hunters, they were surrounded by guerrillas that appeared from the jungle pointing machine guns
at them. Their erstwhile host Paco informed them they were his prisoners.498 For a day and a
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half the guerrillas marched them through the jungle, as Paco took pains to ensure that they would
tell the press that they were treated well once they were released. He even told his prisoners to
make sure to emphasize the guerrilla’s solidarity with the Mexican people.499
Upon their return to Mexico City, instead of being greeted with open arms, the Mexican
security apparatus attempted to cast doubts on the hunters’ story of Guatemalan guerrillas in the
borderlands. A press release by the Secretariat of Defense qualified the kidnappers as simple
bandits.500 The Secretary of Defense, General Hermenegildo Cuenca Díaz, came up with the
dubious defense that if the kidnappers did not have any insignia, uniforms, or carry a flag they
were not guerrillas.501 Cuenca also cast doubt on the hunters themselves. In a press conference
he asked, “isn’t it odd that such a large group was wandering through the jungle?” He added that
these men who called themselves hunters did not request permission to travel to the area, and
besides, the so-called guerrillas did not even take their guns or money. “We are going to be
investigating,” noted Cuenca.502
Cuenca Díaz needed to assure both the Mexican public and the Guatemalan government
that the Chiapan borderlands were not a place of refuge for guerrillas. Reporters revealed an
important motivation for this denial and the denigration of the Guatemalans as “bandits” in the
press conference: the guerrillas of Lucio Cabañas and Genaro Vásquez.503 Asked about the
army’s search for these Guerrero revolutionaries, Cuenca responded, “How are we going to send
troops for two men? It is a police matter.” In fact, the year before the army had launched
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Operation Telaraña, a large-scale campaign that failed to crush the guerrilla movement in that
state. The birth of similar rural, as well as new urban guerrilla movements that year, along with
attention grabbing actions such as kidnappings, frustrated and worried the Mexican government.
Cabañas and Vásquez symbolized the government’s impotence to crush a revolutionary
movement. This new story of the kidnapped hunters seemed to be another instance of growing
insecurity.504
The DFS investigation into the hunters’ story uncovered the extent of the Guatemalan
guerrillas’ penetration in the borderlands as well as the potential for an insurgency to develop in
the region. The investigators determined that a pair of Mexicans living in Comitán, posing as
family members of Paco, helped to establish of the camp. The location, noted the report, was
carefully chosen close to the Guatemalan-Mexican border to serve as a “place of refuge for
subversives from both Guatemala and Mexico.”505 General Casillas, commander of the 31st
military region, who personally directed the search for the guerrillas, reluctantly praised the
chosen strategic location. The jungle growth and numerous navigable rivers made the Lacandon
an ideal place for “delinquent groups.” Citing the case of Guerrero, the general recommended a
campaign to beat the guerrillas in the borderlands once and for all or risk future costly campaigns
in the regions against a future larger insurgency. To that end he requested additional motor boats
and planes to track guerrillas in the vast region.506 Of course, Casillas never caught the
guerrillas, who were already across the border in Guatemala.
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Conclusion

Less than a few months earlier all seemed calm in the borderlands. The May 1971
Echeverría and Arana border summit, during which they posed for photographs alongside the
Suchiate and discussed joint infrastructure development, also reinforced Mexico’s support of the
Guatemalan executive’s strategy of handling internal dissent by patrolling the Chiapan
borderlands. A compliant Mexican press allowed Arana to present a sympathetic portrait of
himself to the Mexican public. For example, he explained his personal connection with
Guatemala’s numerous campesinos: “I come from a humble background, because of that I
understand, maybe, the problem of our people, of our campesinos, of our middle class. I have
identified with them, and my government is fighting to bring to them, to the rural areas, to the
marginal areas, order, progress, help, education, health, and wellbeing.507 At a press conference
a day after Arana left, a reporter quizzed Echeverría about whether the two had talked about
Guatemalan concerns regarding the incursion of guerrillas into Mexico. They did not, explained
Echeverría. Instead they only concentrated on the themes outlined in their joint press release:
cooperation, friendship, and exploiting the natural resources of the borderland.508
Though it is possible the two never discussed one of the pressing issues occupying their
respective militaries, it is also likely that Echeverría, along with the country’s intelligence
sources, thought that the Guatemalan insurgency no longer posed a threat. The first wave of the
Guatemalan civil war had crested, insurgent groups like the FAR had lost their leadership,
declined in membership, and no longer posed a threat to the state. The DFS raid that prompted
Asturias to return to Guatemala, and the kidnapped hunters, laid the foundations of the second
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wave of the Guatemalan insurgency that became active towards the end of the 1970’s. Then, a
broader movement composed of trade unions, students, and the Catholic Church filled in the gap
left by groups like FAR and MR-13, and took up the struggle against the oppressive governments
of Arana and later General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud (1974-1978).509 As before the Chiapan
borderlands became a main stage of activity, as well as a gateway for this second wave of
insurgency to operate in Mexico.
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Chapter Six:
Guerrillas, Refugees, and the Church
Sometime in 1983, a short time after thousands of Guatemalan Refugees had settled in
dozens of makeshift camps and in Mexican communities in the Chiapan borderlands, the
Mexican Secretariat of Defense (Secretaria de Defensa, SDN) compiled a presentation entitled,
“The Situation of the Guatemalan Refugees and National Security.” The outline of the
information in bullet points, the accompanying maps, and the recommendation that a “national
security group” further analyze a potentially volatile situation in depth give the impression that
the presentation was intended to portray the gravity of the situation to a Mexican civilian
leadership already worried about internal stability in the nation’s poorest state. The talking
points painted a grim picture of the political and economic consequences of the refugees’ arrival:
incursions by the Guatemalan military; infiltration of Guatemalan guerrillas “proselytizing” with
their revolutionary propaganda; Mexican workers displaced by cheap Guatemalan labor; a
scarcity of basic foodstuffs; health and sanitary problems; and “land tenure challenges” due to
the expanding Guatemalan camps that exacerbated the decades long struggle of poor
Chiapanecos for land.510
The maps of the Chiapan borderlands illustrated the paths taken by the estimated 39,798
refugees that had moved from Guatemala into Mexico during the previous three years. Forty-two

blue dots marked the locations of refugee camps, while another map illustrated the deployment
of the forces of the 36th Military Division. A color-coded map broke down the composition of
the thousands of Guatemalans; nearly two-thirds of the refugees were women and children.
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Many of the maps explained a rudimentary version of the Guatemalan Civil War and the role
played by the borderlands in supporting the guerrilla movement. One showed a centrally located
“Guatemalan Army” pushing “Rebels” north towards Mexico. Another highlighted the Chiapan
borderlands, where the refugees settled, and an arrow with “logistical support” pointed south to
the “Rebels.” 511
The rebels located by the SDN map were the EGP, whose founding members were
introduced in chapter five, capturing national attention in Mexico after kidnapping a small group
of hunters in the borderlands. By late 1979 the EGP had become the largest and most active
resistance movement in Guatemala, leading the second wave of insurgency in the Guatemalan
Civil War, which coincided with a broader regional resurgence of guerrilla movements in Central
America dating from the beginning of the 1970’s.512 This second wave, like the first, operated in
the borderlands and also crossed the porous border to travel into the interior of Mexico. As in
the sixties, the Mexican national security apparatus, vigilant against possible connections formed
between Guatemalan guerrillas and Mexican dissidents, led patrols in the borderlands and raids
in Mexico City. In the estimation, however, of the Mexican national security apparatus, this
second wave presented a more potent challenge to domestic tranquility for two reasons: the
activity of dissident groups in the borderlands connected to the charismatic Bishop Samuel Ruiz,
and the arrival of the refugees. The region seemed to possess a perfect storm of conditions to
encourage insurgency that could pull Mexico into the Central American conflicts of the 1980’s,
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with the refugees being the factor that could push the borderlands out of the control of the
Mexican state.
The arrival of the refugees constituted a new dimension of Guatemalan exile that greatly
complicated the Mexican national security apparatus’s ability to manage the borderlands. The
sheer numbers of refugees meant that their exile experience was mostly anonymous. The key
piece of information crucial to domestic intelligence networks in determining an exile’s threat to
the Mexican state, identity, was impossible to obtain amongst the thousands of hungry
Guatemalans that sought safety in the borderlands, and which looked suspiciously on a Mexican
state that treated them as potential insurgents. (In contrast, domestic security agents had refined
techniques of targeting guerrillas during the Dirty War). In this void of information, Mexican
national security officials tied the refugees’ supposed goals and identity to the guerrillas that
utilized the borderlands, to the activist church of Samuel Ruiz and, in a wider sense, to the
Central American insurgencies that had plunged countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua
into bloody civil wars.
Luis Ortíz Monasterio, who led the Mexican Commission for Refugee Aid (Comisión
Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR) from 1981-1983, summed up the heightened fears
of the leadership of the Mexican state upon facing the arrival of the refugees:

“Of course, with the issue of the Central American civil war, of the possible Central American
guerrilla, and the fact that it included Chiapas, the most vulnerable, the most remote [region made
us afraid that what happened to us in Texas could repeat, we could lose it [Chiapas].We could
have lost territory, lost energy, Chiapas has the majority of the dam, it [the fear] was logical.513
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The Guerrilla Army of the Poor and the Second Wave of Insurgency

The rapid growth of the EGP, from a few dozen men escaping into Guatemala in 1972, to
a massive insurgent operation by 1979 was due to its rejection of the foquista strategy
popularized by the Cuban Revolution and Che Guevara, which groups like FAR adhered to in the
1960’s. The EGP, instead, sought to build a mass movement by addressing the political and
economic realities of Guatemala, which meant focusing on the exploitation of the indigenous
majority. This approach worked so well that by 1979, in addition to an approximately 2,500
person strong guerrilla movement operating primarily in the Guatemalan borderlands, the group
also could claim an estimated 270,000 adherents throughout the country in its various urban and
rural organizations.514 This organizing success reflected the deep economic, political, and
cultural divisions prevalent in Guatemala.515
In addition to the EGP, scores of other opposition groups were active in this second
wave. The OPRA, a reconstituted FAR, and the PGT had all taken to heart the destructiveness of
the internecine divisions of the 1960’s, which, for example, led Sosa and Turcios to break from
each other. In January 1982 these groups, along with EGP, came together in the national
insurgency organization, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria
Nacional Guatemalteca, UNRG). Their shared goals reflected a Guatemala suffering from deep
economic and racial divisions in both the city and the countryside. They advocated for land
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reform, gender equality, free and fair democratic elections, an end to discrimination against
indigenous people and, finally, the dismantling of the political-military-economic oligarchy that
dominated the country’s resources and government. Inspired by the recent Sandinista victory in
Nicaragua and the revolutionary movement in El Salvador, the UNRG believed a military and
political victory possible. And given the approximately 6,000 to 8,000 rebel fighters spread
throughout their member groups, the government of Guatemala feared the same.516
The EGP operated close to the border, in the majority indigenous zones of Quiche,
Huehuetenango, and the Verapaces. There, in Mayan communities ravaged by the Guatemalan
state’s modernization efforts and land grabs by a military elite that built large fincas on
expropriated community property, the EGP had patiently preached revolution and prepared for
war. Though the group’s first revolutionary act occurred in 1975, when they killed a notorious
ladino landowner in the Ixil region, they spent most of the 1970’s organizing.517
The kidnapping of the hunters in 1972 alerted the Mexican national security apparatus
that resistance to the Guatemalan regime had survived the cruel counter insurgency launched by
Arana. The Mexican military and the DFS undertook similar actions as in the decades before:
increased vigilance of the border, intelligence sharing with the Guatemalan military, which
continued to blame Mexico for the transfer of arms and men; and the uncovering of external
networks operating in Mexico City with the cooperation of sympathetic Mexicans.
By late 1976 the DFS had compiled a substantial amount of data on the EGP’s operations
in Mexico and Guatemala and its connections with the outside world. A thirty-five page DFS
report written late in the year contained the group’s organizational history, structure, operations,
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and contacts within Mexico. It offers a revealing snapshot of how the Mexican security forces
believed the EGP, and the broader Guatemalan guerrilla movement, organized themselves in
relation to Mexico in the crucial years of the mid-1970’s. According to the report, from the
beginning Mexico served as a strategic space of rest, recruitment, and propaganda for the
revolutionary movement. The EGP, like Guatemalan exiles before them, utilized the porous
Chiapan borderlands to traffic in arms and as an entrance into the rest of the Mexico. In
addition, the report indicated that Guatemalan guerrillas were actively trying to recruit Mexicans
to join them in revolution in the state of Chiapas. Finally, the DFS uncovered the possibility that
Cuban operatives utilized that country’s embassy in Mexico City to provide support for the
EGP.518
The DFS stumbled upon a treasure trove of information on the EGP after a routine
immigration inspection outside of Tapachula. On September 14, 1976, Immigration agents
boarded a bus headed to the borderland city in a search of illegal immigrants. The report claims
that they began to question Carlos Romeo Augusto Zetina Baldizón after observing that he had
postcards labeled from both Mexico and Guatemala, though why that was cause for concern is
not stated. Upon further inspection they found a handful of microfilms and upon questioning
why he had so many of these in his possession, his reported answers were “illogical.” The
unfortunate Guatemalan was handed to DFS for interrogation.519 It is likely that Mexican
security officials tortured or, at minimum, severely questioned Zetina, as was common practice
during the period.520 Though such horrific actions often produced false confessions, the
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information Zetina gave DFS officials led to the discovery of safe houses and other sensitive
information verified, in part, by secondary sources, meaning at least some of the information he
told the DFS was true.
Zetina’s history in the movement reveals the EGP’s priorities and strategies during its
crucial years of organizing. According to the DFS report, the Guatemalan joined the EGP in
1972, recruited by a friend in the PGT to become part of the group’s nascent urban front in
Guatemala City. In 1972, as Mario Payeras and the bulk of the EGP trekked through the jungle,
it is hard to imagine that the organization commanded a lot of resources in a Guatemala City
wracked by a violent counter insurgency. Regardless, Zetina told DFS interrogators that he
participated with others in an armed robbery, stealing a cache of weapons and ammunition
before arriving for the first time in Mexico City through Tapachula in 1974.521
Zetina had been tasked with replacing the head of the EGP organizational headquarters in
Mexico City (the headquarters were code-named “Bethina”). Zetina told the DFS he also served
as a go between for his comrades in Guatemala, which might explain why he carried so much
information with him. The DFS believed that Bethina’s primary role was to serve as a “link
between the EGP and countries such as Mexico, the United States, Cuba France, and Italy.”
According to their interrogation, they learned that EGP leadership was concerned that the
struggle for Guatemalan democracy and economic equality no longer attracted worldwide
attention or material support. Isolated armed actions only brought “momentary hope” and
interest outside the country. They feared that “militants and revolutionary countries” interpreted
these as acts of desperation, and not as an organized resistance capable of affecting change.522
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The EGP tasked Bethina members to combat this skepticism and to “attract attention regarding
the class contradictions of Guatemalan society.” Like the FAR safe house raided only a few
years earlier, the Bethina section produced propaganda highlighting the struggle for Guatemala
and all of Central America. 523
Attracting and working with sympathetic supporters in Mexico became a key part of
operations for Bethina, according to the DFS report. They noted that it was their understanding
that though members of Bethina operated according to the directions of the EGP leadership in
Guatemala, while operating in Mexico they had wide latitude to develop personal contacts with
individuals and groups that might assist the Guatemalan cause. This was due to the clandestine
nature of the struggle waged by the EGP leadership in Guatemala; they were unable to cultivate
relationships with the outside world, so Bethina became their link.524

A Guatemala Supported Revolution in the Chiapan Borderlands

One of the relationships the DFS reported was with the Mexican reporter and recently
released Lecumberri inmate, Isaias Rojas Delgado. The way in which Rojas came to establish a
relationship with the EGP indicated the transnational links developed on the left during this time
period: it was a small world as revolutionary ideals and the appeal of armed resurrection forged
commitments across national boundaries. His story alarmingly illustrated for the DFS the
strategic importance of Chiapas for the EGP.
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Code-named Claudio by the EGP, the 41 year old Guanajuato born Rojas spent much of
his adult life in leftist causes, having joined the Mexican Communist Party in 1956. He told the
DFS he broke with the group in 1960 after having become convinced that political change could
only come from armed struggle. In 1963, Rojas, along with the Spanish exile and noted leftist
journalist Victor Rico Galán and a score of others, formed the Revolutionary Movement of the
People (Movimiento Revolucionaro del Pueblo, MRP).525 From the beginning the MRP was
infiltrated by the DFS, which lead to the decimation of the organization as the bulk of its
members were arrested in 1966.526
When Rojas left Lecumberri in 1974, he found work at the UNAM radio station, taught
an occasional class, and reacquainted himself with friends on the left, finally joining the leftist
journal, ¿Por Que? as an editor.527 The magazine had a fiercely independent reputation in its
willingness to criticize a Mexican regime upon which many journalists relied for a salary. It also
attracted the attention of various Latin American revolutionary groups as its founder, Mario
Menéndez Rodríguez, had conducted sympathetic interviews during the sixties and early
seventies with the leadership of organizations ranging from the FAR to the Venezuelan Army of
National Liberation 528
Rojas thus joined a particularly pivotal journal on the left that attracted the attention of
the EGP and served their goal of making sure the world did not forget Guatemala’s struggle.
Rojas explained to the DFS that after he became editor revolutionary groups constantly contacted
him to arrange an article in ¿Por Que? and that is how he came into communication with the
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EGP. Rojas claimed he spent six months in Guatemala in 1974-1975, where he received
theoretical and practical training in guerrilla warfare. Crucially, in Guatemala the EGP
leadership suggested to Rojas the prospect of beginning an armed struggle in Chiapas “in virtue
of the great discontent against the government because of the poverty that exists among the
people of the region.”529 Though the objective of this unnamed revolutionary organization was
to “destroy the present system of government” in Mexico, both Rojas and Zetina indicated that
the Mexican’s group would also help funnel arms and money to the EGP across the border. The
EGP clearly directed Rojas, as the DFS found in Zetina’s possession instructions for the UNAM
radio announcer. 530
By the time of his arrest Rojas had not developed a solid enough organization in the
borderlands to survive the raid. Rojas gave just fifteen pseudonyms to the DFS, with safe houses
in Mexico City, Coatzacoalcos, and Tuxtla Gutiérrez. He also claimed one ex-member of the
group the 23rd of September had inquired about joining his nascent guerrilla group after his
contact had died in a raid and he no longer knew how to reconnect with his organization. The
most dramatic action Rojas’s guerrillas had accomplished consisted of a weekend camping trip
to Toluca, in which members had to pay for their own supplies. Also among the instructions
found on Zetina was a directive from the EGP leadership telling Zetina not to actively participate
in any armed actions, and that Rojas should do so on his own.531
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This failure of the EGP to create a parallel organization in the Chiapan borderlands
indicated the difficulty of an external organization starting a clandestine revolutionary movement
in Mexico. Other national and local revolutionary groups competed for members and could
better articulate a home-grown message and recruit through local networks. In addition,
anybody recruited by the EGP presumably would discover that a primary purpose of the group
would be to supply support for the Guatemalan conflict. The EGP also appeared to realize the
operational and political complications of directing a guerrilla group in Mexico. An unsigned
note found on Zetina seemed to indicate this dilemma, stating “we cannot direct the Mexico
Revolution from A.G. [?].”532 In addition, though the DFS had success in disrupting EGP
operations, armed actions by Guatemalans in Mexico would have no doubt increased the
repressive measures of the Mexican security forces, which until that time had consisted of raids
and prison sentences.
The 1976 DFS raid did not destroy Bethina, or the EGP’s interest and activity in the
Chiapan borderlands. As the group intensified its armed activity towards the end of the decade,
the DFS uncovered and chased down rumors regarding additional activity in Mexico City and on
the border. Based on the transnational nature of the information, it is clear that the Mexican
security apparatus received and shared information with its Guatemalan counterparts. As before,
the Mexican government was concerned about EGP activity in the country and its potential to
disrupt domestic security. For example, two years later in October 1978, the DFS received a tip
that a group of EGP guerrillas had established an area of rest and training in the Chiapan
borderlands and were planning a confrontation with a Mexican military detachment, or
“hacienda police” to steal weapons. The 31st Military Zone commander denied the possibility of
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any type of attack by a large group of EGP guerrillas, or the establishment of a camp. He
assured the DFS investigator that he personally led both aerial and ground inspections of the
border to deny any large-scale intrusions by the “terrorist group EGP.” 533
But the border was not an impenetrable wall. The commander admitted that members
of EGP often crossed back and forth across the border in groups of two or three. After
committing actions in Guatemala, they hid their weapons and crossed into Mexico, blending in
with Chiapan borderlanders. Continuing the lament of the Demographic Commission of decades
earlier, the commander complained that nobody on the border carried any form of identification,
making it hard for security forces to identify who did not belong in the communities straddling
the border.534
Late 1978 was the last period of relative calm in border crossings; a year later the
Commander of the 31st Military Zone no longer could claim Guatemalans crossed into Chiapas
in isolated numbers of two or three. Indeed, in the next couple of years the borderlands began to
become a site of refuge, as thousands rushed into the region to escape genocide, bringing the
Guatemalan conflict into Mexico.

Scorched Earth and Refugees

During the early 1980’s genocide committed by the Guatemalan government against the
majority indigenous population in the north of the country compelled thousands to flee across the
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border. The military-controlled government was battling against a revitalized opposition
movement that demanded an end to economic and political oppression. This reconstituted
movement of laborers, students, and guerrillas, in both the city and the countryside, gained
strength and openly struck out against the government. For example, in February 1980, the
Committee for Peasant Unity (Comité de Unidad Campesina, CUC) a political umbrella
organization connected to the EGP, organized a strike of 75,000 plantation workers,
demonstrating the deep frustration felt across various sectors of society. 535
At the same time the guerrilla movements across Guatemala stepped up the intensity and
frequency of their attacks against the military and police forces, with the EGP being the most
active. The increasing international isolation of the Guatemalan administration due to human
rights violations, as well as the increasing adherence of both the rural and urban population to the
growing local and national opposition, led the guerrilla leadership to believe that a political and
military victory was close at hand. Close to the border in the northern departments of the
country, the guerrilla leadership believed their control of the territory to be complete after years
of on the ground organizing in the mostly indigenous communities. Some in the EGP even
contemplated calling for a sort of free political zone and petitioning for international recognition,
which would have meant a “guerrilla state.”536
In early 1982 a group of young Guatemalan military officers led a military coup
promising a more effective counter insurgency. The former presidential candidate Efraín Ríos
Montt emerged as the leader of the regime, which proceeded to quickly militarize all aspects of
society through a continuous state of siege. A born again Christian, Ríos Montt endeared
himself to the military hawks of the Reagan Administration, who viewed the strongman as a
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effective bulwark against the spread of communism in Central America. (After meeting the
Guatemalan President in Honduras, Reagan called him, “a man of great integrity”). Renewed
U.S. military assistance, despite the awareness of gross human rights violations, added fuel to the
bloody counter insurgency campaign.537
The Rios Montt administration’s National Security Plan contextualized the indigenous
population as the fuel for the insurgency and hence a key target in the counterinsurgency
campaign. In the plan’s estimation indigenous Guatemalans supported the guerrillas either
because they were forced to, or they lacked proper political consciousness. As a consequence,
the military expanded into countless indigenous communities, for the most part in the northern
departments that served as EGP strongholds. There they organized Civilian Autodefense Patrols,
arming peasants to hunt their neighbors, the “guerrillas” in the bush, or suspected collaborators
within the community. Rios Montt claimed that, “for the first time in the history of Guatemala,
the indigenous feels useful, necessarily utilized by the Army, the Government, the President, and
the economic sector.”538
As documented by groups such as Human Rights Watch, the government’s counter
insurgency program destroyed communities. In order to deny the insurgents their base of
operations, the military destroyed the infrastructure and livelihood of countless villages:
churches, schools, hospitals, and stores were destroyed and cattle were killed. Survivors who
fled to the borderlands recounted how the army “saved bullets” when dealing with women and
children, often locking them in buildings and setting them on fire, or bashing small children
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against rocks. Those who fled to nearby jungles, living off wild herbs and fruit, were forced to
dodge their neighbors in the civilian patrols, and the passing helicopters that dropped bombs on
suspected areas of guerrilla concentrations.539
The Guatemalan Truth Commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH)
later determined that the military committed 595 massacres (defined as more than five people)
during the years 1978-1982. Of those, 90% occurred in the northern borderlands departments of
Guatemala: Huehuetenango, Quiché, Chimaltenango, Alta Verapaz, and Baja Verapaz. The vast
majority of the victims, 97 percent, were indigenous Mayans.540 Between 1978 and the peace
treaty of 1996, an estimated 132,000 men and women and children died.
The immense violence of this counterinsurgency campaign led to the mass exodus of
indigenous Guatemalans into the Chiapan borderlands. A steady trickle in 1980 of individuals
and families crossing into Mexico became a flood by 1982, as whole communities escaped the
genocide. By the end of 1982 an average of 400 refugees arrived each week, with a total of
3,000 by the beginning of 1983, and 15,000 by the middle of year. By the end of 1984, an
estimated 46,000 men, women, and children had arrived in Mexico.541
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The Church and Chiapas

These refugees arrived in a conflictive borderlands. Beginning in the early seventies the
Diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas and numerous statewide indigenous campesino-led
organizations had begun to challenge the oligarchical state structure that repressed political
participation with violence and appropriated land. In many ways the social, political, and
economic reality of Chiapas resembled that of Guatemala; a poor indigenous majority received
little benefit from the state and, as in Guatemala, many Chiapanecos began to look for
organizations outside the state for solutions.
The diocese, under the leadership of the dynamic Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia, served as a
foundation for this effort against the local and national governments. In order to understand the
borderlands, Chiapas, and the reaction by the state to the Guatemalan refugees, it is necessary to
understand the vision and work of Ruiz. The defining moment for Ruiz’s approach to the socioeconomic problems prevalent in his diocese came in 1968, when he attended the Conference of
Latin American Bishops in Medellin, Colombia. The discussions and conclusions drawn from
the Medellin Conference regarding the Latin American experience would partially and
temporarily change the relationship between church and state in the region. The bishops’
analysis of the poverty of Latin America led them to incorporate a Marxist viewpoint in their
criticism of the international, national, and local political and economic structures of power.
They rejected the capitalist development model promoted by the United States, which had led to
increasing inequality among the bishops’ parishioners. This Liberation Theology and its
“preferential option for the poor” meant a fundamental change in the church’s practical and
theological outreach. As the conference ended, bishops like Ruiz returned to their parishioners
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ready to lead them in their struggle against oppressive forces — wherever they might be found
— that had long dominated the people of Latin America.542
In addition to theological inspiration, Ruiz also embarked on understanding the
indigenous reality of his diocese. This intellectual journey began at Medellin, prompted by his
nomination as the president of the working group, Department of Missions, which evaluated the
church’s evangelization work among indigenous communities. While presiding he had a fateful
discussion with the Colombian anthropologist Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, an expert on and
advocate for indigenous communities. The encounter, and subsequent dialogue Ruiz maintained
with Mexican academics, led him to the conclusion that the traditional practice of evangelization
often meant a destruction of indigenous culture. Ruiz concluded that in order to spread the word
of the church, instead of preaching to the indigenous people, the missionary had to become an
anthropologist: the Church had to understand the values, history, and language of the varied
indigenous cultures in Chiapas in order to fully integrate them into the faith.543
In this new approach, the diocese encouraged and supported indigenous community
members to take an active role in interpreting their relationship with the church in the context of
their culture. The diocese-appointed catechists no longer led the community in their relationship
to the word of God, but instead facilitated their neighbors’ interpretation of the faith.544 Out of
this effort came the Indigenous Church (Iglesia Autóctona), formed by the indigenous
communities that inhabited the large territory of the diocese from the borderlands to the
highlands. The church became a middle ground, a meeting point for indigenous and Western
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theological values. The deployment of the diocese’s catechists in the Lacandon sparked within
the communities a social and political revitalization that, most importantly, began to value an
indigenous identity that for years many associated with poverty, immorality, and ignorance.545
The strength and impact of this activism was displayed on the five hundredth birthday
celebration of Bartolomé de las Casas celebrated in 1974. Both the state and national
governments conceived of the three-day event as appropriating the historical memory of las
Casas to demonstrate an official commitment to Mexico’s indigenous communities. They
intended the festivities to be a folkloric exhibition for the assembled press: dances, indigenous
foods, a commercial for Chiapan tourism and Mexican progress. The governor tasked Ruiz to
help organize an Indigenous Congress, which was intended to be in the feel good spirit
organizers had envisioned for the celebration. Instead, Ruiz spent nearly a year organizing 1,200
delegates from the state’s four major indigenous linguistic groups, Tzeltales, Tzotziles,
Tojolabales, and Choles, to discuss the economic and political realities affecting their
communities. For three days the congress discussed the lack of infrastructure in their
communities, high illiteracy rates, non-existent healthcare, the scourge of alcoholism, and the
strong-handed violent tactics of the local power brokers. The congress ended with a
commitment to continue organizing for indigenous rights.546
This activism in the Lacandon continued, as indigenous groups such as the Organización
Campesina Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ) and Unión de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos
Solidarios de Chiapas (UU), began to organize communities in the region to demand land,
services such as schools, and an end to the political and economic domination of corrupt state

María del Carmen Legorreta Díaz, Religión, política y guerrilla en Las Cañadas de la Selva Lacandona
(México.: Cal y Arena, 1998), 61-62.
546
Thomas Benjamin,"A Time of Reconquest: History, the Maya Revival, and the Zapatista Rebellion in
Chiapas,” The American Historical Review (105) 2000: 425-426.
545

247

and federal bureaucracies and their allied large landowners and caciques. Many of the leaders of
these organizations were diocese catechists, while many members had joined the Indigenous
Church. Their struggles were often met by official and extra-official violence.547
In the face of this growing political tumult the diocese was faced with a decision: attempt
to stop the political momentum of their parishioners’ organizing, adopt a stance and assume a
leadership role, or allow the communities they helped awaken to choose their own paths. They
chose the third option.548 This decision also became the diocese’s policy towards the Guatemalan
refugees: advocate for the refugees to make their own decisions about their future.549
Both the state and federal governments looked on with suspicion at the deep involvement
of the diocese as revitalized indigenous communities organized and protested the economic and
political inequities prevalent in the borderlands. This reflected a belief by authorities that the
burgeoning indigenous activism had to be led directly by a non-indigenous leader. For example,
the government blamed Ruiz for inciting a deadly shootout between members of the Ejido Nueva
Providencia and the state police, in the borderland municipality of Las Margaritas, in September
1977. In reality, the deadly incident was sparked by the kidnapping of an ejidatario by a local
landowner in response to political organizing in the community led by catechists.550 For the
DFS, Ruiz, who had been in the community a short time before, clearly carried the blame. As
they noted, “the posture of Ruiz is well known in this area as he has a lot of influence among the
indigenous of the region and in his sermons he is always inciting them against the small property
owners and the authorities.”551
547
Neil Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1998); Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, a Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas.
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 223-245.
548
Meyer, Samuel Ruiz en San Cristóbal, 83-84.
549
de Vos, “El encuentro de los mayas de Chiapas,” 10-11.
550
Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion, 81-82.
551
El Estado de Chiapas, México September 8, 1977, AGN-ADFS, Caja 138 Hojas 328-329.

248

In addition, at various levels Mexican officials worried about their dependence on Ruiz,
upon whom they often relied as an intermediary in their interactions with indigenous
communities. The absence of the state in the form of providing services or infrastructure meant
a political and economic void. 552 This would be key when thousands of Guatemalans arrived
and looked for support. A 1978 DFS report, for instance, noted the potential problems caused by
the lack of infrastructure for the 15,000 indigenous families in the Lacandon (they entirely
lacked water, electricity, schools, health care). The DFS worryingly noted that the church was
“channeling economic opportunities and personnel.”553 The influence of the diocese among the
borderlanders reflected the historic absence of the state in the borderlands and the fact that, to the
degree that it was present in the lives of borderlanders, that presence often meant dealing with
corrupt local and federal officials. Though the diocese did not fulfill all functions that the state
might be expected to offer, the church represented to many people in the region an institution
that held the moral high ground, that could be trusted and that, in practical terms, was an
effective advocate for, and even sometimes a supplier of the basic needs and services that the
state failed to provide. In many ways, the refugees would come to feel the same way.
As we will examine in the next section, these formative years of the diocese’s organizing
experience shaped its interactions with the Guatemalan refugees. Ruiz fashioned his diocese’s
outreach to reflect the currents of Liberation Theology and to encourage his indigenous
parishioners to advocate for their political and economic rights, a position which brought
opposition from local and federal governments. And the diocese would adopt the same approach
towards the Guatemalans that came into the borderlands as it did to local Chiapans, generating
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conflict with a Mexican national security apparatus that feared the borderlands would become
mired in a guerrilla war.

The Church, Refugees, and National Security

Sometime in October 1982 Sister Lucy Jiménez, member of the Christian Committee of
Solidarity (Comité Cristiano de Solidarid, hereforth Comité) the organization formed by the
Diocese in 1979 to assist Central American refugees, spent a tense night in Chajul watching a
small contingent of Guatemalan soldiers sleep. She and two other members of the Comité had
arrived a few days earlier bringing food and medicine to Antonio Sánchez’s finca, the largest in
the small twenty family Lacandon borderland community only a couple of miles from
Guatemala. For nearly a week these Mexican families had fed and cared for approximately one
thousand Guatemalan refugees who suddenly arrived, fleeing from the counter insurgency.
When the families’ supplies began to run low, they contacted the institution they trusted most to
help, the diocese. Soon after arriving, however, the Sister and her hosts had to contend with a
new problem, Guatemalan soldiers.
In uniform and carrying rifles, a small patrol of twelve soldiers arrived one afternoon at
the edges of the community, demanding to know the nationality of the members of the Sánchez
family and the sister. They explained they were following a large group of men, women, and
children to bring them back to Guatemala. With a mix of daring and bluster that masked her
fear, the sister, along with the elder Sánchez, told the soldiers that they were in Mexican territory
and should turn around and go back the way they came. It worked, sort of. As night approached
the soldiers, wary of traveling through the jungle in the dark, asked if they could stay on the
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grounds and leave in the morning. The sister and the Sánchez family passed a tense night as they
vigilantly watched the soldiers from the house, praying that the coughs and moans from the sick
refugees hidden only a few hundred yards away would not cause alarm. As dawn rose the
members of the bloody counter insurgency drifted back across the porous border. The sister and
the rest of the Comité members gathered the sickest refugees and began the perilous journey
through jungle trails to the town of Comitán and the nearest hospital, which was several days
travel away.554
The incident in Chajul encapsulates the initial actions of the diocese, the Guatemalan
military and, because of its absence in the story, the Mexican state, to the approximately forty
thousand Guatemalan Refugees that arrived in 1979-1984. Upon the first arrival of the refugees
the diocese, as it did at Chajul, quickly mobilized its resources — including successfully
soliciting funding from around the world — much more quickly than the slow moving and
culturally insensitive Mexican state bureaus. For Mexican officials, especially the DFS, the
Guatemalan refugees represented a security concern as much as a humanitarian crisis. Now
added to their long concern over the incursion of Guatemalan guerrillas was the worry about the
impact of thousands of hungry and poor indigenous families arriving in the poorest region of the
country, which was already teeming with discontent because, in their view, of an activist church.
An additional problem was that the Guatemalan military frequently ignored Mexican
sovereignty, crossing the border to continue their counterinsurgency. Groups of soldiers tracked
and followed refugees as had happened at Chajul, often killing them on Mexican soil, or
dragging the desperate individuals back to Guatemala, where they faced certain death.
Guatemalan military planes and helicopters even flew over Chiapan territory, occasionally
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landing on isolated runways forged by the CILA, carrying the bloody counterinsurgency into
Mexico.

Arrival

Even before the arrival of the thousands of refugees, Samuel Ruiz and the diocese had
long looked south to Guatemala, in part because the church there had become a target of the
government’s counterinsurgency campaign. In July 1980, in an unprecedented action, the
Bishop of the Guatemalan diocese of Quiché, José Gerardi, told a group of assembled priests,
“we are going.” A few days later the outspoken bishop, who used his position to protest the
military’s gross human rights violations, led all the clergy of the diocese into exile. The bishop
himself had been targeted for assassination, narrowly avoiding becoming the seventh church
member murdered by the government since 1978.555
Jorge Martínez was one of the many priests that fled into exile with Gerardi. Originally
from Spain, he came to Guatemala in the early 1970’s inspired, in part, after hearing a lecture
given by Gustavo Gutiérrez. After leaving Guatemala, he and a few other priests traveled to
Nicaragua, where he stayed for a few months working with the triumphant Sandinistas and also
helped form the Guatemalan Church in exile. (During the early 1980’s the Church in Exile, with
their contacts in their former diocese of Quiché became a key source of information for
journalists, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the broader church itself, regarding
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horrific events of the counterinsurgency.556) He arrived in Chiapas a few months later, drawn by
the increasing number of refugees arriving in the borderlands, many from his former diocese.557
Martínez joined the Comité sometime in 1981 and worked for ten years in the Lacandon
Jungle, in other Mexican communities, and in the makeshift camps in the Lagos de Montebello
region, which was also close to the border.558 The Comité never employed more than a few
dozen full time workers, though at its organizational height in the mid 1980’s it served as the
focal point for many charities and foundations, coordinating millions of dollars in donations and
countless projects begun by NGOs from around the world.
At the beginning the main priority for the Comité was to keep the refugees alive. They
did this in part by enlisting the assistance of the Mexican borderland communities with which
they already had formed relationships during the 1970’s. Martínez, for example, related that his
job consisted of being a mediator during the early 1980’s, when the pace of refugees crossing the
border was high. He and two Comité companions traveled on barely passable roads from
community to community in the Lacandon, meeting with the leaders of the refugees as well as
the Mexican borderlanders. Comité members like Martínez negotiated the placement of refugees
with Mexican families. To the Mexican community leaders they promised food deliveries to
supplement their own resources, and appealed to their sense of Christian generosity. Some,
admitted Martínez, took advantage of the Guatemalans, utilizing the newcomers for free or cheap
labor.559
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Martínez believed, however, that the acceptance of the refugees by the Mexican
communities was also rooted in the history of transnational exchanges in the borderlands and a
shared indigenous identity. Martínez observed that the Guatemalan refugees and Mexican
communities were connected by a shared Mayan identity that linked them to a familiar history of
oppression. Mexican borderlanders were willing to help because, in the words of Martínez,
“today for you, tomorrow for me. Or, today the Mexicans take in the Guatemalans, but maybe
tomorrow the Guatemalans are going to have to take in the Mexicans.”560
The Comité’s assistance went beyond simply saving lives, as Martínez and others led
efforts to create an educational program for the many children among the Guatemalans:
approximately 20% of the 40,000 refugees were children under four.561 The program reflected
the previous experience of the diocese working with indigenous Mexican borderlanders. As
such, the efforts became a vital way to ensure that children maintained their identities, while also
serving as a forum to explain the traumatic experiences they were forced to endure. In 1983 the
communities in the Lacandon held the first meeting of promoters of education. Not one of the
approximately thirty-five in attendance had been a teacher in Guatemala, and many who attended
had only a few years of elementary school. Martínez, who led that first gathering, asked
skeptically to the assembled refugees, “do you all really think you will be able to do it? [Become
teachers]. I remember they answered me with firmness and conviction, if you help us.” For the
next nine years Martínez gave one class a month to the promoters and they in turn taught three
times a week in their communities. Together, they collected the oral histories of the elders in the
various camps, creating a book, “We Know Our History” (Nostros Conocemos Nuestra Historia)
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that reflected the story of the many indigenous communities that were forced to call Mexico
home.562
In addition, utilizing their experience with the Lacandon indigenous communities,
members of the Comité developed catechists among the refugees. The religious instruction
reflected the Liberation Theology outlook of the diocese, relating stories from the Bible to the
economic and political situation that the refugees fled. For example, a lesson plan for children
related the Israeli Exodus from Egypt to that of the Guatemalans. Children learned how, “God
helps his people open their eyes, and escape the land of slavery.” Catechists were then instructed
to divide the children into groups of two, where they were asked to make a list of what was the
“same” or “different” between their situation and the Israelites. In addition they were to mark
down the, “Signs of Liberation. (Facts that arise or that lift up our hope).” The catechist
encouraged the children to look for these signs of a future freedom, of leadership, among the
refugees, asking them, “will it be like Moses, will He send someone to take every one of us, to
take our people [indigenous Guatemalans] out of slavery?”563
The Comité also situated its lessons clearly within the class-based viewpoint that lay at
the foundation of Liberation Theology, and which also served as a political and economic
critique of both Guatemala and Chiapas. For example, the pamphlet “Courses for Catechists.
The First Part: Situation of Palestine in the Times of Jesus,” was typical of the religious material
taught by Comité trained catechists. The booklet began by first describing the upper class in the
time of Jesus, dividing the people into the rulers, large landowners, high priests, and the secular
rich. The description given of the large landowners, emphasizing that they lived in the city
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where they counted the riches gained from the exploited labor on their fincas, could have
described the agrarian situation in Guatemala.564
As it had accomplished with the indigenous communities in Chiapas, the diocese,
through the Comité, fulfilled certain functions of the state. Initially, it provided or coordinated
basic services such as food, medicine and lodging. Once the refugees were settled, the Comité
then provided for them beyond mere survival, such as in the key area of education, as well
assisting in organizing their new communities in the areas of work and health.565 Because of its
quick response and its sensitivity, the Comité, and not the Mexican state, became the refugees’
link to a future where they could make their own decisions.

National Security and State Control

Far from providing the social welfare services that the church offered, from the moment
the first refugees arrived, the Mexican government tried to make them leave. In 1981, as
increasing numbers of refugees crossed the border, an estimated two thousand Guatemalans were
deported by the Mexican military and immigration officials. Federal immigration officials
refused to grant those who were allowed to stay permanent status. Many were issued temporary
visas of 60 days, with the threat of deportation and death hanging over their heads.566 Officials
took advantage of the fact that the Mexican immigration system did not recognize refugee status.
The Mexican government had refused to adopt, as had many countries after World War II, a less
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stringent threshold for political asylum, which crucially required granting refuge in cases in
which an individual could reasonably fear persecution. As thousands of Guatemalans entered the
borderlands, Mexican immigration officials still acted under Article 35 of the Constitution,
which if carried out to the letter of law meant each Guatemalan had to individually prove his or
her case for political asylum as an exile. Guatemalans that had fled their communities with
nothing were expected to produce evidence that they would be persecuted for their political
beliefs if they were to return home.567 Those Guatemalans that attempt to stay in Mexico under
Article 35 were likely were likely to be rejected by Mexican officials -- of the estimated 2,000
refugees that petitioned for asylum in June and July of 1981, only fifty were granted it -- as
refugees did not fit into the state’s definition of political exile.568 Many refugees, if they were
able to, resorted to the more traditional route in the borderlands, bribing Mexican immigration
officials to stop deportation proceedings. These officials, however, capitalized on the
circumstances, and the average bribe skyrocketed, from $500 pesos at the beginning of 1982, to
approximately $1,500 by the end of the year.569
At the national level, politicians claimed the refugees were economic immigrants and that
the region could not absorb more workers. Salvador Neme Castillo, President of the Senate
Commission on Immigration, summed up the government’s position when he told an interviewer
in early 1982, “we have limits. We are a country with economic and unemployment problems,
which will make it necessary to control the flow of Guatemalan immigrants.”570
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Similar comments were made by the Secretary of the Interior, Enrique Olivares, who commented
to the press that most of the Guatemalans had come to Chiapas in search of land.571
The continued arrival of refugees, along with the protestations of the diocese,
international human rights groups, and national and worldwide press attention, pressured the
Mexican government to reexamine its policy of deportations.572 The diocese in particular took an
active role in swaying public opinion as members of the Comité, having directly assisted
refugees, could tell their heartbreaking stories to a national press increasingly covering the
growing crisis in the borderlands. In addition, the recently formed organization of the Bishops of
the Pacific South became a powerful voice in denouncing government inaction. Since 1977 this
ad-hoc group of bishops from Oaxaca and Chiapas, united by a shared commitment to the tenets
and actions of Liberation Theology, had come together in unprecedented calls for political and
economic rights for their indigenous parishioners.573 In March 1982 they released an impactful
letter addressed to the Mexican federal government, simply entitled, “Guatemalan refugees in
Chiapas. A message from some bishops from the Pacific South Pastoral Region,” which asked
officials to guarantee the security of the refugees by allowing them to remain in Mexico.574 The
letter, coupled with published reports of Guatemalan army intrusions into refugee communities,
finally slowed and eventually halted the deportations in February of 1983.575
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Ortíz Monasterio believed in part that pressure from the church and the press, along with
the celebrated Mexican history of offering refuge, propelled some in the federal government to
change the deportation policy. He reflected on his efforts and others to convince recalcitrant
officials to contextualize the Guatemalans as:
We had to create a whole narrative. The first argument was that we have to receive the refugees
because this is the old Mexican tradition that has existed since we were born as an independent
country. I think that is the heart of the matter, that is what happened to a sector of the Mexican
bureaucracy, especially those in public relations: they saw the value to Mexico in receiving
refugees.576

Finally, Ortíz Monasterio believed that Mexican leaders decided to focus on forming
some type of response to the refugees other than deportation because it was simply impossible
for the national security apparatus to control the borderlands. Along with others, he argued that
it was better to let the refugees enter and then adopt some type of control over them:
It was very simple, there is no way physically or militarily to close the border. First because there
is no budget, there is no way. Somebody said, we have to close the border. That was the
idea….The counterargument was, it is impossible, therefore we have to welcome them in order to
know how many there are, where they are from, and who they are.577

Even though the refugees were allowed to stay, the federal Mexican government initially
lacked the means and infrastructure to support them, despite the creation of the COMAR in
1980. The COMAR was initially formed in reaction to the increasing number of Salvadoran
refugees and its budget, only $800,000 in 1981, and ability to conduct large-scale operations,
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were limited. The Guatemalan refugee crisis, however, thrust the group into the forefront of
Mexico’s response to the humanitarian crisis in the borderlands. By 1982, with the assistance of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), COMAR’s budget had
expanded to $7,000,000.578
In addition to funneling UNHCR funding to migrants for food, housing and medicine,
COMAR officials became the Mexican government’s mechanism of control and vigilance over
the Guatemalan refugees. Living in, or close by, the refugee communities and camps, they
became the eyes and ears of the DFS, reporting on movements of Comité members, volunteers,
foreign visitors, and of suspected guerrillas posing as refugees. The director of the hospital of
Comitán, Roberto Antonio Gómez, who worked closely with the diocese in treating the refugees,
said “[the hospital] had an absolute close relationship with Don Samuel” and was particularly
critical of COMAR officials. He remembers COMAR as “a form of control from the Mexican
state, I do not believe they had the minimum intention of humanitarian aid. I never saw
COMAR officials that had any sensibility. To me, the majority [of COMAR officials] were
security officials (judiciales) the doctors were security officials (judiciales)”579
COMAR was just one of the many state institutions that arrived in the borderlands during
this period. Along with them came doctors, including many that specialized in communicable
diseases common in the camps, from bureaus such as the Mexican Institute of Social Security
(Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, IMSS) who, along with personnel from the national
security apparatus such as the military and the DFS, represented the greatest concentration of
employees of the Mexican federal government in the borderlands in the twentieth century.
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Though many of these individuals came to aid refugees, scores of security officials posed as
COMAR officials in order to better to observe the refugees and report back to the DFS.
The national security apparatus was concerned about two issues: infiltration into Mexico
by the EGP, and the potential radicalizing implications of the work of Samuel Ruiz and the
Comité for thousands of poor indigenous people of both nationalities. The DFS agents
embedded with the refugees reported on rumors about guerrillas hiding among groups fleeing the
counterinsurgency as well as their contacts with borderlanders. Though many of these rumors
were never verified, they added to the paranoia of the federal government. For example, an April
3, 1983 report -- based on an interview with two refugees – claimed a Guatemala guerrilla leader
named Bernardio Vilatorio was living in a small town in the borderland municipality of Frontera
Comalapa with 100 EGP guerrillas. From there, claimed the DFS report, Vilatorio led his group
back and forth across the border through the Lacandon, living among the refugees and collecting
supplies from contacts in the town of Comitán.580 Another refugee informant in Comitán
claimed that a small group of seven EGP members met regularly with a priest of the diocese, as
well as Roberto Antonio Gómez. The Comitán hospital director was a militant in the Unified
Socialist Party of Mexico (El Partido Socialista Unificado de México, PSUM) and had already
been in the sights of Mexican intelligence for supposedly “proselytizing” his leftist ideology
among the refugees.581 According to the informant, this small group of EGP members was
intimidating the refugees to prevent them from returning to Guatemala, while also openly
contemplating, for reasons not listed, triggering a confrontation with Mexican security forces.582
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One particular case of how this intelligence gathering worked is illustrated by the story of
Javier Pulido Solís. Pulido, a member of a politically connected large landholding family from
the borderland community of La Trinitaria, had previously served in local government positions.
Upon the arrival of the refugees he became a spy for the DFS, under the guise of being a
representative of the Chiapan government in charge of monitoring the humanitarian situation of
the refugees. Reporting directly to Governor Absalón Castellanos, he toured the refugee camps,
spying on the representatives of COMAR, the Comité, and above all the Guatemalans.583
For Pulido all the refugees were connected to the guerrillas, though he admitted that the
Mexican government had the responsibility to keep them alive. Therefore Pulido saw his and the
DFS’s job as to ensure that they did not support the guerrillas by keeping them from having
contact with the insurgency. Complicating this job, according to Pulido, were the “Marxist
priests and nuns,” who aided guerrillas that snuck into camps for food and medical attention.
There, Pulido claimed, they hid their guns and supplies, utilizing the chaos of the refugee
situation as a sort of rearguard. Pulido claimed that this was why opposition to the Mexican
government’s proposal to move refugees to Campeche and Quintana Roo was so strong: the
guerrillas would lose their support in the borderlands. 584

583
584

Interview with author, Comitán de Dominguez, January 13, 2013.
Interview with author, Comitán de Dominguez, January 13, 2013.

262

Campeche and Quintana Roo

By 1984 the Mexican national security apparatus in general came to share Pulido’s belief
that the refugees and the guerrillas were almost one and the same. In their estimation this
represented a potential threat to domestic political peace, as the EGP could partner with the
Mexican indigenous groups that had arisen thanks to the advocacy of Samuel Ruiz. Another
difficulty was the fact that the presence of the refugees on the border provoked frequent
incursions by the Guatemalan army, claiming to be in pursuit of guerrillas, into Mexican
territory. Ultimately, the decision by the Mexican government to move the refugees to
Campeche and Quintana Roo provoked a clash between them, the diocese, and the refugees.
Since the arrival of the refugees small groups of Guatemalan soldiers, such as those that
Sister Jiménez confronted in Chajul, had crossed the border to attack or kidnap refugees. It is
unclear to what extent the Mexican national security organizations cooperated in these incidents.
The arrival of the refugees and the chaos of the counterinsurgency seemed to have broken down
the previous partnership between the two countries’ national security agencies as thousands of
Guatemalans entered Mexican territory in a short time frame, and all were suspects according to
the logic of the Guatemalan government. However, the frequent incursions by sometimes up to
two hundred soldiers never led to any major conflict with the increasingly present Mexican
military. Often these groups of Guatemalan soldiers targeted specific individuals in a crowd of
thousands. This precision suggests that at some level these attacks on Mexican soil were assisted
by individuals like Pulido, who perhaps pointed out suspicious individuals or allowed
undercover Guatemalan intelligence officers to operate in the camps.585 These incursions
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suggested the Mexican military refused to harden the border, either because they feared finding
themselves in a fight with the Guatemalan military, or they wanted to assist in the
counterinsurgency.
Between 1981 and 1984 the Guatemalan military made an estimated 70 incursions into
Mexican territory, varying from snatch type jobs to terrorizing entire groups of refugees. For
example, on September 21, 1982, a squad of a dozen Guatemalan soldiers tried twice to kidnap
refugees or, as the DFS report tellingly calls them, “subversives,” from the Rancho Dolores
camp. Failure at the first attempt of the day led to a second one in which they killed one
individual and wounded another, who managed to escape back to Guatemala.586 Larger groups
of soldiers also made incursions, as was the case on January 23, 1983, when approximately 80 to
100 men dressed as civilians but wielding high-caliber machine guns burst into the La Hamaca
camp one early afternoon. After exchanging words with three refugees, they gunned down the
men and later escaped back to Guatemala.587 Though the Mexican Army had stationed the 24th
Mechanized Infantry in nearby Comitán, they rarely intervened or prevented these incursions. It
is true, however, that when Mexican soldiers were actually stationed at a camp they could serve
as a deterrent, as was the unique case of the La Cila Camp on August 23, 1982. There, a group
of Guatemalan soldiers approached the camp, firing in the air, while Guatemalan military planes
and helicopters flew above it. The Mexican detachment of soldiers fired in the air in response,
dispersing what would have been another attack.588
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On April 30, 1984, a large contingent of the Guatemalan army attacked the El Chupadero
camp, home to close to two thousand refugees, killing six. Though the attack did not differ from
previous incursions as far as numbers, the brutality of the attack, one of whose victims included a
mutilated small child, demonstrated the inhumanity of the Guatemalan regime. The Mexican
government utilized the incident as an excuse to accelerate its recently announced plan to move
the refugees from the border to isolated areas of Campeche and Quintana Roo. Unlike past
incursions in this period by Guatemalan soldiers inside Mexico, which were met with little
protest, Mexico sent Guatemala a formal note of protest regarding the Chupadero incident.
Guatemala blamed the guerrillas, claiming they committed the massacre while dressed in
Guatemalan army uniforms.589
The Mexican government’s reasons for moving the refugees went beyond fears of
Guatemalan incursions. They were motivated by other concerns regarding political and national
security. For example, a detailed report outlining the benefits and disadvantages of moving the
refugees declared that the presence of the Guatemalans on the border benefited the Soviet Union,
“progressive clerics,” Mexican opposition parties such as PSUM, and the guerrillas. The
refugees were contextualized as political and logistical ammunition, ready to be utilized by
critics of the PRI regime or as a rearguard for the EGP. In addition, stated the report, the
relocation would benefit and speed up Guatemala’s counter insurgency, and for that reason
would be looked on favorably by the United States. 590
Under the logic of national security the government did not consider the refugees as
autonomous actors; their wishes and plans for their future were buried in calculations of who
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could utilize their presence against the Mexican state. Only one sentence of the report mentioned
the possibility that the refugees would resist relocating, and even then the report projected that it
was more likely that the guerrillas, presumably hiding among the refugees, would cause conflict,
or that it would be an opportunity for the “progressive clergy” to cause agitation.591
The government did face resistance from the refugees and the Comité, which utilized its
network of organizers, media contacts, and an increasing international profile to assist the
refugees in their opposition to the move. In one instance, the Comité helped refugees flee from
the heavy-handed tactics utilized by the Mexican military. Ultimately, the diocese’s approach
clashed with the government due to the organizing philosophy developed by Ruiz in the 1970’s:
support the decisions of the indigenous communities the diocese served and assist in the
preservation of their identity.
Samuel Ruiz summed up the Comité’s approach in December 1982 in an internal memo:

Having moved to Mexico, they [refugees] keep hold of a social group where they know they can
find a certain security and understanding. It is not only about saving individual lives, but
communities, people…the refugees are asking for guarantees against ethnocide, they do not want
to disappear as a people. Their dispersion and internment into Mexican territory equal
assimilation, deculturalization, the practical Mexicanization of the refugees that will come to
increase the number of dispossessed in our country. The refugee is Guatemalan, Chuj, Canjobal,
etc, and wants to continue being it….Ethnocide is a crime against humanity.592
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For the refugees, staying together in the borderlands meant retaining their identity as well as the
hope of returning home. Upon hearing of the plans to move the camps, the Comité assisted the

refugees in protesting, coordinating an expansive letter writing campaign to the president of
Mexico, UNHCR, and COMAR, to be passed on to the press. Combining heartbreaking tales of
oppression and escape from the Guatemalan counterinsurgency, written in broken Spanish and
often “signed” with inked thumbprints, the letters claimed that the relocation would put them at
risk after surviving so much. They were forceful and moving denunciations of a policy taken by
the Mexican government without consulting the people it claimed it was trying to help.
One such letter, from the Santa Rosa camp and addressed to President Miguel de la
Madrid, COMAR, and UNHCR, “begged that you allow us to stay here in Santa Rosa, the
elderly say that with the change of climate they will die, the children, the same.”593 The
members of the Joaquín Miguel Gutiérrez Camp wrote to the president of COMAR that, “in no
moment will we make ourselves Mexican citizens, we are indigenous Guatemalans, profoundly
tied to the history of our country, to its present and future. We are anxious to witness the future
events of our country, to return when conditions are more favorable.”594
Though officially COMAR and others in the Mexican government claimed the move to
Campeche and Quintana Roo was voluntary, Secretary of the Interior Manuel Bartlett revealed
the true rigidity of the relocation policy when he stated a week after the El Chupadero incident
that the refugees had two choices: return to Guatemala or go to Campeche and Quintana Roo.595
Echoing the state of communications before the arrival of the refugees, when the diocese served
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as interlocutor with the indigenous Mexican communities, the government attempted with no
success to persuade the Comité to convince the refugees to go with the plan.
In the face of active resistance by many refugees -- which included running away from
COMAR and migration officials and blocking the paths into the camps -- the Mexican military
formulated a relocation plan that seemed more like a counterinsurgency operation. In mid-July
1984 they deployed a large contingent of men and equipment to the borderlands: three marine
infantry divisions, two marine parachute divisions, two airplanes with a capacity to hold fifty
people each, six helicopters equipped with rockets and machine guns, and six zodiac motor boats
to navigate the borderland rivers.596 In addition, they began a propaganda campaign designed to
convince the refugees that the relocation was for their own benefit, that it would in fact “reaffirm
their nationalism.” The government also promised jobs, state and federal services, and an overall
better quality of life in Campeche and Quintana Roo. Above all, the propaganda was aimed at
neutralizing the “progressive clerics” and leftist opposition parties.597
The most illustrative and dramatic example of the Comité and government’s clash over
efforts to relocate the refugees occurred at the Chupadero camp. There, without previous
consultation, officials from UNHCR and COMAR accompanied by police and military units,
informed the thousands of refugees that they would soon start the move to Campeche. The
refugees refused, and a tense standoff developed. As military units formed a loose circle around
the encampment, officials from COMAR threatened to repatriate the recalcitrant refugees to
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Guatemala if they did not agree to the relocation. To increase the pressure, COMAR began to
withhold food and supplies: the Mexican government declared a siege on the refugees. 598
The siege of Chupadero ended in dramatic fashion with the help of the Comité.
Sometime between April and June, utilizing Comité funds, Samuel Ruiz bought a large ranch
nearby, La Gloria, which was home to a handful of Mexican families. In the besieged camp
Comité members and the refugees planned an escape to the new church property. During the
night of June 7, approximately two thousand Guatemalan men, women, and children once again
fled their homes. Outracing military and COMAR officials in pursuit, they arrived in La Gloria
to find pre-built shacks, food, and medical supplies.599
Soon after this dramatic escape from the authorities to the safety of the La Gloria camp,
the Comité issued a press release stating that all of the refugees, not just those from Chupadero,
opposed the move to Campeche and Quintana Roo. The Comité strongly condemned the
Mexican government’s refusal to dialog with the refugees, to respond, for example, to the
overwhelming number of letters, 1975, written by refugees spread across the borderlands asking
to remain where they were. The collective message in those letters to the Mexican state, stated
the Comité, was the reasons why the refugees opposed their removal from the borderlands. To
accept relocation, stated the Comité’s letter, would mean for the refugees the “sacrifice of their
most important values, the lives of the weakest among them, their existence as a people, and the
conservation [mantenimiento] of their ethnicity, culture and nationality.”600
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Conclusion

Despite this resistance, between 1984 and 1985 approximately 16,000 Guatemalan
refugees, out of an estimated 40,000, were relocated to Campeche and Quintana Roo. As feared
by the Comité, COMAR, working with IMSS, was inadequately prepared for relocating so many
people and the refugees faced a lack of food and medical supplies. Many were forced to walk
miles without rest through the jungle, echoing their harsh entrance into Mexico. In stations
along the way, thousands of Guatemalans were forced into small hastily built bodegas, with little
room and lacking sanitary conditions. Pregnant women, children, and the elderly suffered the
most. Approximately 7 percent of the refugees died during the trip.601
During the same period in Guatemala the fury of the counterinsurgency lessened and the
pace of arrival of new refugees slowed. An uneasy and often bloody stalemate emerged, as the
military controlled government was unable to completely eradicate the EGP and other guerrilla
groups. Human rights violations against the indigenous population continued as the
communities the refugees left behind were forced into “development poles.” In these jailed
communities thousands lived under gunpoint and the watchful eye of a military responsible for
genocide.602
After the relocation of the refugees and the pause in the mass exodus to the borderlands
in 1984, the Mexican government and the refugees still in the borderlands developed a workable,
though tense, relationship. Dependent on food and medical supplies from COMAR, the Comité,
and other NGOs, the refugees lived in a state of poverty and relative isolation. Their contact
with outside groups was limited, as their official ability to travel was curtailed by a constant
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presence of federal immigration officials as well as COMAR, from whom refugees needed to
solicit permission to travel. However, the Mexican government no longer threated relocation. 603
The federal Mexican government continued to worry about insurrection in the
borderlands, and attempted to curtail that possibility through funding infrastructure development
in the long neglected region. The 1982 Plan Chiapas pumped millions of dollars into programs
designed to improve living standards by improving communications through road building.
Crucially, in the area of national security, construction started on a border highway. In the same
area traversed by Trueba decades earlier, it allowed the Mexican military to patrol the border
from the eastern edge of the Lacandon jungle to the plains south of Comitán.604
Ultimately the government’s goals failed, as the funding allocated in Plan Chiapas was
often misused or taken at the local level by powerful caciques.605 Further attempts at solving the
tension in the borderlands, such as through a program of land-reform in the 1980’s, also failed to
fulfill the demands of the indigenous groups that arose in the 1970’s. Corrupt officials parceled
out land to allies, or failed to meet the demands in terms of size and quality of land given to
indigenous campesino groups. At times, in the Lacandon, this struggle for land became violent
as large landowners violently evicted peasants that had “invaded” their property. The church
continued to be blamed by the state for increasing violence between indigenous protesters and
local and federal officials. The pressure was so great on Samuel Ruiz that rumors pointed to his
removal by Rome in 1993, a move that was only stopped by the outbreak of the Zapatista
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rebellion in 1994. Then, as before, the diocese played a necessary role as an interlocutor
between the state and the leadership of the indigenous rebellion.606
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Conclusion

After the removal of the Guatemalan refugees to Campeche and Quintana Roo, the Comité

continued assisting the thirty thousand refugees left in the Chiapan borderlands, helping the
communities organize in areas of education, health, and economics. By the end of the 1980’s the
Comité also began to help with a crucial aspect of the refugee’s story, to return home. In 1988
the refugees formed the Permanent Commission to negotiate that return. The Commission
became an active participant in the long peace process between the Guatemalan government and
UNRG. With the support of the Comité, along with other international aid associations, the
Commission became a sophisticated and forceful negotiator, ensuring that the refugees were not
forgotten in the complicated peace process that only concluded in 1996.607
In their magazine Reencuentro, the Commission reminded their communities, and the
international community, of the history of their exodus and their hopes for return. For example,
in the article, “Why We Left,” individuals such as Marcos, from a small village in
Huehuetenango, remembered how the military rounded up dozens of men, women, and children
and locked them in a house, setting it afire for suspected collaboration with the guerrillas.608
There were also articles about the first groups of returnees who, in 1993, with the assistance of
the UNCHR and the Comité, negotiated land and assistance from the Guatemalan government.
The Commission ensured a dialogue among the disparate populations in Mexico and Guatemala,
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and that the refugees were informed of problems of the returnees regarding too little land and the
presence of the Guatemalan military, issues that could be brought to the negotiating table.609
By 1996 nearly 80 percent of the refugees had returned home. Many of the returnees
reflected that their time in the borderlands, especially the organizing experience, assisted in their
negotiations to establish acceptable conditions for their return. In particular, the negotiations
called for special assistance for women, as well as equal access to repatriation resources for both
heads of the household. Finally, many refugees commented on the experience in Comité projects
in Chiapas, such as education and cooperatives, as serving as models for initiatives in
Guatemala.610
The Mexican government played a leading role in negotiating the peace process that
formally ended the civil war in Guatemala. This long and complicated process was marked by
false starts, outside interventions, and lack of trust on both the Guatemalan government’s part as
well as that of the UNRG. In 1983 Mexico, along with Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela,
formed the Contadora Group, with the ambitious aim of solving the Central American conflicts.
Mexico, like other Latin American governments, was motivated by a search for peace and a
desire to avoid outside intervention from the United States. Initial progress, such as getting the
five countries of the Isthmus to agree on the general parameters of negotiations, was waylaid by
the maneuvering of the United States, which was fearful of formal recognition of the
revolutionary Nicaraguan government.611
The final peace proposal was not signed until 1996, after the international political
context had dramatically changed. The Cold War over, the Guatemalan government no longer
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had the boogeyman of communism to justify its continued resistance to political openings.
Similarly, the fall of the Soviet Union and the ouster of the revolutionary Nicaraguan regime by
free elections weakened the UNRG position, which seemed to be a relic in the new post-Cold
War world. Mexico continued its active involvement in the process, and Mexico City, home to
many exiles, served as the site of negotiations.612
After the peace agreement was signed, those refugees that had stayed in the borderlands
sought to normalize their legal relationship to the Mexican state. Beginning in 1997, the Comité
began to receive letters from communities asking for their intervention with the Mexican
authorities to become Mexican citizens.613 The reasons for staying were much like the reasons
for leaving: family and the hope for a stable future. As one letter from the community of
Amparo Agua stated, “our children, born here in Mexico, have begun their lives as any other
Mexican….our young people have married Mexicans and we do not want to break up families,
leaving orphans to suffer in Mexico.”614
Thirty years after his leadership of COMAR, Luiz Ortiz Monasterio reflected on the
impact the refugees had on the awareness of Mexicans regarding their southern border:

“The refugees taught us that in Mexico there is a southern border. When we used to talk about
the border, we only talked about the northern border, nobody talked about the southern border.
They showed us the size of our country, where we extended to: this is a reason to thank the
refugees.615
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Not all Mexicans, of course, throughout the period this dissertation examines, forgot
there were two borders, and especially not the refugees who asked to stay in Mexico. At times,
though, it seemed to some, especially borderlanders faced with a lack of federal government
supported infrastructure, that officials in Mexico City had forgotten, because the federal
government’s priorities-- territorial integrity, immigration, energy, and national security—were
distinct from those of many locals. There was a gap in those investments that impacted the
everyday life of borderlanders. This lead, for example, residents of 1960’s Comitán to
occasionally do without lights, even as the rivers of the region supplied millions of kilowatts of
energy to the rest of Mexico The actions and programs of the numerous bureaus concerned with
the region, meanwhile, reflected a federal government approach to the borderlands as fugitive
landscape, outside of, and at times threatening, Mexico’s changing political, economic, and
cultural milieu.
From independence in 1821 the borderlands did not seem to fit into the story Mexico told
itself about its history, but rather seemed more connected to Guatemala or adrift in a nebulous
neutrality. The region needed patriotic writers like Manuel Larráinzar and Matías Romero to try
and demonstrate to Mexicans with no connection to the region that it was part of their country,
that Chiapanecos had chosen to become Mexicans, and that the potential loss of the region would
be yet another blow to Mexican territorial integrity. But even as they developed these arguments
the wider Mexican public also read another story, one of a region plagued by invasions and
depredations, of a chaotic fugitive landscape: this was an image that would endure long after
Guatemala gave up its claims to Chiapas in 1882.
The image of a borderlands outside of the purview of the federal government was in
some respects reflective of reality, leading, for instance, the head of the 1936 border study
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commission to note the region was “almost forgotten.” The post-revolutionary programs that
sent a variety of federal officials to the borderlands, from engineers to immigration agents,
reflected an effort to establish a state presence as well as to – reflecting the observation from
Ortiz Monasterio above --- to find out literally how far the nation extended. This process of both
discovery and management produced two conclusions that had consequences for the borderlands
in the latter half of the twentieth century: the region had a wealth of resources and it served as an
entrance point to potentially subversive transnational migrants.
In terms of managing its resources on the southern border, Mexico looked north, to its
history of transnational border management with the United States. For nearly three decades,
from the 1930’s to the establishment of CILA in 1962, officials in the president’s office, the
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, and the embassy in Guatemala, repeated to themselves, and to
successive Guatemalan governments, a story of cooperation with the colossus to the north. This
story ignored a history fraught with instances of the US pointedly refusing to commit to a shared
management of the border. For these diplomats and engineers, however, in search of sources of
electricity to provide for a growing Mexican economy and population that complicated history
lost importance. For them, the borderlands remained fugitive as long as they were untapped,
unmanaged by the powerful new bureaus such as the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources, whose
technocratics possessed the budget and technology to bring the fruits of the the struggle for
Chiapas, and the Mexican Revolution, to the nation.
These engineers worked parallel to those federal officials concerned about the danger to
national security posed by the movement of Guatemalans into the borderlands. At first this
worry focused on the demographics of the region. This fugitive landscape contained “foreigners”
that could claim the rights of Mexicans, and even potentially dislodge Chiapas from the nation.
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As it became clear that it was impossible to stop this transboundary movement, that Guatemalans
would not reclaim Chiapas, and that this immigration offered a needed source of labor, the
federal government retreated from the large scale efforts that produced programs like the
Demographic Commissions of 1935 and 1941.
The federal government’s management of the borderlands became more concerned with
the changing nature of exile in the region, especially after the fall of Árbenz in 1954. The
removal of the traditional-type exiles that fled Ubico’s Guatemala in 1944 demonstrated that the
new national security bureaus could effectively control a specific aspect of the borderlands.
However, that institutional effectiveness failed to contain the arrival and operations of a new
type of exile, the guerrilla. The borderlands became the entrance point to insurgency. The
guerrillas’ goals and ideology transcended borders -- unlike those of earlier generals and
politicians who were only interested in obtaining the president’s chair in Guatemala City. And
this meant that they threatened the stability of a Mexican state already challenged by domestic
actors, such as an activist church and leftist dissidents, who were in part indignant about the
absence of the state in the form of schools, roads, and hospitals.
The arrival of thousands of refugees reminded federal officials that their borderlands
were fugitive. Despite a boundary treaty and efforts such as the Demographic Commission and
demarcation of the boundary, not much had changed in terms of managing the border. If a
Mexico City newspaper reader from the 1850’s glanced at stories regarding the borderlands in
the later twentieth century, he or she would find them very familiar: occasional violence, worries
over “invasion” by Guatemalans, commerce outside the state’s control and, finally, Guatemalan
political strife that spilled over into the region. The most substantial changes would be that they
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might be reading by light supplied, in part, by a borderland dam, and when listing the weather of
major cities, Tapachula would definitely be on the map of Mexico.
However, it is important to situate the arrival of the refugees in this decades-long
examination of the creation of the Chiapan borderlands by recognizing their arrival as
introducing an important new period in the region’s history. Reading Ortíz Monasterio’s
statement above, in conjunction with the letter of the refugees asking to stay in Mexico reveals a
border that acquired a significance that it never so clearly had for so many people. The refugees
and the violence of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency served the same role as capital described
by Katz on Mexico’s northern border. If before the border was ignored or its placement on the
ground was unknown, the arrival of the refugees gave a new significance to the border, one side
meant death, the other life.
To harden the border, Mexico City did what governments do, they sent bureaucrats, and
national security personnel, who in turn reported back to the center. Those interactions, explored
from 1821 on, are in large part what this dissertation adds to the historiography: an examination
of what the border meant to the center, and how representatives of the state shaped the impact of
the federal government through the narratives they crafted regarding the borderlands. The first
story that needed to be told was how this peripheral region was part of the national history of
Mexico. The emotion that fueled the patriotic historical interpretation of Chiapas’s inclusion had
as much to do with Mexico’s sense of loss in its northern borderlands and political rivalry with
Guatemala; Mexicans might not know where Chiapas was but they were not going to lose it.
From that period on Mexicans officials (and to an extent the Mexican public) from the
center began a series of rediscoveries of the region that emphasized the fugitive nature of the
landscape: Matias Romero wrote about the destruction of Cafetal Juarez, Mexicans read about

279

the attack on La Fama, Armando Trueba became alarmed over Guatemalan cultivation in
Mexico, and reports by DFS officials warned about Guatemalan guerrillas. For many engineers
and diplomats, the periodic rediscovery of the borderlands meant a reinterpretation of the history
of how Mexico had managed its northern borderlands, and what that story meant for the future of
the Chiapan borderlands. It was a story of the relationship between the center and the
borderlands, of how the peripheries of the nation are understood and eventually incorporated.
Ultimately these interactions with the borderlands shaped a pattern of similar, but
impactful policies focused on the issues of national security, mapping, and energy production.
Broader programs such as the short-lived Demographic Commission, which occurred after the
rediscovery of the borderlands in 1935, demonstrated to officials that it was impossible to fully
manage the region. Instead, temporary, concentrated efforts by the modern Mexican state, such
as control over the post-Ubico exiles, remained possible for the national security apparatus;
control over the rivers seemed possible, and fruitful, on the part of the CILA.
Any temporary control the Mexican government managed over the borderlands was
fleeting due to its very geography and the presence of the political border. From the state’s
viewpoint labor became unregulated and trade became contraband when it passed without its
say-so over the line on the map. Further impeding control was the landscape of the vast
Lacandon, which the state did not even try to manage, leaving it to loggers, and later, those
dispossessed of their land.
Finally the region’s position on the post-independence map made it a natural place of
refuge for exiles, which as the nature of that experience changed after 1954, also meant the
borderlands became a threat in the eyes of the state. Specifying the borderlands as a site of
refuge introduces an important analytical point of view in the examination of regional and
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international history. Political conflict in Guatemala, and more broadly in Central America in
general, arrived in the borderlands through individuals and groups fleeing violence at home.
Exiles, like commerce, culture, and religion, represented powerful transboundary connections.
These were often, though, connections made outside the view or against the wishes of the state.
Examining the movement of exiles through the eyes of the state means also broadening
the definition of exile to include people more often identified as refugees. The indigenous
Guatemalans that fled into the borderlands were political actors; they had become targets of a
counterinsurgency because their very ethnicity was deemed subversive. This charge of
subversiveness followed them to Mexico. There they became a cause of concern for the
Mexican national security apparatus because of their politics, and the possible domestic
disruption their presence might cause in the borderlands, especially due to their connection with
the San Cristóbal de las Casas diocese.
There are many questions that still need to be explored regarding the region’s history. It
is important to examine the history of how borderlanders conceptualized the border. In contrast
to the state’s conception of the region as fugitive, how did they see their home? How did they
understand the border? What narratives did they tell? How did they view their relationship with
Guatemala or with the rest of Mexico? And finally, how did they fit themselves into the narrative
of Mexican history? In addition, better understanding of the Guatemalan point of view would
round out a history that has been dominated by conflict. What did the “loss” of Chiapas mean to
Guatemalans, to their sense of nationhood? What are the histories of the Guatemalans that
crossed into Mexico as cheap labor? How did they view the border, Mexico, and the Mexicans
that employed them?
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The Chiapan borderlands offer rich possibilities for historical research, and in a practical
sense demand to be better understood as the region continues to be an entrance point for
thousands of Central American immigrants traveling to Mexico and, often, to the United States.
In many instances, the reasons these individuals are passing through the region are similar to
those motivating earlier refugees, connected to political and economic violence in their home
countries. In addition, they face similar circumstances, including a particular manifestation of
the lack of a Mexican government presence that I have traced throughout this dissertation, as
non-governmental organizations, including the Catholic Church, are the backbone of assistance.
However, the majority of these individuals are not staying in the borderlands, but traveling north
to Mexico’s other border, connecting the country’s two borders in a long and hazardous journey.
This is yet another story of transboundary movement from the Chiapan borderlands.616
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